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The current report refers to an internship experience in Fondazione Giangiacomo 
Feltrinelli, Milan, taken place between September 2018 and January 2019. The 
question “what is the role of cultural institutions given Italy’s emerging populism?” 
framed the research period. This paper’s aim is to address the numerous approaches 
employed by cultural institutions in the current political Italian landscape, shaped by 
populism.  
 
Populism is described as the people wills’ impersonation (Müller, 2016; Mudde & 
Kaltwasser, 2017; Urbinati et al., 2018; Moffit, 2016). Specifically, the “populist 
moment” is characterized by an ideology with an antagonistic nature: the “corrupt 
elite” against the “pure people” (Mouffe, 2018; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). The 
once dominant neoliberal model has been fervently challenged since 2008’s financial 
crisis; global populist movements indistinctly question capitalism’s contradictions. 
Neoliberalism’s failure is located within the “crises of knowledge”, where all 
traditional knowledge producers are experiecing a loss of authority (Grossber, 2017). 
Italy’s Lega-Five Star populist coalition exemplifies this frame, given the anti-science 
and anti-immigration sentiments it propagates. Intellectuals’ are in privileged 
positions of opportunity, which yield responsibility (Chomsky, 1967). Cultural 
institutions’ promise is to provide an epistemological “culture of enquiry” to all 
citizens (Carr, 2003). The methodology adopted in this report, besides the hands-on 
experience of the internship, is primarily lecture and library-based, hence includes 
secondary sources. After the “state-of-the-art” overview, Fondazione Feltrinelli’s 
scope is considered together with its predominant dialogue capabilities, analysis and 
countering of populism, through educational and historical approaches. Finally, this 
report includes a comparative analysis between Feltrinelli and Fondazione Basso, 
Istituto Sturzo and Istituto Dignitatis Humanae’s functioning. With the exception of 
the latter, whose peculiarity is Bannon’s endorsement, this research concludes that 
Italy’s cultural institutions typically act counter-hegemonically to populism and strive 
for change through reflection. 
 
Key Words: Populism; Crises of Knowledge; Responsibility; Educational Role and 
Fondazione Feltrinelli. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
A personal concern for Italy’s political climate and a fruitful work experience 
motivated this internship report, which hopes to function as a testament to liberal 
intellectuals while investigating: what is the role of cultural institutions given Italy’s 
emerging populism? We have currently entered an “age of anger” (Mishra, 2017). 
Italians now celebrate Vaffa Day (F**k you Day), launched by the founder of the 
populist Five Star Movement Beppe Grillo (M5S). Populism’s interpretation is 
multifaceted, as is its global appearance. It is linked to politicians’ voicing of the 
people – a “volontè generalè” claim - and to the dichotomous ideology of the “corrupt 
elite” against the “pure people” (Müller, 2016; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Urbinati 
et al., 2018; Moffit, 2016; Mouffe 2018). Populism is anti-pluralistic as its leaders’ 
Messianic presupposed representation of the people implies a homogenuous society, 
and their competitors’ exclusion from the “pure” people. The illusory nature of a 
single, authentic population facilitates populists’ journey towards the people’s moral 
impersonification. The resentment that fuelled this global revolt was caused, and in 
turn enhanced, by the challenging of the hegemonic neoliberal formation (Mouffe, 
2018). Capitalism was considered unrivalled after the Soviet Union’s fall, yet a 
wealthy financial minority – whose hyperglobalization tremendously exacerbated 
inequalities – was seen as responsible for the 2008 crisis, which affected the majority 
of Western society. Frustration became synonymous to distrust. Post-modernity is 
witnessing a “crises of knowledge”, as all traditional knowledge logics are under 
attack: universities, newspapers and the “establishment” (Grossberg, 2017). “Post-
truth’s” winning of the “word of the year” title was far from arbitrary in 2016.  
 
After years of non-elected governments, Italy in 2018 witnessed its first populist 
government, the Northern League-M5S coalition. Respectively, their  “warhorses” are 
the protection of Italy from immigrants’ invasion and the attribution of dignity 
through citizens’ income. Populists awaken emotionality, at the expense of rationality, 
through their “spectacle”: dominant values’ rejection (Sutherland, 2012). The Five 
Star’s anti-vaccine stance demonstrates the Enlightenment notions’ erosion, however 
Italy’s populists are no longer an oppositional movement; nowadays they form the 
Government (Urbinati et al., 2018). Chantal Mouffe’s work proves invaluable to this 
research, and the latter owes its relevance to Culture Studies to the study of Italian 
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cultural institutions’ agonistic approaches and counter-hegemonic practices aimed at 
the populist common-sense, as well as the analysis of populism appearance’s link to 
the crises of knowledge and institutions’ battling of such (2013; Grossberg, 2017).  
Mouffe draws from Gramsci’s egemonia, such as the non-violent dynamics through 
which the ruling class convinces the lower ones that its prestige-derived domination is 
necessary (1957). Just as the ruling class’ hegemony depends on its ability to produce 
intellectuals, Gramsci argues organic thinkers are vital to the opposition of the 
“common-sense”. Intellectuals can choose whether to agree with the dominant 
thought, however it is vital that they acknowledge the responsibility that comes with 
their privileged position in society (Chomsky, 2011). Widespread agreement 
surrounds intellectuals’ fact-sharing role: such must speak truth to power (Foucault, 
1977; Bourdieu, 1989; Chomsky, 1967; Said, 1993). Institutions’ intellectual 
opposition to populist notions imply the privileged location’s use; the Italian outlining 
of such is another contribution this paper offers to Culture Studies. Carr similarly 
posits that cultural institutions’ promise is to allow ordinary people to craft the truth, 
through the recounting of public voices and common memory (2003). Especially 
within uncertainty, these educational spaces bear the duty to foster thinking, a 
“culture of enquiry” through multiple contexts’ recording. Agonistic views are 
certainly productive, as debate is a potent knowledge-producing activity (Grossberg, 
2017). In fact, all social orders are contingent and can thus be opposed counter-
hegemonically (Mouffe, 2013). Despite the necessary “us-them” antagonistic 
positions in politics, conflict and dialogue must have an agonistic nature, where 
adversaries battle for their ideals’ gaining of hegemony, without delegitimizing 
others’ views. Agonism can also occur in art through the production of alternative 
narratives: conviviality can solely be elicited through conflict (Power, 2018; Santos & 
Cachola, 2018).  
 
Once the conceptual framework, such as populism, the crises of knowledge and 
cultural institutions’ role have been noted in chapter 2, one will outline Fondazione 
Feltrinelli in chapter 3 and later compare its duties to Italy’s cultural institution 
landscape in the following chapter. The sources featured are mainly secondary, as this 
report is lecture and library-based. Feltrinelli became the centre of my research, thus 
my case study, given my interning experience there; such will be mentioned in 
chapter 3. Fondazione is a leading European educational, social and political cultural 
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institution. This hub owes its left origin to the founder’s joining of the Italian 
Communist Party (PCI) and his wish to create a library documenting the working 
class movements’ history, which later became Fondazione. Lombardy’s Archival 
Superintendence has confirmed the historical relevance of the Foundation’s archive, 
which is at the heart of its scope (Fondazione Feltrinelli, 2019). The institution’s 
“supply chain” typically follows the patrimony-research-education-divulgation and 
publication macro sequence, and includes performative arts. The two past events’ 
seasons - Stagione Ribelle (2017-2018) and Stagione Capitale (2018-2019) - are 
analysed together with the hub’s self-proclaimed role and discussion of its duty. 
Through its research, free promulgation and historical role it aims to initiate agonistic 
dialogue, interdisciplinarity, truth and a plural society. Fondazione acts counter-
hegemonically to populist notions, and an increase in its political responsibility is 
noticed with the establishment of Italy’s populist coalition. Critical thinking is 
promoted through the description of populism, its causes and links to the crises of 
knowledge, however the Foundation prioritizes its holistic service to citizens. 
Populism is a symptom of democracy’s profound crisis (Urbinati et al. 2018), and the 
institution’s ultimate objective is to strengthen democracy through capitalism’s 
rethinking. Given chapter 4’s comparative purpose, Fondazione Feltrinelli’s 
epistemological role and development of a convivial common-sense are paralleled to 
Fondazione Basso’s dialogue and meeting of contemporary and historical teachings; 
yet the latter deems human rights’ valuing as paramount. Just as Basso’s 
responsibility derives from its founder’s participation in the Universal Declaration of 
the Rights of Peoples’ writing, Istituto Sturzo’s role entails the comparison of Luigi 
Sturzo’s ideology, popularism, to populism. The Institute acts as an educational 
institution through counter-hegemonic harmonizing practices and citizens’ call to 
action, however limits its inquiry to compare as a means to contrast; popularism and 
populism are solely explored. Finally, the Istituto Dignitatis Humanae is unique to 
Italy’s cultural landscape as it advocates for human dignity through Bannon and 
Cardinal Burke’s pro-life, anti-Muslim and anti-corrupt elite “voicing of the people”. 
Moffit believes populists initiate a state of crisis (2016), and one argues such political 
school for anti-pluralist warriors employs such to foster a crusade rhetoric. 
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PART 1: Conceptual Framework 








“When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, there were 11 countries around the world with 




























2.1 – Populism: A Global Phenomenon 
 
Nowadays a powerful term has been widely employed to describe political 
movements and politicians such as Farange, Varoufakis, Sanders, Grillo and Trump: 
“populists”. The Podemos movement in Spain, Marine Le Pen and Orbán as well have 
been defied so. The term “populist” has gained ubiquity in the 21st century given it is 
a global phenomenon (Urbinati et al., 2018). As such, one shall begin its analysis 
through a brief review of contemporary history. All of the concepts explored in the 
following conceptual framework are believed to enrich the understanding of 
populism’s pervasive status and to own a palpable link to both Culture Studies and 
Fondazione Feltrinelli’s convivial work and political duty. Mouffe finds leftist parties 
guilty of non-receptiveness and “class essentialism” (2018). Left politics, whether 
social-democratic or Marxists, were unable to adapt to a series of resistance 
movements emerged in the wake of 1968, nor were they receptive to a second wave 
of anti-racism, feminism and gay movements. This inability is likely to have 
originated from the dominant left essentialist thinking, the notion that political 
identities and interests are the expression of social agents’ positions in relation to the 
means of production. This prevented the left from acknowledging that the current 
demands are no longer class-dependent. Novel forms of subordination have arisen 
outside of the productive process, thus originating priorities that no longer correspond 
to individuals’ social structure position (2018). The current “hegemonic neoliberal 
formation” that Mouffe speaks of is characterized by “hyperglobalization”: the 
dramatic increase in the already existing globalization - economic, cultural and 
political world exchange – which took place from the 1980s (Rodrik, 2011). This 
formation is an adaptation by modern capitalism of classical liberal ideas. 
Neoliberalism was born from Adam Smith’s God given right to have a free economy, 
make a profit and accumulate wealth (1776; Hall, 2011). The defenders of such order 
claim that it drives up the world’s GDP and helps reduced poverty, however rapid 
acceleration continued steadily up until the crash of 2008, when its contradictions 
appeared.  
 
Blair once stated: “the choice is not between a left-wing economic policy and a right-
wing one but between a good economic policy and a bad one” (as cited in Mouffe, 
2018: 4). The former British Prime Minister’s words resonate with Thatcher’s well-
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known “there is no alternative” (TINA) to neoliberal globalization ethos. Blair’s New 
Labour Party discarded its leftist identity in favour of a centre-left one, and promoted 
what Hall defines as the typical social-democratic version of neoliberalism (2011). 
The fall of the USSR was another reason for TINA’s dogma legitimation, as by 1991 
there no longer was any opposition to a world free market (Cox, 2017). Several low-
wage, emerging economies as India and China joined this formation. Ordinary 
citizens were however voiceless in regards to this global shift, as “neoliberal 
globalization was seen as a fate we had to accept, and political questions were 
reduced to mere technical issues dealt with by experts” (Mouffe, 2018:4). “It is not 
merely a nationalist myth” (Cox, 2017:16) that millions of jobs have been lost in the 
West as a consequence of neoliberalism’s spreading. Further, a great expansion of the 
financial sector took place at the expense of the productive economy, to which the 
exponential increase in economic inequality witnessed recently can be attributed 
(Mouffe, 2018). Wealth became ever more concentrated in the hands of a minority. 
The degree to which the global population felt powerless as the 2008 economic crisis 
unfolded was unprecedented. The financial crisis hit Western economies the hardest, 
particularly the EU, hence undermined the faith in the establishment’s competence. 
The grand neoliberal formation had shown its limits. “Who, after 2008, would ever 
believe the experts again?” (Cox, 2017:16) 
 
Gramsci’s interregnum1 resulted from the Lehman Brothers’ collapse: a period of 
crisis characterized by the challenging of the current hegemonic formation (1957; 
Mouffe, 2018). A rare occasion showed as wealthy bankers, an elite minority whose 
influence was furthered by the financial sector’s hyperglobalized growth, could be 
seen as responsible for a crisis that affected the majority of Western society (BBC, 
2018). The first signs of disaffection with democratic institutions manifested 
themselves in the rising levels of abstention since the 2000s (Mouffe, 2018), and later 
polls detected that trust in elected representatives in Western countries has rarely been 
lower (The Guardian, 2018). The already disillusioned European crowd was also 
affected by the crisis’ consequent austerity policies, specifically southern nations. 
Populism’s touted direct representation, within this frame of frustration, presented 
 
1 An extraordinary instance where the traditional social order or legal frame is contested by 
novel formations (Mouffe, 2018). 
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itself as an effective means to restore control to the people. Ideally, the former 
incorporates society within the State: the ruler uses representation as a hegemonic 
strategy that shortens the distance between the voted and voters (Urbinati et al., 
2018). While different understandings of populism exist, there is a shared definition: 
such impersonates the people’s will (Müller, 2016; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; 
Urbinati et al., 2018; Moffit, 2016). Populist politicians certainly echo the people’s 
voice, yet this characteristic is not sufficient to differentiate such from any other 
individual who hopes to gain votes in a democratic society. One believes this 
definition to be effective as well as preliminary. It is not enough to distinguish 
populist politicians from any other individual who wishes to be democratically elected 
through their popular appeal. 
 
Naim and Mouffe agree that populism is not an ideology; the former defines such as a 
demagogic strategy to obtain and retain power, and the latter states this political way 
takes different ideological forms according to time and place (2017; 2018). In fact this 
glocal 2  movement is equated to different phenomena around the world, as it 
frequently alludes to economic mismanagement and clientelism in Latin America and 
to xenophobia in Europe (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Today we are certainly 
experiencing a “populist moment” mostly marked by right and far right political 
actors (Mouffe, 2018). Mudde and Kaltwasser recognize populism’s flexibility as 
well; such rarely exists in a “pure” form. Unlike “full” ideologies as Fascism, 
populism is  “thin-centered”, or has a restricted morphology, thus appears necessarily 
attached to other ideologies. In the majority of cases it is linked to multiple 
ideological elements, crucial for the promotion of appealing political projects. This is 
one of the reasons for populism’s multiple shapes. Elitism, politics as predominantly 
or exclusively a minority’s affair, is an opposite of populism. Populism is “a thin-
centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogenous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’ and 
which argues politics should be an expression of the volonté générale of the people 
(Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017:6). As exemplified by Chàves3’ motto, the populist 
leader typically embodies a notion of collective representation: “I am not an 
 
2 With both global and local characteristics. 
3 Venezuela’s 45th President (2002- 2013). 
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individual - I am the people” (BBC, 2018). One suggests populists’ brilliance derives 
from the exploitation of a key anthropological notion. Levy-Strauss perceives 
humans’ understanding of the world as deriving from the innate formulation of 
dichotomies: night and day, female and male, nature and culture (1962). Populist 
representatives have managed to capitalize on our natural, binary simplification of 
reality to understand it, and to construct a persuasive “people vs. elite” dichotomy.  
 
“We are the people. Who are you?” (Müller, 2016:6) was Erdogan’s4 response to 
domestic opponents. Miller notes populist movements are mere examples of 
collective freedom, constitutive of democracies (The Guardian, 2018). One strongly 
counters this view as to deem populism a typical revolt is to ignore the unrivalled 
threat it poses to the democratic project. Whilst the term populism is often used as a 
synonym for anti-establishment or associated to frustration, such feature is not 
sufficient to be considered a populist either; rather these political actors are 
consistently anti-pluralistic (Müller, 2016; Urbinati et al., 2018). Pluralism values 
diversity, holds that power should be distributed throughout people and that several 
social groups with overlapping interests are found in society (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 
2017). Populism’s opposition to plurality emerges when its leaders claim that solely 
they can represent the people, and portray their competitors as part of the immoral 
elite. Even within the general public, those who do not support populists are not part 
of the “pure” people. Müller understands this thin-layered ideology as identity politics 
that are greatly powerful: the people is an “empty signifier”, a construction that 
allows for much flexibility (2016; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Identity is always relative 
and solely functions in conjunction with “the other”, through which it constructs and 
defines itself (Hegel, 2005). Rather than an empirical representation of citizens, 
populism employs a distinctly moral one. However “democracy requires pluralism 
and the recognition that we need to find fair terms of living together as free, equal, but 
also irreducibly diverse citizens” (Müller, 2016:3). The idea of a single, homogenous, 
authentic people is a fantasy (Habermas, 1962). The people’s illusory nature 
facilitates the populists’ journey towards a moral impersonification of the population. 
 
 
4 Turkey’s 25th Prime Minister (2003 - 2014), and 12th President (2014- present). 
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Being popular and being populist are not the same (BBC, 2018). How does a populist 
movement effectively formulate a “people’s voice” narrative? Populist leaders often 
call for greater transparency through the implementation of more referendums, 
elections and recall votes (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). It is common for populists to 
prefer direct democracy to “complex” systems. The Five Star Movement was the first 
to develop a political programme through citizens’ online votes: “solutions are chosen 
directly by citizens. M5S responds to the needs of ordinary people and not the big 
corporations which finance political campaigns” (Programma M5S, 2019). Not only 
do the people become sovereigns, mass clientelism is often exhibited in populism: 
citizens who become supporters often turn into clients of such movements given they 
receive bureaucratic or material benefits (Müller, 2016). Argentina’s longstanding 
Peronist party for instance distributed medicines, sugar and milk while rallying 
between 1990-2000, in the country’s poor areas to harvest votes (Auyero, 2001). 
 
Could it be that we call all popular politicians that we dislike “populists”? Certainly 
most political anxieties become associated to such (Müller, 2016). Moffit notes the 
term is especially misused in the European context, while Mouffe accuses the media 
of using such as a derogatory label for all of those who oppose the status quo (2016; 
2018). Gandhi’s much celebrated independence movement has been defined as 
populist as well: the term is not employed in a defamatory manner here, rather it 
signals his mobilization of the lower castes (Subramanian, 2013). Hence this political 
designation cannot be solely perceived as pejorative. One until now has implicitly 
attempted to address the term’s confusion: populism is a versatile ideology that 
reoccurs distinctly in the world and depends on a prevalent construction, a single 
people. Part of the confusion could also originate from the fact that movements and 
people rarely claim the populist title themselves (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). 
Despite the intellectual frustration with the term, the people’s resentment takes 
priority: academics agree that its supporters cannot be ignored (Müller, 2016; Mudde 
& Kaltwasser, 2017; Mouffe, 2018). Populism is too central to contemporary Western 
politics to be discarded, and excluding populists from debate is not an option, as it 
would resonate with its anti-pluralistic will to exclude (Müller, 2016). For the left – 
whose links to Fondazione Feltrinelli will be explored later - to deem right wing 
parties as extremists, simply link their attractiveness to lack of education and deny 
such the right to participate in democratic debate, given the imposition of a “moral” 
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barrier, entails a politically unjust behaviour (Mouffe, 2018). Mouffe affirms it is 
tempting for the left to disqualify rightist populism without admitting its own 
responsibility for its emergence. Rather than excluding right-wing populism as 
fostered by atavistic passions a priori, the democratic origin of their demands must be 
acknowledged. Extremism should not be justified, as should its supporters not be 
attributed responsibility for the articulation of their demands (2018). University 
graduates in 2016 were twice as likely to vote for Hillary Clinton than for Trump, as 
were UK graduates significantly more prone to vote “remain” in Brexit (Waller et al., 
2017). While a correlation between lack of education and populist swings is 
undeniable, it is imperative that both politicians and citizens do not fall in the 
prevalent trap of merely viewing populism’s requests as irrational.  
 
Populism can be summarized as a politician’s symbolic enrichment, the gaining of the 
citizens’ sole representative status. Populists’ echoing of the people’s will is only 
partly exhaustive as a definition: such must also ignore society’s multifacetedness. 
The notion of a homogenous people is immensely troublesome as it thrives on innate 
dichotomous thinking, is versatile as well as a fantasy that denies democracy’s 
constitutive plurality. The neoliberal formation born in the post-war era, which 
“seemed destined to normative uncontested solitude after the defeat of the Soviet 
model” (Urbinati, 2018:10) is suffering from a rapid decline in legitimacy. The 
Director of the European Consortium of Political Research notes that populist parties 
emerged in Europe in the 2000s, however only started gaining wide support in 2008 
(BBC, 2018). Aristotle argued the shrinking of the middle class and pluralism’s crisis 
typically leads to what Gramsci later formulated as the interregnum: “the 2008 crisis 
created a full-blown radical protest against European mainstream politics, allowing 
for new forms of populism to arise. Such forms reinterpret the left-right dichotomy, 
unifying the people’s category against the ruling elite and thus de facto allowing for 
the disappearance of class articulations” (Chiantera-Stutte, 2018:180). We are 
currently living in the “age of anger” (Mishra, 2017):  the neoliberal model’s 
contradictions are being question indiscriminately by both political camps. This 
global phenomenon can be rationalized through the acknowledgement of a cross-
cultural discontent with the establishment. When bearing in mind the powerlessness 
sentiment, austerity, inequality and disillusion that hyperglobalization and the 
financial crash brought about, it is easier to grasp how the populist “people-against-
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the-enemy-elite” rhetoric benefitted from novel attention. It is the assumption that 
populism is both characterized by a democratic origin and dangerous credos that 
implies the role of cultural institutions – as traditional knowledge sources - to counter 
it.    
 
2.2 - Crises of Knowledge 
 
The failure of the neoliberal model is located within the “crises of knowledge” frame. 
The plurality of the term derives from the fact that all traditional production of 
knowledge logics are under attack. This is not a singular phenomenon – crisis - as 
journalism, education and research all appear to have lost their authority (Grossberg, 
2017; Dahlgren, 2018). Traditional journalism has lost its status as arbiter of the truth 
and has decreasing audiences. Rather than a “static cerebral storehouse” (2018:21), 
Dahlgren introduces knowledge as the integration of novel information to people’s 
existing frames of references, which includes lived experience. Nowadays the social 
perception of knowledge is that of a troubled entity. Cynicism has become our daily 
bread whilst the Enlightenment’s principles have become secondary. Sapere aude, to 
have the courage to use one’s own understanding, was Kant’s motto: an enlightened 
thought escapes immaturity through the cultivation of the mind (1784). Truth 
however is increasingly malleable, as people are faced with ever-changing 
contradictory facts. Effective examples of such are evolution, vaccinations, climate 
change, the earth’s shape and Obama’s birthplace. Within the crises of knowledge 
there is one of commensuration: shared standards used to measure competing claims’ 
value no longer exist. Whilst one cannot avoid mentioning Trump’s fake news, the 
crises did not originate with his rule. The problematization of knowledge should not 
be limited to the right, as leftists often accept conspiracy theories against science 
(Grossberg, 2017). Nor is this failure recent, as Lyotard had previously noted that the 
nature of knowledge could not survive unchanged as societies entered post-industrial 
ages (1979). “The ideology of communicational ‘transparency’… will begin to see the 
State as a factor of opacity” (1979: 5). Nonetheless the author argues that information 
depends on power, therefore knowledge will increasingly become a question of 
government with the computerization of societies.  
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Opacity and the State are increasingly perceived as synonymous, given the shedding 
of light on the establishment’s corruption (Meer, 2017), yet the latter cannot be said to 
monopolize the production of knowledge. Veracity and the State are also growingly 
mutually exclusive due to the politicization of knowledge (Grossberg, 2017; 
Dahlgren, 2018). Opinions about most topics have become polarized, and objectivity 
is losing to fanatism. “Fake news” has become a global buzzword and is employed by 
distinct hegemonic forces to delegitimize political opponents (Farkas, 2018). The 
term gained popularity during the 2016 U.S. elections and liberal media sources as 
CNN and the New York Times critique such as online misleading information. Trump 
uses it as a derogatory designation for untruthful mainstream media. Even the left has 
accused the latter of lying, and the erosion of journalism’s credibility is partly caused 
by these political attacks (Grossberg, 2017). Far from solely being a fabricated means 
of political attack, fake news are fabricated realities. Those who forged Obama’s 
Kenyan birth certificate view profit as their priority (Farkas & Schou, 2018). “Fake 
news is cheap to produce - far cheaper than real news – and profitable” (The 
Washinghton Post, 2016).  
 
Post-factuality can also be attributed to information’s unprecedented speed and 
abundance, and to the “amazon effect” (Dahlgren, 2018; Grossberg, 2017). Bauman 
states humans entered a post-modern era as “the long effort to accelerate the speed of 
movement has presently reached its natural limit…instantaneity” (2000:10-11). Not 
only has information become inexhaustible in this 4.0 digital panorama, it is also 
accessible instantaneously: news platforms can report within minutes about a 
Californian earthquake. The epistemological crisis is heightened by Bauman’s post-
modern conquest, as decision-making necessitates time, which in turn has become a 
rarity in our cyber “ever-new” environment. Decreasing attention and standardised 
thinking are becoming the norm as technology fights imagination (Carr N., 2014). 
Whilst Grossberg does not doubt individuals are overwhelmed by the sheer quantity 
of information available, the author supposes every human generation has felt this 
way. One can now describe the “river occurrence”: Grossberg and Dahlgren agree on 
people’s tendency to expose themselves to sources they already agree with, through 
the following of specific media outlets they trust and the social media sharing of 
information with like-minded friends. The amazon effect is a characteristic of 
contemporary society for the former author, however only the latter believes the 
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abundance-caused-disorientation to be legitimate nowadays and “citizen journalism” 
to be an adaptive strategy born to counter such. One supports the “evolutionary” 
claim: today’s information overload is unparalleled in time, hence people navigate 
this tsunami of facts through an erected suspicion of novel sources. A lack of trust in 
media sources derived from the notion of “the other” has emerged, creating “echo 
chambers” where digital gatherings of individuals in agreement occur (Dahlgren, 
2018). Individuals inform themselves both through their social media friends’ 
divulgations and by seeking specific ideological safe spaces. The screening out of 
opposing information that fosters discursive divides is enhanced by the technological 
algorithms that select information based on previous searches. 
 
Echo-chambers awaken sentiments as the “gravitational pull of group identity reduces 
societal insecurity and promotes emotionality” (2018:26). Affect is another means to 
deal with excessive information. As politicians lying gained attention in the past 
century, citizens started channelling their narrative of lament through social networks 
in the 1990s. Shared ideals promote trust thus alternative facts and new epistemic 
realities are disseminated within these counter-public spheres, often of extra-
parliamentarian politics. Now that sentimentality “is on the table”, one can underline 
a fundamental populist feature: spectacle (Sutherland, 2012). Populist politicians tend 
to make spectacles of themselves to foster affect and construct the people’s rhetoric. 
The spectacle is directed to a “suggestible” crowd and initiates emotionality through 
dominant values’ rejection. While the left at times still posits the privileged elite as 
the sole legitimate knowledge producers, the right comparatively often emphasizes 
the silent majority (Grossberg, 2017). Populism can be right or left, yet it is 
conservatives that delegitimise higher education by questioning the need for research 
and funding. Similarly to universities’ loss of authority, cultural capital is perceived 
as less valuable since rightist populist do not value an educated citizenry. The populist 
dismissal of dominant notions – born from the “us-and-them” ethos – is variously 
directed to “the government, liberal politicians, mainstream media, intellectuals, 
experts and immigrants“ (Dahlgren, 2018:24). Visions of a “pure” nation and racist-
scapegoating occur daily in populists’ spectacles and its supporters’ echo chambers. 
The sentiment witnessed today is commonly one of hatred: emotionality unfortunately 
does not equal humanity. Whilst the Berlin Wall’s fall was generally celebrated as the 
end of the Western world’s division, the supporters of the wall’s crumbling would 
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have been disenchanted had they known 60 more would be built in the coming 
decades.  
 
Lyotard had rightly predicted the nature of epistemology would shift through 
computerization (1979), however had not anticipated the destabilization of 
democracy’s principles.  “Civic cultures” are at the heart of democracy’s survival and 
participation, and knowledge and trust are vital to such cultures (Dahlgren, 2018). It is 
telling that 2016’s word of the year was “post-truth”: “circumstances in which 
objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion 
and personal belief” (Oxford English Dictionaries, 2016). This trend has become 
widespread and should be distinguished from classic deception. It emphasizes a new 
epistemic regime where reasoned, factual evidence is discarded in favour of an 
emotional response (Dahlgren, 2018). Global warming deniers treat unanimous 
scientific evidence as subjective opinions. “Truth becomes reconfigured as an inner 
subjective reality” (2018:26). Even though State apparatuses certainly contributed to 
the collapse of truth through the politicization of facts, they cannot be said to 
monopolize the production of the current increasingly emotional knowledge. A 
paradox unfolds: whilst neoliberalism’s individualistic tendencies are failing, personal 
inner-directed beliefs gain prevalence in shaping the public’s opinions. 
 
When the long-standing authority of all traditional knowledge producers fails, citizens 
turn away from sapere aude and turn to their inner, often problematic truths.  The 
post-modern era is now also perceived as the post-truth one, a time when knowledge 
is in crisis. Even though facts can never be understood as fully objective, given they 
are found within ideological currents, we have officially reached a moment of distrust 
of unprecedented magnitude (Dahlgren, 2018; Grossberg, 2017). Excessive 
information, speed and alternative facts are intrinsic to our present day. Fake news’ 
recurrence highlights the valuing of profit over morality and facts’ promotion. All 
discussions have become politicized, and the polarization of beliefs reflects 
democracy’s crisis. Rather than a characteristic, the amazon effect is a survival tactic 
arisen to navigate through excessive information. Technology is in fact redefining 
epistemology, and discursive divides characterized by incompatible views of reality 
are showing. You-tube in January 2019, overwhelmed by emotionality’s growing 
supremacy over rationality, declared war on all conspiracy theories on such platform. 
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Is freedom of expression no longer a viable option? Do we value “freedom” more 
than truth? What we do know is that no traditional knowledge producer – newspaper, 
cultural institution, intellectual - is safe in the quicksand of failed shared truth.  
 




Figure 1: Salvini supporter kissing his hand 
© Enzo Lacopo (Lentelocale , 2018) 
 
 
Italian politics have often been international media’s target of ridicule, given the 
Bunga-Bunga scandal5 or the fact that there have been six governments between 2011 
and 2018.  Nonetheless Italy is no longer just scandalous politics: its first post-war 
extremist government is arguably in power. The coalition between the Northern 
League and the Five Star Movement (M5S) is a crucial phase in Europe’s populist 
emergence (Urbinati et al., 2018). Before delving into politics, it must be noted that 
the number of Italians living in poverty has tripled in the past ten years, with 18 
million risking poverty, while its economy has been the slowest in the euro zone 
(Reuters, 2018; BBC, 2018). In 2011 Berlusconi’s government (Popolo della Libertà, 
PdL; right) fell, leading to two technical governments, such as a non-elected Prime 
 
5 Term employed by the media to signal Berlusconi’s notorious parties with prostitutes, at times 
under-aged. 
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Minister nominated by the President. The first was the technocrat Monti, an 
economist, who was then replaced by Letta (Partito Democratico, PD; left) who led a 
coalition between PD, PdL and the centrist Scelta Civica. This government was a 
unique one in that Letta was appointed by the President yet his cabinet included both 
technicians and politicians and was considered a Grand Coalition (larghe intese) 
given the diverging parties it included (ANSA, 2016). In 2014 Renzi, PD,  became the 
third non-elected Prime Minister in three years as he asked the PD leadership to 
withdraw their backing from Letta and formed a government, which received the 
majority from the lower chamber (Reuters, 2014). He then resigned three years later 
after he lost a referendum he had called. The vote proposed changes to the 
Constitution, to transfer many decision-making powers from regions to the central 
government, and to increase the lower chamber’s powers at the expense of the upper 
one. An increasingly centralized government was expected to further its pro-
establishment reforms, unleashing greater competition within the labour market and 
limiting bureaucracy (The Economist, 2016). Shortly before the referendum The 
Economist noted it appeared as a “call for Italy to open up for more globalization… A 
‘no’, would offer the next piece of evidence that voters in Western countries are 
growing disillusioned with those in power” (2016). Indeed it acted as evidence of 
such frustration and eventually resulted in the aforementioned Lega-Five Stars 
Movement coalition. After years of non-elected governments – within a growingly 
critical economic situation - and when asked whether to further centralize the lower 
chamber’s power, the Italian majority rejected the ruling elite. In the 2018 vote the 
Northern League, lead by Matteo Salvini, gained 17.4% of votes whilst Luigi Di 
Maio’s M5S earned 32.6% (Repubblica, 2018). Given no party or coalition can rule 
without gaining at least 40% of votes, which equates to the majority of parliamentary 
seats, the said leaders had to consider what they had previously declared as 
unthinkable - a Green-Yellow (Lega-M5S) coalition (BBC, 2018). Salvini became the 
Minister of the Interior whilst Di Maio became that of Labour. A lawyer and 
professor with links to the Five Stars, Giuseppe Conte, was nominated by the 
President as Prime Minister of the “Government of Change”, a term coined by the 










The Northern League, short for The Northern League for Padania’s Independence, 
was founded by Bossi in 1991 (BBC News, 2012). The party had the separatist wish 
of establishing a northern Italian State called Padania, the river Po’s country. Such 
river crosses the entire width of northern Italy, from Turin to the Adriatic Sea, and 
Bossi used to have yearly rituals at the river’s source where he would fill glasses with 
sacred water, surrounded by supporters. The politician often shouted “thieving 
Romans!” (Roma Ladrona) as Padania’s independence would have stopped “hard-
working” northerners from having to pay taxes to sustain “lazy” southerners 
(terroni)’s welfare. Autonomy also meant such no longer had to answer to Rome’s 
corrupt politicians (BBC News, 2012). Nowadays the party has abandoned most of its 
features: its name was abbreviated to a more “inclusive” Lega for the 2018 elections 
and pagan rituals were substituted by Salvini’s use of rosaries (Urbinati et al., 2018). 
One of Bossi’s beliefs that was not discarded was his intolerance with regards to 
immigrants: Salvini wants all Italian ports to have crucifixes as barriers for human 
influx (2018). The narrative is constituted by slogans such as “Italy First”, “More 
Justice” and “Italy cannot turn into a refugee camp”. When rallying in the Basilicata 
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region Salvini argued “the League’s battles on immigration, security and good 
governance should be fought here too, not just in the north” (Bloomberg, 2018). 
Whilst Salvini used to make fun of Neapolitans’ smell, his mocking ended with the 
coming elections: ”I’m here (in the south) because I answered a call, and I wanted to 
give something to the people” (2018). Salvini not only has come to be seen as the 
voice of the people, as polls demonstrate he is the most appreciated politician, with 
49% of approval rates (Repubblica, 2018); one believes a true “cult of the leader” is 
now taking place. Figure 1 portrays one of the many Salvini-supporters who have 
kissed his hands as a sign of utter respect. The previous citation is salient to this 
paper: Salvini’s words denote his own portrayal as a magnanimous person whose 
altruistic duties have drawn him to the south of Italy. As opposed to a political 
strategy to gain votes before the election, his cross-country popularity proves Salvini 
was successful in depicting his southern likings as a genuine new-found interest in 
promoting legality in such deprived area. More than collective representation, his 
travels’ depiction appear to echo the Messiah’s calling, as Salvini implies he is the 
sole one that “answered a call”, the only one who thinks the south deserves justice as 
well.    
 
“We are not leftist nor rightist, as those are not ideologies in which we believe in… I 
represent a cheated generation which is now gaining power everywhere” (Agi, 2017). 
Through these words Di Maio sums up the MS5’s political stance; its politics of 
change are firstly represented by the fact it does not identify as a party. The comedian 
Grillo established the movement in 2009, denounced Italian politics of cronyism, and 
rapidly gained votes.  M5S promises direct democracy through the already mentioned 
online citizens’ programme (“the programme for Italy, written by Italians”) 
(Programma M5S, 2019), to fight exercised bureaucracy and strives for “proactive 
referendums”, where citizens’ proposals are discussed in the Parliament to become 
potential laws (Contratto per il Governo di Cambiamento, 2018). Di Maio notes “we 
understand quality of life as our priority, which entails the abolishment of poverty“ 
(Rainews, 2018) through the implementation of citizens’ income (reddito di 
cittadinanza). Citizens’ income is understood as a means to reintegrate an individual 
in working life and to preserve his dignity (Contratto per il Governo di Cambiamento, 
2018). Through the calculation of the poverty risk based on one’s patrimony and 
wage, the income will provide a maximum of 780 euros per month. The benefiter will 
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have to prove his active participation by accepting 3 offers in 2 years at least; new 
work centres will aid such. In fact all European countries except Greece and Italy 
provide an income to those under the poverty line. A study in 2015 calculated that the 
income would amount to a 14.9 billion cost for the Italian State: 10.6% of families 
who reside in Italy should receive such (ISTAT, Senato, 2015). Nonetheless the 
OECD noted the income is not a useful tool to reduce poverty (2017). Its Italian 
critics in fact believe this aid will not incentivize Italians to search for jobs (Boschi, 
2019), rather it will worsen the already critical public debt (Monti, 2018; Boeri, 
2019). Finland recently announced its two-year basic income experiment improved 
health and happiness yet did not affect unemployment (Independent, 2019). Further, 
Italy has historically had a tax evasion and non-declared work issue – the yearly 
estimate for the first is that of 132 billion euros – and a prevalent worry concerns 
“illegitimate” individuals’ benefitting from the income (Senato, 2018; IPSOA, 2019). 
The Five Stars claim it “will favour the occupation and economic growth of the 
country” (Contratto per il Governo di Cambiamento, 2018:34) and that Italians’ 
quality of life will be certainly improved, as opposed to hearing politicians’ typical, 
untruthful reassuring. Esposito, a 64-year-old Neapolitan, told the Guardian he had 
not voted in 40 years until the “young and fresh” M5S came along (2018). He is one 
of the millions of cheated Italian people whose political trust was re-established by 
this movement’s assumed restoration of Italy’s dignity. The hopeful recovery of 
control to the people within a disaffected present is exemplified by this person’s truly 
rare voting.  
 
The Government of Change’s appeal rests in its dismissal of class essentialist 
rhetoric: the League and M5S recognize the economic crash created a narrative of 
lament indiscriminately in the majority. They also view the Italian political elite as 
characterized by opacity. Anti-education and anti-elite often go hand in hand. One 
argues these politicians’ attractiveness is further heightened by their true educational 
representation of the population, given their modest educational titles and political 
background. Italy is the penultimate in the EU, with Romania coming last, in terms of 
university degrees: 26.9% of 30-34 year-olds hold such (as cited in ANSA, 2018). 
Grillo became a politician in 2009 after a lifetime of comedy, Salvini never received a 
higher education degree and nor did Di Maio, who entered politics at 26 after a few 
years of waiting tables (The Guardian, 2018). The Minister of Education was 
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nominated for his practical skills given his numerous teaching positions, rather than 
his Physical Exercise degree (Repubblica, 2018). Traditional cultural capital 
prioritizes intellectual over practical knowledge (Bourdieu, 1984). The Minister’s 
nomination further emphasizes the decreasing authority of cultural capital. One 
suggests the prevalent disillusion with the typical, cultured and distant politics gave 





Figure 3: Salvini poses with pride next to a bulldozer 
 (NeXt, 2018) 
 
“Relatability” is a virtue, when “someone can understand or feel sympathy for” 
(Cambridge Dictionary, 2019). Sympathising with populist ideals was further elicited 
in Italians through leading politicians’ spectacle; the awakening of sentiment through 
the rejection of dominant values. Let us start this analysis through a common image 
promoted by the League: a bulldozer driven over Roma settlements. The visual offers 
a sensual immediacy, “an undeniable impact on first sight that a written text cannot 
replicate” (Mirzoeff, 1998:9). Salvini is seen in figure 3 standing next to such 
machine with an approving thumb. With the opposite symbol for death-sentences 
used by Roman emperors’ with gladiators, he still condemns Romas to homelessness. 
“The growth in nomad settlements, the exponential growth in crimes committed by its 
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inhabitants…is a serious social problem…there are 40,000 Romas living in such 
settlements. The closing of all illegal settlements is needed” (Contratto per il Governo 
di Cambiamento, 2018:45). Not only has the League been succeeding in the 
destruction of multiple illegal Roma settlements for years, shortly after the coalition 
450 people were driven out of a camp in Rome even though it was official, under the 
pretence of the land’s expired lease (OSCE, 2008; Reuters, 2018). 
 
Moffit considers the perpetuation of a state of crisis to be a prevalent populist trait, 
and the League certainly initiates such, specifically by debating immigration far more 
than Roma settlements. There are “at least 500,000 illegal migrants present on our 
soil, hence an efficient repatriation policy is pivotal” (Contratto per il Governo di 
Cambiamento, 2018:27). Emotionality does not result in humanity: rather than 
stressing the humanitarian crisis taking place, as 5000 refugees drowned while 
crossing the Mediterranean in 2015 (Weiwei, 2017), Salvini stresses the number of 
foreigners in Italy, linking crime to such. Migrant arrivals’ in Europe were: 
- 1,015,078 in 2015, 
- 362,753 in 2016,  
- 178,500 in 2017 (UNHCR, 2018).  
Further, figure 4 shows the dramatic decrease in 2018 compared to the year before, 
specific to Italy. While one does not merely wish to undermine the crisis occurring in 
the Mediterranean, it must be mentioned that despite the fact immigrant arrival 
numbers in Italy are decreasing, the “narrative of invasion” is steadily gaining power. 
The crises of knowledge appears within that of migration, and within the tackling of 
Roma settlements regardless of their legality. Significantly “terrorism” and “mosque” 
appear in the same sentence in the Governments’ official document: “to prevent 
possible terroristic infiltrations it is necessary to create…an ad hoc Religion Ministry 
and the tracking of funds to build mosques, and other religious places” (Contratto per 
il Governo di Cambiamento, 2018:28). Salvini noted on Facebook “those who help 
clandestines hate Italians and will answer to the law and history” (Comozero, 2019) 
perhaps willingly drawing from history and paraphrasing Hitler himself. Populism 
creates degraded forms of democracy (Müller, 2016) and Salvini has certainly 
maintained an anti-pluralistic spirit: he relates terrorism to Islam (one of the world’s 
biggest faiths), clearly equates Romas to thieves and argues for immigrants’ 
repatriation policies. A strong Italian sentiment particularly arises through the 
 29 
“othering” of one people against the migratory waves (Urbinati et al., 2018); those 
who help migrants are excluded from collective representation as they hate the nation. 
Bulldozers’ destruction of Roma homes has physical and ideological overtones. It 
functions as a potent metaphor for the League’s ethos: it is by physically preventing 
foreigners from having a future in Italy that its “pure” inhabitants will be granted 






Figure 4: arrivals of migrants in Italy per month 
  (UNHCR, 2018)  
 
Whilst the League rejects the former, dominant approval of diversity, Grillo eroded 
another foundation of the Enlightenment: science. One of the key ideals M5S attached 
itself to is the movement against vaccines (no-vax). Italy has become a country where 
its tourists are recommended to take precautionary vaccines, as advised by Mexico 
(The New York Times, 2018). Renzi’s Government imposed 10 obligatory vaccines 
for children to attend school and was met by extensive criticism by the Five Stars: 
there are “links between vaccinations and specific illnesses as leukaemia, poisoning, 
cancer…” (The Guardian, 2017). Grillo has correlated vaccines to, among many, the 
immune systems’ weakening and autism; the latter is now a discredited claim born 
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from a study’s speculation between the connection of MMR vaccines and such 
condition (2017). “It is hard to distinguish a fair speech from a manipulative one 
when freedom of expression characterizes the political order and when opinions, 
rather than truth, are found” (Urbinati et al., 2018:30). While the linking of cancer and 
autism to vaccines by the M5S was unfounded, a family recently won a court case 
against the Ministry of Health given an obligatory vaccine in 2003 caused a learning 
disability in their son (Repubblica, 2019). Vaccines can in fact result in side-effects, 
as any other drug, however these are incredibly rare: there are minuscuole risks 
compared to the public worries (WHO, 2018; Fondazione Veronesi, 2018). 
Considering the Five Star’s anti-science position includes both unfounded, 
contradictory and discredited facts, it can be likened to a conspiracy theory. Grillo 
asserted vaccines are solely promoted for pharmaceutical companies’ profit. This 
spectacle’s sentiment climaxed when a prestigious immunologist who denounced 
M5S’s statements received a no-vax mom’s wishes for him to drown in his seaside 
holidays. In this post-truth discursive atmosphere, emotional gains are winning over 
rational critique (Dahlgren, 2018). Italy’s unprecedented crises of knowledge 
materialized: between 2016-2017 measles cases grew from 843 to 5006 (The New 
York Times, 2018). The politicization of knowledge carries with it much risk; an anti-
system sentiment caused the immune systems’ collapse for many. 
 
“The cages and ties that are bringing back hunger and insecurity” (BBC, 2018) are the 
words chosen by Salvini not to describe a medieval torture as one might suppose, 
rather the European Union. Euro-scepticism arose in the 1990s in debtor countries 
particularly among populist politicians, given the phenomenon must be understood as 
an anti-system one (Urbinati et al., 2018). Lecompte identifies anti-Euro tendencies as 
fitting perfectly the illusory populist rhetoric given the fact a single European demos 
does not exist (2015). Both the Five Stars and Lega have criticized extensively Italy’s 
relationship with the EU, although neither have campaigned to leave such. Salvini 
celebrated Brexit as the UK’s freeing from the cage: the League has remained 
separatist in that it hopes for a return to national sovereignty. A Lega senate candidate 
noted “we have become the EU’s rubbish dump” (Bloomberg, 2018) as more than 
600,000 immigrants reached Italy since 2013 and as a critique to the EU’s insufficient 
relocation aid (BBC, 2018). Furthermore, the demolition of the Roma official camp in 
Rome had been halted by the EU court, however policemen proceeded undisturbed: 
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“the emergence of Euro-scepticism induces the questioning of fundamental 
foundations…of the European project and even the maintenance of certain democratic 
and human rights’ principles, which have been given for granted and linked to 
Western democracy’s values” (Chiantera-Stutte, 2018:171). 
 
As post-factuality usually goes, Italian journalism has come under attack. Di Maio 
announced “thankfully we vaccinated against fake news…many newspapers are dying 
as Gruppo L’Espresso which - I’m sorry for the workers - has already initiated 
employment termination processes as no one reads them anymore. They spend their 
days twisting the truth” (Repubblica, 2018). The newspapers Repubblica and 
L’Espresso’s combined response was a witty one: “not only were you unaware that it 
has been two years since Gruppo Espresso merged into Gruppo Gedi…which 
demonstrates once again you are not able to differentiate between fake news and 
facts, as you are an expert regarding the first…make your peace with the fact that (all 
Gedi newspapers) will not die and, following the Constitution…we will continue 
telling the truth, especially when uncomfortable for those in power” (Repubblica, 
2018). The response defines Di Maio as “allergic” to truth as the dying of such group 
was his wish, not a fact. These newspapers followed their calling before this direct 
attack, as L’Espresso’s previous enquiry into Salvini’s links to the Mafia, and 
continued “full-steam” to tell uncomfortable information afterwards: the day Di Maio 
stated Italy will soon experience an economic boom as that of the ‘60s, several 
newspapers discredited this statement by underlining Italy is likely to have entered 
economic recession (2018; Repubblica, 2019; Il Post, 2019; ANSA, 2019). Can we 
blame readers for being confused? While L’Espresso reports the League’s Mafia-
befriending, the Government of Change defined “defeating the mafia” as one of its 
goals on the official programme (Contratto per il Governo di Cambiamento, 2018). 
Again, the traditional authority’s jeopardy has manifested materially: the famous 
journalist Mentana received a death-threat stating “soon you will be punished” (Italia 
Sera, 2019) and two L’Espresso journalists covering a commemoration were 
physically abused by far-right extremists (Corriere.Roma, 2019). Italy did not escape 




One wishes to emphasize the fact that populism did not simply emerge in Italy: it 
travelled from an oppositional movement to that in charge (Urbinati et al., 2018). 
While it was commonly regarded as an ephemeral revolt in the past decades, Italian 
populism is now an established governmental reality (Anselmi, 2018). A movement 
of protest rebelling in the face of shared values has become the dominant culture. Let 
us take a step back: “the variations in the meanings of ‘culture’ are not a 
disadvantage, but a genuine complexity corresponding to real elements of experience” 
(Williams, 1998:49). Culture, from the Latin term cultura (“to cultivate the mind”), 
was intended since the 19th century as a possession of the middle and upper classes. 
Hochkultur, “high culture”, and Kulturkritik, the understanding of culture primarily 
through its aesthetic value, were born in concomitance in such époque. Nonetheless 
such definitions underwent a reversal in the 1960s (Mulhern, 2002; Assman, 2012). 
Culture Studies were born in response to radical changes in society: it was the 
numerous arrivals of immigrants in the UK that helped erode culture’s hierarchical 
notion. The Birmingham School rejected high culture to include all forms, as social 
and ethnic minorities’ traditions (Hall, 1980). Further, months after Woodstock 
Roszak coined the term “counter-culture” (1969). The author described society as a 
technocracy where “those who govern justify themselves by appeal to technical 
experts who, in turn, justify themselves by appeal to scientific forms of knowledge. 
Beyond the authority of science, there is no appeal” (1969:7). In such repressive 
Western culture the youthful revolts against authority, be it Anti-Vietnam protests, 
LSD consumption, Civil Rights movements, university campus radicals, all represent 
an anti-rationalist counter-culture which could result in a new, visionary society. Just 
as Roszak understood “technocracy’s children” as sharing a rejection of technocracy, 
Yinger wrote “I suggest the term contra-culture wherever the normative system of a 
group contains, as a primary element, a theme of conflict with the values of…the 
















   
  
 
Whilst Yinger identifies contra-culture as typically found among irresponsible youth 
in conflict with the adult, male role, the Lega-M5S Government is one of 
irresponsible adult males.  “Populism, as an opinion movement, is a genuine 
democratic movement of protest“ (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017:25) which can 
nonetheless cause democracy’s deterioration. Populism has been around for decades 
yet resurfaced forcefully given the digital revolution, precarious economy and hence 
wide-spread uncertainty of what awaits us (Naim, 2017). The Lega was dismissed as a 
fanatical party by most Italians up until a few years ago, while it is no coincidence 
that M5S was founded the year after the economic crisis. Social media counter-public 
spheres aided these counter-cultures to grow and become mainstream culture. 
Populism’s strength rests both on media and images (Urbinati et al., 2018). Both 
innate dichotomous thinking and images’ potency are exploited by anti-system 
politics. The League employs bulldozers, a powerful image to materially represent 
their ideology, while the M5S use social media to increase the crises of knowledge 
through vaccines’ conspiracy theories. The spectacle-elicited-emotion is vital to 
defeat traditional notions. Relatability is promoted both through cultural capital’s 
loosing prominence and through spirituality. Religious belonging offers many 
symbols and images to Salvini, to sanctify the unity of the people; nonetheless his 
Christianity is without Christ (Guolo, 2011; Spini, 2018). Religious identity here is 




primarily used in belonging rather than believing terms. Far from helping erode 
hierarchies as in England, the unprecedented migration wave in Italy fostered 
xenophobic, unwelcoming sentiments - which are in tension with the Vatican’s 
stance. Surely through populism Italy’s existing ills have appeared. Roszak rightly 
predicted the revolt against science and technical experts’ ruling, but could not have 
imagined an anti-pluralistic governance being born from counter-cultures becoming 
dominant. Rather than a visionary society, Italy has become an extremist one. Again, 
the urgency of Italy’s populist anti-democratic beliefs requires cultural institutions’ 
action.  
 
2.4 – The Role of Intellectuals 
 
“For any intellectual who is willing to take on the burdens of being politically 
answerable, how might one respond with rigour to these dark times?” (Grossberg, 
2017:1) One will commence the analysis of the role of typical producers of 
knowledge firstly through individuals, or intellectuals, and in the later sub-chapter 
will outline epistemological places, such as cultural institutions. Gramsci specifies all 
men are intellectuals, however not all have such immediate societal function (1957). 
While non-intellectuals do not exist, as even the most physical work requires 
technical qualification, the professional category is determined by cerebral activity. 
Gramsci differentiates between “traditional” intellectuals, those who give themselves 
an aura of historical continuity as teachers and priests, and “organic” ones that appear 
with the dominant social group. A social group’s dominance, egemonia - the 
dynamics through which the dominant class convinces the lower ones without 
violence that its domination is necessary given its prestige – is determined by the 
elite’s ability to organically produce intellectuals (1957). In fact the State is divided 
into the Government, which includes police, bureaucracies and other “coercive 
apparatuses”, and the “integral state” which contains the State and the civil society 
(religious, education, political activities). The integral state is intrinsic to the State’s 
hegemony: school is the instrument to form intellectuals, which then are vital to 
perpetuate the ruling class’ ideological domination (1957). Hegemony however does 
not always result in consensus, as organic thinkers are fundamental to counter 
“common-sense” view. Gramsci defined himself as a socialist, organic intellectual 
promoting new intellectuals’ role as permanent persuaders, rather than eloquent 
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speakers, to initiate social change. Foucault on the other hand, distinguishes 
“universal intellectuals” from “specific ones”, respectively the promoters of 
educational ideas and the sociocultural type that appeared after World War II (1977). 
Rousseau and Voltaire had universal minds and were bearers of cross-cultural values: 
knowledge and truth are universal intellectuals’ eternal principles. Intellectuals have 
predominantly become “specific”, as they are dismissing their global strategy to 
develop a political struggle. What is paramount for intellectuals’ political role is 
following the regime of truth.  
 
Privilege is an essential concept when analysing intellectuals’ political role. Bourdieu 
affirms intellectuals earn significance through their cultural capital, thus have the 
privilege of contesting authorities (1989). Thorndike stated “it is the great good 
fortune of mankind that there is a substantial correlation between intelligence and 
morality… consequently our superiors in ability are on average our benefactors” (as 
cited in Chomsky, 2011). Intellectualism has been used to legitimate wars, as the  
“Manifesto of 93 German Intellectuals” wrote before World War I “have faith in us! 
Believe that we shall carry on this war to the end as a civilized nation, to whom the 
legacy of a Goethe, a Beethoven, a Kant” (2011). Oppositely, Chomsky uses his 
position to contest his nation’s actions, declaring American politics continuously 
elevate self-interest over morality. America has installed murderous national security 
states, as in Brazil and Chile, to “protect” the continent from communism. American 
superiors tend to be benefactors solely with respect to its communist-phobic citizens, 
and formulate intellectuals’ position based on their sharing of the State’s views. Just 
as it used to praise intellectual dissidents in the USSR, it now honours the Iranian 
ones that oppose the clerical establishment. “Dissident” is a term used selectively: 
Mandela was on the US terrorist list up until 2008.  Chomsky believes intellectuals 
who oppose the State are denigrated, yet started emphasizing their fundamental roles 
as a response to the Vietnam War’s distortion (1967). “Privilege yields opportunity, 
and opportunity confers responsibility” (Chomsky, 2011) hence intellectuals must act 
as decent human beings with an elevated status to promote justice, peace, freedom 
and truth. Chomsky emphasizes how individuals have a choice, to agree with the 
dominant thought or not, just as there was an alternative to Afghanistan’s invasion. It 
cost $3.2 trillion and what is often omitted was the Taliban’s proposition to treat 
terrorism as a crime against humanity, trialling the likely subjects through an 
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international operation; of course the validity of this proposal cannot be certified. 
Unlike Nazi trials, Bin Laden was killed and his body disposed at sea. Ironically, 
Chomsky’s text preceded the resurfacing of the Independent titled “anti-Soviet 
warrior puts his army on the road to peace” (Independent, 1993), a British newspaper 
which exemplifies the travelling dissident notion attributed to Bin Laden. In light of 
9/11’s 10th anniversary, the author states it is his duty to question the need for 
Afghanistan’s invasion and his nation’s culpability.  
 
How can intellectuals perform their truth-telling duty nowadays, when traditional 
institutions and cultural capital have lost their authority? “Truth” and “intellectual” 
are certainly treated as synonymous, particularly such must speak the truth in the face 
of power (Foucault, 1977; Bourdieu, 1989; Chomsky, 1967; Said, 1993). Therefore 
the fact-sharing responsibility intellectuals bear has become even more vital to 
societies, seeing the widespread post-truth, populist condition. Most authors cited 
until now did not specify their role in society; better yet, their regime of truth through 
sociological analysis made it implicit. Laclau and Mouffe have been opposing right-
wing populism far before it became Western mainstream culture, Urbinati has reacted 
to Italy’s recent populist emergence by increasingly criticizing such in her 
publications, Müller addresses this phenomenon through the emphasis of the 
“people’s” empty meaning. These intellectuals extend their literary political struggle 
further to the public realm by participating in debates (Urbinati, 2018; Müller,  2017; 
Mouffe, 2019). Similarly, Italian newspapers are proving they still own a privileged 
position that cannot be silenced. After Di Maio’s attack on Gruppo Gedi, the 
established newspaper Corriere announced its solidarity by denouncing the Minister’s 
“attack on pluralism and freedom of information…rights for everyone, which must 
always be defended, against those who maybe want a world of information with a 
single, complaisant voice” (2018). As opposed to being “the voice of the voiceless” 
(Chomsky, 2011), Corriere, L’Espresso, Repubblica – Italy’s prominent media 
sources - want to be the voice of the once-dominant pluralist, truthful voice. It was the 
notions of the cheated, “silent majority” which elected the populist Italian leaders; 
those who did not feel represented by the liberal ruling elite. This thesis is a testament 
to many liberal, specific intellectuals who understand their role as that of persuaders 
joining in a political struggle. All intellectuals have the choice of joining or 
countering the common view, nonetheless must recognize the responsibility that 
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comes with their professional category. Bobbio agrees on this category’s duty, 
however does not assume intellectuals have answers; he believes such must solicit 
their interlocutors to ask questions (1993). “Knowledge production is an on-going 
conversation, always crawling towards better truths, better understandings, but rarely 
arriving at a final complete shared conclusion“ (Grossberg, 2017:9). Grossberg’s 
antidote to the crises of knowledge is academics’ fight to prevent information from 
becoming a mere political conflation, and the responsibility to teach students open-
mindedness, whilst Chomsky thinks intellectuals must be the critical ones. “Rather 
than negation and antagonism” in a world where every fact is polarized “critique 
might become agonistic, seeking forms of conflict that are productive” (2017:38).  
 
2.5 – The Role of Cultural Institutions 
 
“How can cultural projects produce meaning during the crisis of the expert and 
intellectual tradition that has given neoliberalism its legitimacy?” (Moreno-Caballud, 
2015:273) Whilst intellectuals’ role analysis has a quasi-centennial history, the 
political potential of cultural institutions started concerning debate recently. 
Institutions, generally, are artificial constraints that structure economic, social and 
political interaction, both formal as property rights and laws, and informal as 
traditions and taboos (North, 1991). A cultural institution can be intended as a pattern 
of social behaviour, or more commonly as a sphere concerning the social organization 
of cultural goods’ production, distribution, mediation and reception (Hanson, 1975). 
“Cultural artifacts and activities that satisfy a need can be defined as goods and 
services that yield a specific benefit that derives from a number of functions as 
education, political representation and entertainment” (Hasitschk et al., 2005:5). 
Carr’s outlining of cultural institutions’ promise is regarded as significant to this 
paper (2003). A promise exists in the future and it is a free expression of will, similar 
to a gift. “Cultural institutions are places created to preserve objects and texts, to 
expand the boundaries of public knowledge associated with those artifacts and words, 
and to open the possibilities of learning” (2003:xiii). Upon the definition of such 
places, Carr looks for the presence of a collection as that of fine art, artifacts and 
books, accessible to the public; an organized, continuous structure of knowledge, as a 
historical narrative; information, thought-based empirical observations and documents 
which record multiple contexts and implications.  
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A connection to the public sphere is vital to cultural institutions’ functioning, which 
are at times public institutions. These public dimensions include local, regional and 
national governments, as well as NGOs and not-for-profit sectors, which have greatly 
increased in the past decades. Public institutions facilitate economic activities - as 
taxes - and moral valuing, such as the promotion of consensus notions, typically 
referring to corporate culture (Pratt, 2006). Cultural institutions, both private and 
public, are often perceived as part of the State’s coercive apparatus. Museums were 
conceived in the 18th century as means of public education, yet ever since culture 
became less controlled by the clericals its association to the markets has grown. The 
firsts’ emergence cannot be distanced from the rise of the bourgeoisie (Hasitschk et 
al., 2005). Starting in the 1980s arts and culture have played a fundamental role in 
“symbolic democratization”: the expression of the State’s equity priority through the 
exhibition of the “people’s patrimony”. In fact democracy’s key concepts as suffrage 
and representation are typical themes promoted through culture. De-industrialization 
caused the disenfranchisement of the traditional labouring class’ majority, at which 
point the European left employed culture as a vehicle to counter the scepticism 
surrounding social solidarity (Šešić & Vickery, 2018). Šešić and Vickery assert 
cultural autonomy has become a rarity as in this said period cultural institutions 
became dependent on cooperation with public policies: “participation” and “social 
inclusion” are strategic terms for institutions to receive funds. “Cultural value” is now 
almost entirely abstracted from the social and material conditions of cultural labour 
given cultural policies are hegemonic instruments. They critically understand cultural 
institutions as neoliberal machines that act either ideologically or by creating social 
capital through employment, wellbeing and education; such organizations have 
remained politically ineffective in response to its visitors’ shift to consumers within 
retail spaces.  
 
Even though cultural institutions’ dependence on public funds is clear, one disagrees 
with Šešić & Vickery that such and institutions’ moral valuing have “eclipsed their 
participation in a putative public sphere” (2018:11). Excellence in cultural institutions 
is solely achieved through constant public engagement (Carr, 2003). “These 
institutions determine the formation of cultural goods and their transformation into 
commodities, appreciated objects, symbols of collective identities, and as integrated 
parts of the public space” (Hasitschk et al., 2005:11). It is reductive to deem cultural 
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institutions mere vehicles of neoliberal hegemony, which have lost their symbolic and 
material power. Milton Friedman argued resources should be allocated to places that 
are more societally beneficial than public, governmental institutions (1993). The 
economist ignored the societal need for culture deriving from its everyday life 
representational, entertainment and teaching capabilities. 
 
Populism’s nemesis, elitism, is often regarded as a distinctive trait of cultural 
institutions. Carr notes such public spaces can defeat elitism’s barriers that discourage 
learners, yet a socio-cultural inclusion tension is typically noticed in cultural 
communities (Hasitschk et al., 2005). “Culture and arts find themselves vulnerable in 
the face of populism insofar as they are inevitably associated with historical 
institutions, and are heavily mediated by a range of complex discourses, which in turn 
demand education, dialogue and a confrontation with forms of meaning not easily 
established” (Šešić & Vickery, 2018:10). Despite the well-known public educational 
role of heritage, culture remains associated to the elite given this group’s greater 
consumption of such (Bourdieu, 1984). Within a prevalent anti-establishment context, 
the elite-culture duality has been exacerbated and cultural institutions have come 
under further fire. Shils holds that populism is a cultural as opposed to political issue, 
concerning the public dimension in relation to the institutional one (1996; Anselmi, 
2018). This cultural problem is understood as the delegitimizing tendency of any 
established institutional order, specifically academic and scientific ones. Shils 
exemplifies a populist mentality through America’s traditional public dimension’s 
prevalence – possibly originating from its distrust for aristocracy’s hierarchy – and 
consequent weak institutional identity. Furthermore, the public sphere gradually 
opened up to bottom-up possibilities (Habermas, 1962): the foundations for cultural 
populism were set partly by such possibilities becoming an opposition in tension with 
top-down culture (School of Frankfurt). Research and intellectual work by institutions 
are seen as an elite manipulation adverse to popular culture hence awaken heightened 
distrust and resentment today. Institutions’ cultural mediation in contemporary 
democracies is suffering a profound crisis due to populism’s cultural polarization 
(Anselmi, 2018). Populism cancels intermediate cultural positions, discourages 
articulated debate and prefers dichotomies and simplification. Culture however 
requires dialogue, theoretical reflection, questioning of social norms and willingness 
to experience the challenging of one’s sensory reflexes. These pre-conditions are in 
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tension with those who perceive reality as divided into for-the-people and against-the-
people camps, where all information must be rationalized politically (Šešić & 
Vickery, 2018).  
 
For Šešić and Vickery cultural institutions are loosing however have not lost to 
populism, thus call for a collective intellectual project through art research practices 
and critical reflection. Art today is a quasi-academic enquiry involving publishing, 
collaborating, analysing, psychology, education, research and criticizing: the marriage 
between research and art can challenge dominant views and produce alternative 
narratives which have been excluded from the historical canon (Power, 2018). Art has 
a political potential deriving from its openness, it is the 21st century factory meeting 
alternative. In today’s bewildered post-truth of damaging images and fake news, art 
“has an obligation to thought” (2018:24). Carr wrote before the economic crash yet 
predicted both learners and professionals’ future would soon become complex and 
fragmentary (2003). Within insecurity, cultural institutions bear responsibility to 
function as places of reflection that nurture change. Whilst Carr understands 
disconnection, assumptions and certainty as enemies of learning, he is certain a 
“culture of enquiry” drives the cultural environment, as opposed to commercialism, 
inviting visitors to enter and think without the purchase of anything other than the 
ticket (2003). Thus the literature on cultural institutions’ role disagrees on the 
corporate nature of such, however recognizes these places’ informing, educational 
duty. Perceived elitism and dichotomous thinking extend the traditional knowledge 
producers’ crisis of authority to cultural institutions, nonetheless these spaces 
epitomize today’s rarest creature: truth. Our knowledge is multidisciplinary, such as 
the layering of distinct disciplines that remain within their borders. The promise of 
cultural institutions goes further such and aims for the mapping of interdisciplinarity: 
the differences intrinsic to the human condition are explored through the meeting and 
fusing of epistemological complexities (2003). Again, culture’s almost infinite 
definitions derive from its complex nature. Cultural institutions strive to explain 
different pasts, different paths, different ways of understanding the future through 
numerous disciplines. An artistic exhibition, for example, will solely benefit from a 
historical and geographical contextualization. “The issue is not how to ‘accurately 
represent the other’ but how to comparatively relate one’s own cultural framework 
inter-subjectively” (Gregos, 2018:34). Pluralism is the sole antidote to democracy’s 
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extremist deviation (Shills, 1996). The promise is that visitors will renegotiate, alone 
or jointly, their own culture’s view and open up to the possibilities of producing new 
truths about oneself and others (Carr, 2003).  
 
Cultural institutions are both regarded as agents of elitism and means to overcome 
such. Carr notes all structures of common memory, public voices and cultural 
institutions are the sole place where a mindful experience can happen for everyone; 
these places were thought for the “crafting of truth by ordinary people” (2003:158). 
Italy’s former Minister of Culture, Franceschini, promoted free Sunday entries in all 
Italian public museums, each first weekend of the month. This had extraordinary 
results for Italians and tourists’ cultural consumption: the total yearly entries grew 
from 40.7 million to 50.1 million between 2014 and 2017 (Mibac, 2017). In 2017 
public museums’ yearly income grew by 11.7% and 3.5 million visitors were 
registered on free Sundays (2017). Franceschini attributed the cultural interest growth 
on Sundays to the novel initiative, to a more efficient employment of European funds 
and a significant increment in public funds’ spending by the Ministry (Federculture 1. 
R., 2017). The Government of Change, as its name goes, then cancelled this initiative 
by noting it devalued the national heritage. The current Minister, Bonisoli, noted 
Pompei would appear to lose prestige in tourists’ eyes, upon free entry (Corriere, 
2018). Italy’s heritage most certainly demands greater valorisation (and management) 
given the sheer quantity the country holds, yet the statistics hinted precisely to such. 
An exponential increase in museums’ entries entails educational, representational, 
entertainment and monetary returns as well as cultural visibility. Populism’s witch-
hunt, institutions’ persecution (medical, cultural, European), is indisputable hence 
“cultural and artistic institutions have a pivotal role in the critique of the 
contemporary grammar and semantics, but also in the search of new codes that 
encourage dialogue to overcome binary discourse” (Santos & Cachola, 2018: 1). 
Truth and conviviality can only arise through conflict (Grossberg, 2017; Santos & 
Cachola, 2018). 
 
The Lega-MS5 coalition has never outspokenly criticized culture, nonetheless their 
cancelling of passed initiatives functions as a political strategy, which in turn causes 
the devaluing of culture they allegedly denounce. After the Bataclan’s terroristic 
attack, Renzi announced the establishment of a Bonus Cultura for all 18 year olds, 
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both to encourage greater cultural interest and as “each euro invested in security 
should be equalled in one for culture…the response to terror cannot solely be 
securitarian” (Forbes, 2017). Just as populism cannot be analysed solely politically, 
terrorism must be tackled physically and ideologically. It allowed 18 year olds to 
spend 500 euros on books, cinema, theatre, courses and national parks: Minister 
Boschi noted the country would be wealthier each time someone entered a book store 
thanks to such (2017). 61% of those entitled made use of the bonus (Agi, 2017). By 
drawing parallels between economic wealth to literary consumption, it appears as 
though the Renzi Government perceived culture and capital as equivalent. The 
initiative certainly had its flaws as it became known that some exchanged it for cash, 
but the fact that 39% of adolescents did not use the Bonus is far graver; it points to a 
youth section which is culturally inactive, or unaware of the Bonus (2017). Bonisoli 
announced App18 would not be renovated as “culture is a (long-term) investment, not 
an electoral allowance, a propagandistic move” (AgCult, 2018). While recognizing 
the importance of adolescents’ cultural capital, he paradoxically hints to Renzi’s 
clientelism through the offering of the Bonus. Let us not forget the M5S’s warhorse: 
citizens’ income. Is Bonisoli acting as a post-modern individual whose emotional 
gains are defeating his rational critique? The current Minister of Culture delegitimizes 
the past legislature through this political move and penalizes youth’s culture in the 
process. Again, populist do not strive for an educated citizenry. 
 
Cultural institutions’ interdisciplinary ethos finds itself in a rigid tension with 
simplification and dichotomies, thus such must oppose these phenomena to guarantee 
their epistemological pursuit. The statistics however portray a hopeful future for such 
institutions in Italy: the yearly museum entries gain further relevance when proposing 
that culture cannot be politicized as easily as science. The boom in museum entries 
took place during the key years for Italy’s emerging populism. Federculture 14th 
Report underlines that Italians’ cultural spending, including cinemas, concerts, 
museums and theatres, rised by 3.1% in 2017 (2018). Italians’ increasingly frequent 
cultural participation therefore goes further than museum visits. Anti-establishment 
sentiments, and cultural institutions’ longstanding association to the elite therefore did 
not prevent Italians from appreciating Franceschini’s initiative nor do these 
sentiments seem to be correlated to cultural inactivity. The Colossieum, Pompei and 
the Uffizi respectively received the most visitors in 2017 and directly benefitted from 
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free Sunday’s visibility (Mibac, 2017). Whilst one could write a thesis just on this 
occurrence, one for now will propose the concurrent growing populism and visiting of 
the country’s iconic heritage results from Italy’s national identity winning over the us-
against-the-elite ethos. “National heritage is at the centre of the question, and it is the 
property of all the citizens’ of the Republic” (Corriere, 2018). Carr mentions cultural 
institutions’ interdisciplinary emphasis on differing voices as well as common 
memory, and one believes these spaces’ anti-exclusion agency derives from such. 
Culture is defined by its public dimension and epistemological role. Whilst humans 
innately divide night and day, “pure people” against “corrupt people’s culture” is a 
tough political illusion to establish. It is easier for populists to portray a common, 
establishment enemy in Renzi’s compulsory vaccines, rather than in Pompei’s 
elegance. Not only do cultural institutions have a responsibility to employ their 
educational calling against the crises of knowledge, they truly have the political 
potential in Italy to defeat this cultural disease of simplification through their ordinary 
people’s appeal and heightened consumption. Luckily Italy’s cultural activity was 
independent from Renzi’s lost referendum. Cultural institutions’ must promote their 
enquiry culture, as their gift is to “create sustained conditions for intellectual risk” 
(Carr, 2003:166). After this chapter’s “state-of-the-art” analysis, the second part of 
the research will commence, through the critical outline of Fondazione Feltrinelli’s 















PART 2: Critical analysis of case study - Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli 
Chapter 3: Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli 
 
The Italian peninsula’s landscape of cultural institutions is a prosperous one: its 
museums and exhibitory spaces alone amount to 4976 (ISTAT, 2016). Italy is unique 
for its 88 banking foundations, established by the said institutions, whilst its 37 
community foundations are based on an American model that connects the 
representatives of a local community through a common aim: increasing the quality of 
life (Non Profit, 2019). The most common foundation is the enterprise and family 
one, given there are more than a 100 (2019). The President of Associazione Istituti di 
Cultura Italiani (AICI) recently noted “the institutes which are strongly linked to the 
history of Italian political culture have prevented…the disappearance of references to 
great ideals, cultural strands and celebrated characters which founded our democratic 
Republic” (Fondazione Basso, 2019). This paper is precisely focused on such cultural 
institutions, foundations and institutes, which place political engagement at their core.  
The reason for Fondazione Feltrinelli’s initial analysis and subsequent comparison to 
3 cultural institutions originates from the former institution’s prolific work and self-
definition. More so than all the other entities considered, Fondazione Feltrinelli 
underlines its multifaceted role and clearly states the approaches it adopts. This 
explicit description facilitates the outlining of the scopes of the other cultural 
institutions, at times implicit. Further, the overview of Feltrinelli’s extensive work is 
woven together with the analysis of key notions such as Mouffe’s agonistic politics 
(2013), whose complexity is untangled and illustrated by Fondazione’s study. Once 
these concepts have been thoroughly observed through Fondazione’s scope, context 
and perspective concerning the Italian cultural landscape are provided via a 
comparative chapter of other prominent cultural hubs. Chapter 3 and 4 therefore 














Figure 6: Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli 












Giangiacomo Feltrinelli was born in 1926 into one of Italy’s wealthiest families, its 
fortunes originating among others from timber trading - supplying half of the world 
with wood by the end of the 19th century -, a bank under the family name and real 
estate investments (Feltrinelli C., 1999). Giangiacomo struck a deal with his mother 
during his studies: once he graduated from high school he was free to enrol in the 
struggle against the Germans. He enrolled in the Legnano combat unit in November 
1944 and a year later joined the Communist Party (PCI). Whilst Giangiacomo had just 
started his journey as a comrade, his family was openly pro-monarchy during Italy’s 
1946 Referendum and thus ashamed of his political likings (Feltrinelli C.,1999). Yet, 
Giangiacomo was the sole male heir and decided to use his family’s wealth to 
document a story not often told back then: he created a library documenting the 
history of international working class movements, which later became an Institute and 
subsequently Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli. In 1955 Feltrinelli Publishing was 
also born (Fondazione Feltrinelli, 2019). It is only with this tale in mind that one can 
grasp Fondazione Feltrinelli today and its leftist historical narrative. The archival 
patrimony is one of economic, political and historical nature and no longer collects 
documents solely linked to the working classes. It now holds 1.5 million pieces, 
including volumes, newspapers and posters, among which the first editions of Karl 
Marx’s Das Kapital (1867) and Thomas More’s Utopia (1516). 
 
In 2016 Fondazione’s headquarters found a new home in Viale Pasubio 5, Milan, in a 
building envisioned by Herzog & de Meuron (Fondazione Feltrinelli, 2019). The 
institution aimed to expand its scope as a cultural centre through the novel space: it 
currently conceives itself as a national laboratory for cultural programs, with an 
international outlook. All cultural manifestations respond as much as they are 
responded to (Bal, 2013). Far from eclipsing the public sphere (Šešić & Vickery, 
2018), Fondazione is a non-profit institution that strives to function as a cultural 
meeting point for Milan’s community, while collaborating with local cultural 
institutions and associations (FondazioneFeltrinelli, 2019). Fondazione Feltrinelli’s 
archive is at the heart of most of its initiatives: the “supply chain” typically follows 
the patrimony-research-education-divulgation and publication macro sequence, and 
includes performative arts. The research mostly originates from the patrimony and is 
divulgated through lectures, publications, exhibitions, forums, workshops and 
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didactical laboratories. This community space also hosts film viewings, live music 
and interactive art. With the exception of a minority of paid musical and didactical 
events, as well as the masters courses, anyone regardless of age and nationality can 
take part freely in Fondazione’s initiatives, access its publications online or watch its 
lectures live on social media. Further, the Sala Lettura on the last floor is open 6 days 
a week and acts as a library. Carr looks for the presence of artistic or literary 
collections, their preservation and the resulting expansion of public knowledge 
through such when distinguishing cultural institutions (2003). This definition 
significantly fits the Foundation’s ethos, as the patrimony is both included in the free 
activities and can be visited by the public – together with the main building - and 
consulted. 
 
The areas of research tackled by Fondazione are divided into four thematic realms:  
 
- “Political Innovation: Observatory on Democracy” - analyses the redefinition 
of democracy, representation and political communication given the strong 
political, economic, social and technological contemporary pressures such 
experience.   
 
- “Cities and Citizenship: Observatory on Cities and Urban Transformations” – 
outlines the socio-historical transformation which have taken place in the past 
century, and still affect European cities today. The analysis of recurring 
phenomena can allow for the conception of novel conscious citizenship 
practices.  
 
- “Globalization and Sustainability: Observatory on Ideas and Practices for a 
Sustainable Future” – researches the actions and practices connected to the 
production, distribution and consumption of resources while considering the 
environmental, social and economic impact such foster.  
 
- “Work’s Future: Jobless Society Platform” – promotes a reflection on the 
growingly fluid, unstable labour market, as the relation between work and 
society is severely modified by technological innovation. 
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As explored later, the topics tackled by this institution cross its thematic areas 
transversally. Given Fondazione Feltrinelli’s focus on sociological phenomena - and 
as mentioned in the educational component of the patrimonial supply chain - in 2014 
it established an Educational branch which recognizes the quick shift in societies, 
reflected in the changing labour market. It promotes life-long learning, soft skills, 
empowerment and capacity-building. While Fondazione is a greatly versatile and 
prolific institution, the scope of this thesis will mostly include the analysis of its 
opposition to the prevalent populist phenomena. The outlining will be discussed 
through cultural institutions as well as intellectuals’ role lens. Both are endowed with 
the calling for knowledge production: intellectuals are individuals that bear the same 
truth-telling, epistemological responsibility as cultural institutions. Not only do they 
share the same duty, these spaces and privileged professionals often meet. This case 
study’s institution functions intellectually by publishing its own research in books and 
articles, while its keynote speakers’ findings are typically disseminated after their 
presentations. This community space in fact publishes materials generated by its 
researchers, project managers as well as those of experts external to the Foundation, 
some of which hold lectures here. The latter guests or collaborators are 
representatives of institutions (cultural and non-), the third sector, community 
practices and civil society. The role of cultural institutions and intellectuals becomes 
one is this paper, not solely given their close nature, rather as intellectualism is 
intrinsic to Fondazione’s daily functioning. 
 
The discussing of Fondazione Feltrinelli’s role will be firstly considered through its 
own definition and in the later sub-chapters through an overview of its cultural action 
regarding Italy’s populist wave. Carr underlines cultural institutions’ responsibility to 
foster thinking through the recording of multiple contexts and implications, similarly 
to Grossberg who perceives dialogue as the ultimate knowledge-producing activity, 
where agonistic views can elicit forms that are productive (2003; 2017). Together 
with these already noted theories, Mouffe’s agonistic politics will be the guiding 
framework throughout the chapter, which were inspired by Gramsci’s egemonia. 
“What is at a given moment accepted as the ‘natural’ order, jointly with the common-
sense that accompanies it, is the result of sedimented hegemonic practices. It is never 
the manifestation of a deeper objectivity” (2013:2). Each social order is the product of 
numerous practices whose aim is to establish a structure in a context of contingency. 
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Mouffe refuses the Universalist approach that postulates Western modernity as 
morally superior, given one of liberalism’s main tenants is the availability of a 
universal consensus originating from reason. We must abandon the search for a 
quintessentially harmonious society and consensus without exclusion. The common 
liberal outlining of pluralism presupposes that we inhabit a world with several values, 
yet an empirical limitation prevents us from adopting all of such; if they are brought 
together however, a harmonious ensemble arises. Habermas notes that consensus can 
be reached in the public sphere, nonetheless fails to see consensus’ hegemonic 
component: there is no society devoid of power relations (1962; Mouffe, 2013). The 
former, liberal perspective negates politics’ essential antagonistic dimension, given 
each order is susceptible to counter-hegemonic practices’ challenging. Liberal thought 
is also constituted by individualism in Mouffe’s opinion, thus “cannot recognize that 
there can only be an identity when it is constructed as difference and that any social 
objectivity is constituted through acts of power” (2013:4). To recognize radical 
negativity entails the acknowledgment of the people as divided and multiple: it is the 
very agreement that difference is a precondition for each identity’s existence which 
allows one to grasp why politics – which deals with collective identities – is 
characterized by the constitution of a “we”, whose demarcation is born from a “they”. 
Within Mouffe’s “agonistic pluralism” frame, democratic politics in fact have the 
pivotal task of creating the institutions that will foster debate, where conflicting 
consensus arises among opponents rather than enemies (2013). Antagonism and 
agonism go together: “passions” are integral to politics and importantly, conflict must 
take the form of agonism over antagonism, a struggle between adversaries. Whilst an 
antagonistic us-them distinction is cardinal in politics, adversaries’ battles focus on 
their ideals’ gaining of hegemony, nonetheless do not question the legitimacy of 
others’ right to fight for their opinion. Mouffe relates the growing disaffection with 
political participation to lacking confrontation, thus proposes society’s need for 
dialogue concerning alternatives (2013). No order should be presented as the sole 
legitimate one, as Mouffe hopes to initiate the challenging of the neoliberal order 
through agonistic debate. 
 
This thesis’ link to such agonistic theory derives from Mouffe’s perception (inspired 
by Gramsci’s organic countering) of the cultural domain as occupying a central space 
in the development of the common-sense, as this realm is fundamental in the 
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construction of counter-hegemonic practices. In regards to contemporary Italy, this 
notion presupposes the challenging of the populist governmental order. Firstly 
Fondazione is in agreement with the author that democracy and politics are not a 
minority’s question (Tarantino, Lo Stato di Salute della Democrazia di Oggi, 2018; 
Mouffe, 2013). Massimiliano Tarantino, the Secretary General, described the current 
global political moment as a historical one where the flattening of the past on the 
present appears to prevail: far from an anachronistic cost, archives have an 
opportunity to overturn such disastrous politics. Tarantino understands this cultural 
institution as bearing a role, arisen from its conservation and research identity, to 
become decisive in the imagining of a future characterized by what should constitute 
as the common sense: rights’ valuing, conviviality and tolerance (IALHI, 2018). 
Fondazione identifies its enemies through society’s dividing, unjust ills as 
xenophobia, loss of the rights that seemed to have been won timelessly and 
polarization (IALHI, 2018; ‘900, La Stagione dei Diritti, 2018). The institution 
opposes anti-democratic forces as demagogy, souverainism and nationalism, deeming 
populism as one of the most significant challenges to representative democracy 
(Feltrinelli C. 2018; Tarantino, Lo Stato di Salute della Democrazia di Oggi, 2018). 
Whilst the institution recognizes as its enemies the phenomena that hinder 
conviviality - a uniting community or shared space of existence – as radicalization, it 
posits that the demonization of such prevents the understanding of the consensus it 
generates, similarly to Mouffe (Fischer, 2007; Lo Stato di Salute della Democrazia di 
Oggi, 2018; ‘900, La Stagione dei Diritti, 2018). In fact Fondazione initiates agonistic 
discussions as the President of Fondazione specified “we truly invite everyone to our 
table, as we are convinced that without a collective and shared investigation on the 
present, it is impossible…to face the future positively” (Feltrinelli C., 2018). The 
hope is for contemporary debate to originate accurate and secular knowledge, and 
critical thinking to develop through citizens and consequently adversaries’ encounter. 
Opposing views are not treated as enemies’ illegitimate opinions, as the Foundation 
acknowledges a pluralistic polyphony of voices.  
 
Grossberg’s debate epistemological capabilities are shared by the Foundation, as the 
President identifies three specific means for the not-for-profit institution to fight 
today’s political horrors: to study, communicate and share (Feltrinelli C., 2018). The 
engagement of the public sphere is presupposed in such actions. A pivotal aspect of 
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Fondazione’s role in facing democracy’s challenges is to create novel dialogue 
possibilities between institutions and citizens, closing the gap between such 
(Tarantino, Lo Stato di Salute della Democrazia di Oggi, 2018). Conviviality should 
also emerge through the institution’s battling of another enemy, the often elitist and 
fragmented nature of cultural consumption, by striving to reach a wider crowd 
(Stagione Ribelle, 2017). The Foundation perceives its responsibility as primarily 
concerning the emphasis of historians’ role: to unite as opposed to divide through free 
archival dissemination - through the digital ecosystem -, to identify indispensable 
research contributions and their breaking points through historical comparative 
approaches (IALHI, 2018). The enacting of this cultural institution’s educational duty 
requires interdisciplinarity, through the reaching of a virtuous equilibrium between 
dissemination and the scientific rigour of historical approaches (IALHI, 2018). 
Moreover, this community hub follows a freedom of research ethos and adopts the 
common view that truth entails the confrontation with the ruling power (IALHI, 2018; 
Foucault, 1977; Bourdieu, 1989; Chomsky, 1967; Said, 1993). Speaking the truth to 
power is interpreted as the responsibility to honesty, or regime of truth, especially 
when entering the political realm. Far from promoting the hegemonic order’s ideals, 
the Lega-M5S values, the Foundation acknowledges the value of antagonistic 
challenges to the dominant ideology. Whilst political difference is not discredited, 
populism is commonly challenged in Fondazione’s initiatives. Within an agonistic 
frame, Fondazione outlines contemporary left as well as right politics. By 
representing both political camps, and allowing the public to access materials often 
ignored, the hub strives to aid citizens in reaching an informed, documented opinion. 
Whilst denouncing xenophobic sentiments and totalitarianism, “which horror and 
frighten us” (Feltrinelli C., 2018), by noting an “us-them” rhetoric, Fondazione 
ultimately strives to be a service to citizens, so to ameliorate their future, rather than 
building counter-hegemonic practices (‘900, La Stagione dei Diritti, 2018). 
 
At a moment in time when the world is heading towards profound political change, 
and has witnessed dramatic economic shifts, Fondazione yearns to initiate social 
change. It is moved both by civic sense and what it perceives as cultural institutions’ 
duty: to have a true rather than symbolic role, by enriching citizens with the tools to 
navigate an unprecedented, complex present. This institution promises to follow a 
“culture of enquiry” (Carr, 2003). Agonistic dialogue, research, truth, 
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interdisciplinarity, references to the past, free promulgation are vital to the creation of 
a “polyphony of opinions” (IALHI, 2018) which must represent citizens of all ages, to 
build bridges between individuals, institutions and between each other. Therefore 
Fondazione Feltrinelli within times of uncertainty and emerging populism defines its 
role as a social, political and educational cultural institution guided by a research 
predisposition and with the objective of laying the hopes for a greater future. Archives 
share intellectuals’ key characteristic: opportunity.  
 
My internship experience in Fondazione Feltrinelli commenced in September 2018 
and ended in January 2019; such case study was fundamental with regards to this 
report’s Culture Studies framing. In fact Fondazione’s outline and comparison to the 
landscape sheds light on cultural institutions’ central positioning in the cultural 
domain given their construction of counter-hegemonic practices, through the exercise 
of the opportunity located within their privileged position (Mouffe, 2013; Chomsky, 
2011). The bewilderment caused by the crises of knowledge is tackled in the 
conceptual frame, linked to populism in Italian institutions’ intellectualism and 
opposed by their scopes (Grossberg, 2017). In terms of my activities, I started by 
working in the Programming and Production area, where I would curate events’ 
details as the set up of the room, the catering and porters’ timings, coordinating the 
guest speakers’ wishes with those of the project managers and supporting the running 
of the event itself. Within a few weeks however I was incorporated in the 
Foundation’s thematic areas. I supported a benchmarking activity where I analysed 
Italian institutions’ cultural management formation courses, and searched for possible 
granting centres, which was essential to this thesis’ comparative chapter. I 
collaborated with 2 video-makers in the production of Fondazione’s videos, as 
Stagione Capitale’s introductory one; story-telling, conciseness and semiotic images 
are vital to the production of videos and the crowd’s enticement. A task that remained 
unchanged throughout my experience was that of translating English and Italian texts. 
Based on the coming initiative’s topic, I scouted for specific contacts to invite via 
email as the public, among organizations and universities’ sites. The initiative I was 
lucky enough follow the most was linked to the Cities and Citizenship area, “Atlas of 
Cities”: I invited speakers, artists and curated the distinct promotional materials 
required by the Communication team. Through its 6 appointments, the cycle of events 
compared 12 cities thanks to notions as safety, happiness and formality. The virtue I 
 53 
believe is paramount to students’ work, the ability to solely concentrate on one project 
until it is complete, must be forgotten in a working environment. Here, the mastery of 
multitasking is key.  
 
3.2 – Fondazione Feltrinelli’s educational role (or political blindness)?  
 
Fondazione Feltrinelli 2017-2018’s Stagione Ribelle, season of events, condemned 
elitist culture and called for “rebels”, which it defines as distant from the common 
perception of lonely individuals moving in opposite directions; such today are those 
whose priority is community-thinking and who are curious hence listen and grasp 
differing opinions’ significant notions (2017). Stagione Ribelle aimed to engage 
citizens, focusing its cultural initiatives on themes as labour, globalization, politics 
and social transformations. Following rebels’ valuing of opposing visions, its 
confrontational space role and with a disoriented society in mind, Fondazione 
envisioned the cycle of events “What is left/ what is right” for Italy’s March 2018 
upcoming elections. Whilst reiterating the counter-hegemonic ideals it opposes by 
asking “is it possible to contrast the waves of insecurity and intolerance?” (What is 
left, what is right, 2017), the institution invited both left and right thinkers to question 
whether such political distinctions are still relevant. The Foundation recognizes 
Europe’s future is stuck between two ills, hate and inequality, and acknowledges the 
blurring of the left-right dichotomy: “left and right are categories still greatly utilized 
for guidance in public debate…yet are not always exhaustive in the drawing of lines 
of fracture and juxtaposition on critical political themes…Are they still useful terms 
when interpreting the novel political phenomena?” (Nè di destra nè di sinistra?, 2018) 
Despite Fondazione’s famous leftist roots and remarked opposition to intolerance, 
such cycle initiated controversy among the intellectual community. Fondazione’s 
hope was a two-sided one: to encourage the public to vote (it started a hashtag 
#IamthereforeIvote to facilitate this wish) and insure that its vote was an informed 
one, through the confrontation of differing political ideologies. The voting aid 
emerged from the cultural centre’s self-declared epistemological predisposition. 
Althusser argues education is among the most potent Ideological State Apparatuses - 
which mirror the understanding of cultural institutions’ functioning as neoliberal 
machines - given they perpetuate the State’s repressive ways through a specialized 
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apparatus (1971; Šešić & Vickery, 2018; Pratt, 2006). The ruling classes ensure their 
domination over the working classes through these apparatuses’ reproduction of the 
relations of production. Althusser understands the educational system as a powerful 
State apparatus, given it is the sole compulsory one and teaches the ruling class’ 
ideology in its pure state, philosophy and ethics for example, when a child is most 
vulnerable (Althusser, 1971). Bennet argues for a less politically charged educational 
scope (1998). Education acts as a technology within the cultural field, as its 
technological component implies its continuous reform process to reflect society’s 
ways, and its complex operational realities are a cultural process of mediation (Chan 
& Hui, 2011). Vermittlung, “mediation” in German, means the transfer from one party 
to the next, the pragmatic transmission of a message, as well as the attempt to 
reconcile two conflicting parties (Lind, 2012). “What is left/what is right” exemplifies 
Fondazione’s recognition of both left and right agonistic views: far from solely 
legitimating the populist ruling class’ values by brainwashing children, it arbiters, 
mediates conflicting views for young-adults and adults acquisition of contemporary 
information.  
 
Before delving into the intellectual backlash originated by the said initiative, one will 
briefly mention this institution’s outlining of fascism and populism, to portray the 
informational role and historical references it provides. Giangiacomo’s militant 
antifascism has remained a recurrent, now intellectual constant among the 
Foundation’s priorities. The 23rd March 2019 was the 100th anniversary of the Fasci 
di combattimento’s founding, a movement destined to become Mussolini’s regime, in 
one of Milan’s most central squares: Piazza San Sepolcro. Despite the fact Milan’s 
Prefect had cancelled CasaPound’s meeting to celebrate such recurrence, 2000 
supporters of such extreme right movement held a meeting-concert in the city’s 
outskirts welcoming the band ZetaZeroAlfa with roman salutes (Repubblica, 2019). 
Italy finds itself in an alarming context where a League politician admits to being a 
fascist after being called so on stage (Video.Repubblica, 2019), whilst the journalist 
Gad Lerner calmly reaffirmed being Jewish after another anniversary extreme right 
meeting by Forza Nuova shouted such religious label (ANSA, 2019). “Jew” and 
“fascist” were employed offensively. The former sheds light on Italy’s persisting anti-
Semitism while the League politician’s accepting of such name tellingly illuminates 
the normalization of fascism. “If fascism means being in favour of the people, than I 
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am a fascist” (Video.Repubblica, 2019). “Fascism-never-again” (#maipiùfascismo) is 
a motto promoted by Fondazione, where the significant date was marked by the 
revealing of a capital letters art installation on the institution’s building with such 
maxim, and the publishing of In presa diretta: la costruzione del fascismo raccontata 
in tempo reale (1919-1925) (Masini, Troglio, Panaino, & Perazzoli, 2019); the book 
reports Mussolini’ slow rise aided by severe class and generational divides. Historical 
parallels to the present were in fact drawn throughout Fondazione’s day events. The 
Secretary General both presented this commemoration and published an article on an 
external newspaper by specifying how the Fasci introduced themselves initially as a 
leftist revolutionary movement able to radically reform the economy and society; 
however only the old-against-new opposition remained in this shifting ideology and 
many of the founders themselves then endorsed antifascist struggles (Huffington Post, 
2019). Tarantino later noted “history does not repeat itself, perhaps it rhymes, yet it is 
the people who make the difference, through their passions and perseverance” (2019). 
The commemoration certainly served to remind citizens of what Fondazione 
understands to be a present-day communal priority, as this cultural centre leads a 
daily battle against fascism through its remembering.  
 
Il fascismo in tempo reale was a joint research and publication led in 2015 by 
Fondazione, which told the genesis of such movement throughout Europe (Bidussa & 
Vacca, 2015). The educational opportunity held by archives recently appeared 
through Fondazione’s publishing of an excerpt which reads “it would be enough for 
each Italian, posing his conscience a question that even fascism cannot prevent, asked 
himself what race he is…for the ‘purity of the antique blood’ proclaimed by the 
Minister of Culture to gain an absurd appearance. Citizen of big harbours which are 
the living communities of all people, farmer of the south from which many emigrated 
only to come back Africanized, Americanized, Europeanized, citizen of those islands 
inhabited by diverse civilizations and captured by pirates of all coasts…all Italians 
carry within them the traces of the ‘races’ of the four cardinal directions” 
(Gianfranchi, 1938; Fondazione Feltrinelli, Masini, 2018). An excerpt from the end of 
the 20th century was also shared in 2019 to emphasize how French, German, Italian 
antifascist struggles should not be distinguished: “they are all one persistent moral, 
civil cause regarding freedom, enacted in the name of conscience” (Rosselli, 1997; 
Fondazione Feltrinelli, 2018). Antifascism has been both promoted and questioned 
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through multiple opinions, given the sharing of a researcher’s article condemning a 
priori antifascism. Antifascism will only take place once Italians admit they have 
been and still are fascist. Raimo argues antifascism cannot be enacted until the 
acknowledgment of the reasons for contemporary fascism in Italy (Fondazione 
Feltrinelli, 2018).  
 
The populist question has been tackled by Fondazione through its deepening, 
discussing and often critique. A 2016 article noted how Clinton referenced experts’ 
backing of her economic programme whilst Trump accused her of being an 
establishment insider. This confrontation hints to the technocracy vs. populism 
debate, and the author believed it would have been a mistake to perceive Europe as 
immune to such axis (Fondazione Feltrinelli, Invernizzi, 2016). One of Johnson’s 
decisive comments on Brexit’s Leave campaign was “people are sick of experts”, 
similarly Invernizzi here pointed to Italy’s growing popular discontent towards the 
ruling elite and Five Star’s technical competency claims. Given the beginning of 
populism’s global emergence, Fondazione started defining such through its people-
against-the-elite dichotomy, claimed representation of people through the awakening 
of emotionality and distinction from popularity through personalization and 
spectacularization styles - centered on provocations (Fondazione Feltrinelli, 
Biancalana, 2016). “What is left/what is right’s” main task is to grasp whether these 
political distinctions matter nowadays, a topic which has been commonly linked to 
populism within Fondazione’s literature. The book Destra voiced Manin’s initial 
hypothesis that the defeat of alternatives to liberal-democracy caused among average 
voters a perpetual state of doom in the centre, undecided between left and right (1997; 
Puttini & Fumagalli, 2018). Manin later recognized he had overestimated the erosion 
of parties’ divisions: the silent majority has in fact found itself more willing to favour 
extremist movements since 2008, and the majority of contemporary populist 
movements are found on the right spectrum (2018). Fioravante’s article on the other 
hand reported how the movement that received the most votes by those undecided 
between left and right, in France’s 2017 elections, was Mèlenchon’s La France 
Insoumise (eco-socialist) rather than the extreme-right Front National. Despite 
UKIP’s6 extraordinary win in 2015 in Margate (UK), two years later such extreme 
 
6 United Kingdom Independence Party, which lead the Brexit Leave campaign.  
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right party lost 10,000 votes, and Labour doubled its consensus to 16.5 thousand 
(Fondazione Feltrineli, 2018). Fioravante quotes de Benoist as being accurate only to 
an extent when proposing the disappearance of left-right identities; rather than 
converging towards each other as the French author states, political camps have rarely 
been more divided (2018). This publication condemns the left as being stuck in old 
ideologies, unable to renew itself and act while fixating on an immaterial populist 
enemy. The only text identified which outlines a left-right convergence still points to 
the populist use of corruption accusations to give the illusion of difference among 
contemporary parties’ (Fondazione Feltrinelli, Curini, 2018). Gerbaudo’s writing 
instead asks for the end of populism’s pejorative connotations, as left populism can 
truly fight societies’ enemy, such as financial oligarchies, rather than the right’s 
scapegoating of migrants (Fondazione Feltrinelli, 2017). Gerbaudo notes it is the 
left’s responsibility to cover the political vacuum resulting after the economic crisis, 
as opposed to the right’s given it architected neoliberal policies. He deems left 
populism as the sole global alternative to Trump, Le Pen and Salvini’s xenophobia 
(2017). The texts regarding populism disseminated by Fondazione Feltrinelli 
primarily critique such movements as drawing on emotionality and people vs. elite 
oppositions: such criticism climaxed with Anselmi’s already cited publication, where 
populism is portrayed as representing democracy’s epochal destruction (2018). 
Nonetheless, populism’s tackling up to Stagione Ribelle does not feature its 
simplification or condemnation, rather analyses, critiques and distinct promotions of 
such are found, as are the differing arguments of the left-right covergence.  
 
The cultural initiative that initiated intellectual backlash will now be discussed. 
Varoufakis, former Greek Minister of Finance of the Tsipras Government (the 
coalition of the radical left) and Pisapia, former Mayor of Milan (centre-left) were the 
first guests to take part in What is left/ what is right. The keynote speaker of the 
second event was Florian Philippot, director of Marine Le Pen’s Presidential 
campaign and founder of the right-wing movement Les Patriotes, and that of the third 
was Paul Mason, journalist closely working with Corbyn’s Labour Party. Alain de 
Benoist, writer, philosopher and founder of the rightist Nouvelle Droite movement 
was supposed to lecture in Fondazione in February, nonetheless the criticism initiated 
by the event made for its postponing to April, after the elections. It is significant that 
the relevance of the left-right distinction was posed to many politicians linked to new 
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radical parties, most of whom are close to, or who have been defined as populists: Le 
Pen, Varoufakis and Corbyn. On this occasion, a large group of academics studying 
far-right movements accused the institution of political blindness. An open letter to 
Fondazione’s President and Scientific Committee was written; Albanese, University 
of Lisbon, Chollet, University of Lausanne and Bernini, University of Verona, were 
among the first researchers to sign such (Albanese et al., 2018). “We were surprised 
in discovering that your Foundation, which we admire for its democratic and 
antifascist effort, has invited two well-known representatives of the French far-right, 
de Benoist and Philippot…what the two French share is their “nativism”, belief that 
nations should only be inhabited by natives…this discriminatory understanding of 
society contradicts democracy’s pluralism” (2018). The letter acknowledges the need 
to take interest in rightist movements, however states that such cultural events entail 
serious political regression. Rather than breaking ideologically from Jean-Marie Le 
Pen’s Front National, Marine Le Pen Party’s communication strategy is solely 
succeeding in its de-demonization. Philippot and de Benoist as well are not 
representatives of the new right, and the first’s attendance contributes to the Front 
National’s normalization strategy. Moreover, the placing of the events before the 
Italian elections worsened Fondazione’s choice in the academics’ eyes, given de 
Benoist inspires Italian far-right Lega and CasaPound supporters. The letter asked the 
cutting question: “nowadays, when…many seek protection in Europe, and others 
create a fertile ground for racism and xenophobia, do you think it is appropriate to 
emphasize the ideas which de Benoist and Philippot promulgate?” (2018). 
 
Passions guide politics among diverse people. Fondazione after having repeated its 
intolerance for xenophobic sentiments - just as it recognizes difference among 
collective identities - it acknowledged the legitimacy of agonistic views. In response 
to the letter the Secretary General found it was necessary to outspokenly outline the 
purpose of such institution once again. “We respect your position however believe the 
peculiarity of our role…is that of contributing in the founding of future society. On 
the one hand emphasizing the roots of antifascism, which are greatly found in our 
patrimony and research, and on the other also promoting the meeting of different 
opinions and listening to opponents’ beliefs, which act as the foundations of a truly 
democratic context” (Lettera43, 2018). Thus the formula adopted by the Foundation is 
confrontation over censorship and demonization. Significantly, whilst the majority of 
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the institution’s efforts concern the promotion of antifascism, as recognized by the 
intellectuals, this is not its single aim. “The aim we have given our institution is… the 
promotion of  plural confrontation and the creation of a space which does not follow 
one thesis, rather it is committed to the promotion of knowledge and information, key 
to critical thinking” (2018). Rather than promoting the ruling ideology in place before 
the March elections ( the technical left, PD, Gentiloni Government), the hub strives to 
represent contemporary society by inviting left and right notable politicians. Given 
the Foundation’s educational role and acknowledging of opposing views and their 
agonistic right to fight for hegemony, which is constitutive of democracy, it trusts that 
dialogue between left and right will elicit informed votes. The productiveness of 
polyphonic voices’ mediation and discussion materializes in critical thought.  
 
Despite Fondazione Feltrinelli’s public explanation of the institution’s choice given 
its epistemological role, the appeal continued accumulating signatures by European 
intellectuals throughout February, who then shared it with the general public: 800 
people signed the petition linked to the open letter (Change.org, 2018). This debate 
travelled beyond the letter’s intellectuals; such professionals were not in agreement on 
the happenings. Repubblica advertised What is left/ what is right as an educational 
laboratory leading up the elections mapping the competing political families through 
the lecturing of different thinkers and political actors (2017). Further, it believed the 
institution perceived the coming elections not simply as a participatory tool, but as the 
symbol of a thoughtful choice as well. Oltrelalinea is a newspaper that distances itself 
from mass-media and harshly criticized the open letter as contradictory. The 
newspaper’s journalist Vivaldelli thinks whoever – regardless of political views - has 
read de Benoist’s work can agree he is not a “dangerous nazi” and can appreciate his 
intellectual prominence. In fact the French author’s contributions on the left-right 
vanishing axis have already been mentioned in this paper. ”The open letter, in the 
name of ‘democracy’, prevented a great thinker from taking part in a civil 
confrontation, negating pluralism…of which they are false prophets. This letter’s 
contradiction justifies…an obnoxiously repressive act” (2018).  
 
Intellectuals cannot always take it upon themselves to define their role in society: 
typically, they carry out such task through self-proclamation or their works, however 
the open letter was a rare example of intellectuals attempting to define other 
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colleagues’ duty. The letter urged Fondazione to cancel de Benoist’s invitation both 
considering his nativism and influence over the Italian far-right; those who formulated 
it study and are alarmed by such European movements, hence solely wanted 
Fondazione to invite leftist thinkers. The fear of right-wing views’ legitimation and 
awareness of the Foundation’s leftist ideology made the letter’s intellectuals outline 
Feltrinelli’s work as one that should solely explore antifascist beliefs. The 800 
signatures signify the letter’s perception of Fondazione purely as an institution for 
leftist debate was shared by the public. A peculiar attempted, external superimposition 
as a leftist conversational institution was initiated by What is left/what is right. The 
epistemological, debate role of the cultural institution did not shift as de Benoist held 
a lecture, however the Foundation moved such initiative in April, possibly 
acknowledging the controversy of hosting a right-wing philosopher shortly before the 
elections. Fondazione was therefore not willing to negotiate on its promotion of 
dialogue between opposing beliefs, as censoring right notions negates democracy’s 
pluralism. Rebels are those who can grasp differing views’ salient points while 
agreeing to listen. The concern should focus on the relation of one’s cultural 
framework inter-subjectively, as opposed to how to “accurately represent the other” 
(Gregos, 2018: 34). In fact, one argues the institution’s explicit leftist origin does not 
imply an overriding antagonistic us-them rhetoric between such and the right, as 
prevented by its mediation, confrontational and pluralistic calling. 
 
Does the outlining of rightist beliefs foster their promotion? Can the promulgation of 
one, single thesis by an institution truly favour individual thinking? What is left/what 
is right can surely appear as an ethical dilemma if one merely focuses on 
Fondazione’s political role; nonetheless, this cultural institution defines itself as a 
social and educational centre as well. It reiterates continuously its leftist beliefs 
through fascism’s remembering and antifascist stance, and whilst it openly opposes 
rightist thinking and condemns populism as being dangerous for representative 
democracy, it perceives exclusion from political debate as being futile, unjust and 
unconstitutional. The “confrontation between adversaries is what constitutes the 
‘agonistic struggle’, which is the very condition of a vibrant democracy” (Mouffe, 
2013:7). Fondazione introduced this initiative by specifying again its opposition to 
Europe’s critical hate emergence, nonetheless its ethos dictates the listening to plural 
agonistic opinions. The open letter and public appeal it originated attempted to define 
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Fondazione’s intellectualism as solely leftist. Perhaps such were the ones blinded by 
Giangiacomo’s political stance, carried forward by Fondazione, thus could not grasp 
it is also a conversational meeting point for Italians and Europeans. The truth-telling 
capabilities of intellectuals, epistemological calling of cultural institutions and 
Fondazione Feltrinelli’s clearly stated, self-proclaimed informational role through 
novel dialogues materialize in the relevance of What is left/what is right guests and 
theme’s topicality. Education must renew itself to mediate and reflect contemporary 
notions, as opposed to the ruling class’ single ideology. Fondazione’s cultural domain 
scope underlines antifascism and tolerance as common-sense values that foster 
convivial shared experiences, hence did not counter the leftist hegemonic order in 
place before the elections. The Foundation rather follows a regime of truth where all 
political camps deserve honest descriptions, especially if the left is to grasp right and 
populist consensus. Information took primacy over politicization and persuasion with 
the upcoming elections: this public space welcomes opposing thinkers not as it shares 
all of their views, but because they are representatives of current politics. The battling 
of adversaries’ opinions prevented an us-them frame from showing. Fondazione also 
offered small laboratories to students on voting’s democratic participatory value, 
enacting in an interdisciplinary manner its credo that democracy does not concern a 
minority (”Votare è l’unica forma di partecipazione?”, 2018). As a cultural institution 
with the civic duty of bettering future prospects, its role is that of eliciting 
contemporary debate. When individuals find themselves at the edge of uncertainty, 
information and depth are the sole antidotes to the fear it generates (Carr, 2003). 
Fondazione hopes for a true rather than symbolic role by aiming to enrich its guests 
with critical thinking: the tool for an educated vote.  
  
 
3.3 –Fondazione Feltrinelli’s increased political responsibility given the 
Government of Change 
 
Distressing words by Tarantino introduced Stagione Capitale: “Europe 2018/2019, an 
epochal happening is taking place before our eyes…we are about to welcome our first 
European governments dominated mainly by the right” (2018). While handing a 
utopic continent born in the hopes of overcoming nationalism, to guarantee progress 
and peace, to demagogues of populist propaganda “and doing so democratically… we 
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must take the questions this crisis poses responsibly and think of solutions and shared 
routes for its defeat. Before it is too late” (2018). A distinct, growing severity shows 
in such introduction: whereas Stagione Ribelle appealed for a non-elitist cultural 
consumption, valuing of opposing thesis and participation, the latter notion is greatly 
magnified in the current season. Globalization, politics and social transformations are 
topics carried forward in the next season, nonetheless a far more radical analysis and 
call-to-action appear. Tarantino’s opening remarks discredit Euro-scepticism and 
xenophobia, attributing the authoritarian right’s democratic wins in Europe to the 
millions who fail to see such area as a solution as opposed to an obstacle in the 
reaching of an equal welfare state, and to those who believe walls are sufficient to 
tackle the migratory phenomena. The crisis of the neoliberal hegemonic model is a 
core concept of such season, as Tarantino notes the collapse witnessed in Europe and 
the U.S.A. hints to capitalism’s sole generation of predatory ways. This contradiction 
initiates retaliation: “economic, alimentary and emotional poverty are increasingly 
prevalent and turn the relationship of the majority on this planet towards the elite into 
a violent and ferocious one” (2018). Fondazione hence deems capitalism to be the 
originator of profound inequalities and subsequent cause of establishment-phobia, or 
populism. Whilst Stagione Ribelle calls citizens to action to an extent, Stagione 
Capitale marks a pivotal shared responsibility experienced by individuals and 
institutions to brainstorm for solutions to current affairs. All hegemonic orders are 
contingent and cannot be treated as absolute (Mouffe, 2013). This cultural institution 
detects urgency and momentousness in the recent political developments, thus 
proposes two vital tasks on which Stagione Capitale rests: rethinking capitalism and 
rethinking democracy. The hope for democracy’s rethinking is its strengthening 
through the appearance of a sustainable and innovative basis for a novel economic 
and social system, which can overturn capitalism’s crisis and contradictions. 
Fondazione’s civic commitment is the countering of democracy and capitalism’s 






Figure 7: Funambulist above a city 











                          




                                  
 
 
                         
                                        
                                        
 






















                     
 
                      
                    Figure 10: Frontiers Repression poster and an immigrant's 
photographic registration  
                                (Ibid.)       
Figure 9: Amazon's rising stock value and migrants' 
reconstruction capabilities 
(Ibid) 
Figure 10: Salvini's twitter spectacle, the Italian "why" 
gesture and multicultural athletics team 
(Ibid.) 
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                        Figure 12: Impeach Trump 
       (Ibid.) 
 
                                 
                                           Figure 13: Power, Democracy 
                                  (Ibid.) 
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Rethinking allows for possibilities and alternatives: Stagione Capitale’s introductory 
video in fact bears images of urgency as well as hope. The above images are some of 
the numerous pictures featured in such, and will be outlined through brief references 
to their historical relevance and a visual and personal analysis. One will firstly 
consider Fondazione’s archive and then proceed to analyse the video’s public art and 
counter-hegemonic nature. An idiosyncrasy emerges in the hub’s archival documents: 
the institutionalization of the “unworthy”. “Archive” comes from the Greek arkheion, 
such as the residence of magistrates who represented the law, where official 
documents were held (Derrida & Prenowitz, 1995). The archons were the guardians 
and interpreters of the archives, which could not exist without a residence. It is in 
“this domiciliation that archives take place…this place where they dwell permanently, 
marks the institutional passage from the private to the public” (1995:10). Archival 
materials are safeguarded by virtue of their privileged topology, and Lombardy’s 
Archival Superintendence has confirmed the historical relevance of Fondazione’s 
conservation (FondazioneFeltrinelli, 2019). This elevated domiciliation however was 
originally envisioned as a counter-bourgeoisie documentation of international 
working class movements. Whilst Fondazione’s archive expanded greatly to include 
1.5 million pieces, where invaluable first editions as Das Kapital are found, its first 
role lied in the valorisation of subordinate classes’ political organizations and action 
(1867). An “inclusive archive” in fact contains the traces of the poor, non-white, 
women and “unworthy” individuals on top of leaders and heroes (Sekula, 1986). The 
peculiarity of the Foundation’s archival documents is found in the privileged 
topological location attributed to subordinate classes’ heritage, directly challenging 
the 19th century portrayal of culture as an upper and middle class value. Significant 
parallels can be drawn between such archive and the clip, produced by Pierluigi 
Anselmi - a story-telling professor, moviemaker and founder of an art collective, 
“Minimum” (Anselmi P., 2019). While the public sphere has already been touched 
upon, public art has not: Kwon defines such as socially relevant works which are 
accessible publicly, engage and empower audiences, consider marginalized groups 
and foster politically-conscious thinking (2002).  
 
Stagione Capitale video’s accessibility is determined by its showing at the start of 
most lectures at the Foundation, and its dissemination on you-tube. The first (figure 7) 
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and last image is that of a funambulist dangerously walking on a tight rope, the 
symbol of Stagione Capitale: this is intended to function as a metaphor illustrating the 
complex historical moment in social, economic and political terms, and the 
widespread difficulty encountered by citizens in navigating such. Social relevance 
appears to guide the video itself, as for instance socio-economic conscious thinking is 
enticed through the emphasis of the economy’s rapidly changing nature. The 2008 
economic crash shows through the Lehman Brothers images, as well as the growing 
prominence of the gig economy (figure 8), through a vast Amazon warehouse and a 
Cortilia basket, a delivery of in-season fruit and vegetables. A subsequent chart shows 
Amazon’s exponential rise in stock value and a smile materializes through the 
company’s logo (figure 9). This is the first of many oppositions showed through the 
two companies, as Amazon’s prominence and earnings appear through the spacious 
warehouse and chart, underlining its controversial, voracious (smiley) model; Cortilia 
on the other hand represents the gig economy’s sustainable potential, through the 
plastic-free delivery of seasonal goods. 
 
The League’s promotion of bulldozers’ destruction powerful image is replaced by 
refugees’ reconstruction capabilities in the video. Migrants’ relocation to dying towns 
has been one of Italy’s immigration policies. Two article headlines (“i paesi che 
rinascono”; “così i migranti hanno salvato un borgo destinato a morire”) point to the 
numerous isolated villages - which seemed destined to total abandonment once the 
older generation passed away – that received a second chance thanks to migrants’ 
repopulation (figure 9). Similarly to the archive’s rare documentation of the lower 
classes, this public art piece represents marginalized individuals and how they can 
enrich the country, therefore empowering such group through the valorisation of their 
role. Seconds later Salvini’s twitter post “leave, leave, leave ☺”, accompanied by a 
picture of foreigners queuing, appears on the right and is swiftly mocked by the 
wonderfully stereotypical Italian gesture on the left (figure 10).  Salvini’s authority 
crumbles instantly through the derisive hand and the subtle questioning of his 
distasteful spectacle on social media. The video speaks truth to power: the politician’s 
typical linking of a state of crisis to all foreigners, and consequent hegemonic 
xenophobia, is delegitimized through the refugees’ urban repopulation ways and the 
bottom image of the all-black Italian athletics team (figure 10). The group is seen 
hugging after winning the 4x400 meter race and have become a symbol of Italy’s 
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multiculturalism. Mouffe emphasizes art’s relationship to politics as well, given 
critical art initiates dissensus by giving voice to the narratives obliterated by the 
hegemonic order (2007). Fondazione Feltrinelli’s abhorring, antagonism to Salvini’s 
anti-pluralistic notions emerges, also the institution’s convivial pro-migration ethos 
and diverse society’s valuing show through the empowering of migrants and by the 
recognition of the athletics team as representative of Italy. A dangerous emotional 
poverty is underlined through Salvini’s offensive post together with a promising 
message through migrants’ reconstruction and integration possibilities. Whilst the 
audience did not directly engage in the creation of Stagione Capitale’s video, 
accessibility is also determined by relatability given its social relevance, earned 
through the portrayal of sub-groups, a plural community and historical happenings as 
the economic crisis. “Art today cannot be understood as something created by genius, 
separated from the world we live in” (Santos & Cachola, 2018:1). 
 
A cardinal year for sub-groups’ notions, counter-cultures, is pictured in the video: 
1968. On the right side the welcoming of migrants once they are rescued from shanty 
boats, sided by the paradoxical incarceration connotations of the numbering and 
photographing featured in such hospitality, appear in figure 11. The Frontiers = 
Repression poster on the left recalls the 1968 French anti-border protests, which 
advocated for migrants’ rights. The common severity-faith tension is attributed 
another positive shade through the Black Power salute below the number-attributing 
activity image (figure 11). This historically significant picture of the 1968 Olympics 
shows two African-American athletes raising their gloved fists as a sign of human 
rights’ protest against racism within sports. Fondazione therefore undertakes its 
historical emphasis role by linking the current welcoming of migrants to the anti-
racism battles already fought by counter-cultures in 1968; viewers are reminded of the 
bottom-up’s potency through this prominent year and its counter-hegemonic 
capabilities.  
 
Marine Le Pen, Putin7 and Salvini’s faces mould into one by shifting images (figure 
12). This artistic choice effectively draws parallels between these figures’ 
conservative beliefs and recalls a Rubik’s cube, possibly hinting to the complexity 
 
7 Vladimir Putin is the current President of Russia. He held the same position from 2000-2008. 
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brought about by the current political climate. Compared to Stagione Ribelle, one 
believes an antagonistic us-them frame appears - liberals vs. demagogues – 
throughout the video. Despite the fact the cultural centre openly condemns binary 
thinking in favour of multiple opinions, dichotomous juxtapositions are employed in 
the video both to evoke urgency and optimism, and for its political views to transpire. 
In fact the aforementioned politicians are portrayed in tension with another sub-group, 
the LGBTIQ8  community. The rainbow girl symbolizes such through the group’s 
colours. Fondazione’s pluralistic vision of society is once again underlined through 
the lugubrious grey-coloured politicians that favour the colourful accentuation of the 
girl’s face. Salvini and Trump are the subjects featured the most in the video: the 
former’s cult of the leader is weakened while the latter’s impeachment is promoted 
(figure 13). Artistic agonistic practices can significantly challenge dominant, 
hegemonic values (Mouffe, 2007): rather than his own Messianic portrait or his status 
as voice of the people, Salvini is presented as a conservative politician who cannot 
represent Italy’s multifaceted population through the outlining of his anti-migration 
and anti-LGBTIQ credos 9 . Politically-conscious thinking is marked by the 
Foundation’s antagonism to right, illiberal politicians and through the call for active 
citizenship in the second last “power, democracy” image. The central notion of 
democracy’s rethinking does not entail its discarding: it must be strengthened through 
a collective questioning of such so to ameliorate its complexities. The cultural 
institution urges citizens to act by reminding them of their significance: the hundreds 
of hands holding the “democracy” sign are both the ones needed to sustain such 
model and to enable its reshaping. Again, images’ persuasiveness and impact is 
incomparable to written text’s rigidity (Mirzoeff, 1998). 
 
Art must be considered through the “symbolic value of the ‘world’ it suggests to us 
and of the image of human relations reflected by it” (Bourriad, 2002:18). Fondazione 
Feltrinelli does not solely preserve art in its archives, it produces such as well: 
Stagione Capitale’s video is a public art piece that is accessible, stimulates political 
awareness through historical and current renowned images and the symbolic - rather 
 
8 LGBTIQ is an initialism for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer 
community. 
9 Salvini’s latter opinion was omitted in the previous chapter and can be exemplified through his 
participation in the World Congress for Families XIII in Verona, an openly anti-abortion and anti-
LGBTIQ rights initiative in the name of “natural families” (Repubblica, 2019). 
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than participatory - engagement of subgroups. It shares the archive’s non-elitist 
celebratory nature of marginalized groups and similarly to the former’s counter-
bourgeoisie origin, the video functions as a challenging artistic practice with regards 
to the anti-pluralistic, populist ideological order. Cultural hegemony does not always 
generate consensus, as organic intellectuals initiate social change by countering 
common-sense views (Gramsci, 1957; Mouffe, 2013). LGBTIQ rights’ valuing and 
migrants’ inclusion no longer constitute as Italy’s shared values and thus dominant 
culture, given they are discarded by the Government of Change; however are 
advocated by Fondazione through an us-them, liberal-illiberal antagonistic 
juxtaposition. Rather than considering populists’ views, Fondazione uses a 
dichotomous style to signal the severity of the current populist moment. This cultural 
space’s continuous historical narrative - its leftist opinion - clearly materializes 
through the use of oppositions and emphasis of the LGBTIQ community, anti-racism 
1968 protests, Italy’s refugees’ repopulation capabilities and multi-culturalism. 
Foucault intellectuals’ specific political struggle is combined to a global overview 
(1977). The clip’s world echoing arises through international politicians, the historical 
and global relevance of 1968 and the 2008 economic collapse, whilst opposing 
specific phenomena as Italy’s xenophobia. Neoliberalism’s predatory ways and 
consequent widespread inequality are among the video’s first images. Compared to 
What is left/what is right’s purely educational purpose, the video aims to inform 
through its social and historical relevance, however is certainly not short of 
politicization. Salvini’s authority and cult are targeted by the humouring of his 
insensitive social media use, his common representation of the people is also hurt 
through the portrayal of Italy’s ethnically diverse society and his opposition to 
LGBTIQ rights. In light of Italy’s populist government, Stagione Capitale’s 
introduction and video are centered mostly on a struggle against such demagogues. 
Despite the Foundation’s explicit delegitimation of Salvini’s ways, which hinder 
conviviality, one argues populism’s democratic origins and right to agonistic debate 
are not questioned. The clip denounces rightist notions, yet underlines everyone’s 
responsibility to engage politically by depicting democracy’s functioning as the 
majority’s task. Art draws its political potential from its intrinsic inclusiveness and 
offering of alternative narratives (Power, 2018). The institution’s political and 
intellectual opportunity manifests: it organically opposes the consensus and wishes 
for social change by calling for citizens’ engagement. The video’s alarm is not 
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intended to surpass its promising connotation: democracy’s rethinking and subsequent 
strengthening through participation can achieve the people-against-the-elite mentality 
breakdown. Art and politics are mutual fields (Mouffe, 2007). 
 
Notwithstanding Stagione Capitale video’s intentional condemning of populist 
politicians, Fondazione generally reacted to the League-M5S’s coalition by 
continuing to study, communicate and share multiple materials on such phenomenon. 
Similarly to the previous season, a potent yet not absolute critique of such emerges, 
however the topic gained unprecedented relevance in the Foundation’s cultural scope. 
10 articles concerning populism were published just between January and March 
2019. Carr concludes assumptions and simplification are enemies of learning and 
cultural institutions’ promise is to defeat such (2003). Fondazione as well believes its 
duty entails reductionism’s opposition. Populism’s definition therefore continued in 
Stagione Capitale: its pluralistic aversion and depiction of society as definite, lacking 
stratification and social interests were noted (Fondazione Feltrinelli, Casalino, 2019). 
The historian Levis Sullam is hesitant on the use of the term “fascism”, given it 
should directly point to a European phenomenon of the 1920-40s, nonetheless holds 
no doubt on the parallels between such and the Five Stars (Fondazione Feltrinelli, 
2019). The author accuses the League of xenophobic tendencies yet deems it a 
traditional right movement; the M5S’s presumed voicing of the people however 
implies the movement’s populist identity. The Five Stars propagate an illusory 
democracy: the volontè generalè is fictional, while in truth a symbolic substitute of 
representative democracy that is non-parliamentary hence totalitarian shows. The 
Rousseau platform is a tool for supporters’ control (2019). Benadusi’s historical 
analysis has led him to argue as well for the past’s reoccurrence, where the League is 
the subject. Historical fascism was a movement of the 19th century, instead what we 
are witnessing today are notions as xenophobic nationalism, intolerance and 
opposition to multiple opinions, which fall under the general notions of fascism 
(Fondazione Feltrinelli, 2019). Salvini often intentionally draws links to historic 
fascism, for instance by quoting Mussolini: “many enemies, much honour”. The 
Minister also trivializes such (similarly to his colleague on stage) by claiming that 
what occurs in the European Government, finance and spread, is much graver than 
fascism. Another article relates populism to one more notorious individual, 
Berlusconi. Surely populism’s racism, anti-academic and anti-science stance 
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perpetuate an image of politics lacking cultural references, nevertheless Panvini 
believes intellectuals can only oppose these phenomena by acknowledging populism 
is a cultural matter (Fondazione Feltrinelli, 2019). Berlusconi turned Italy into a 
laboratory for the extension of the common politics-culture duality to the power, 
society, new communication mediums complex relation. Just as mass culture and 
television were essential for Berlusconi’s rise, the digital revolution allowed the Five 
Stars to rethink collective mobilization (2019). Hate has gained cultural hegemony: 
this aspect was initiated by Berlusconi and reached consensus with the League, with 
conspirationism as the most alarming feature of such hegemony. The most “neutral” 
characteristics identified in Fondazione’s recent populist literature are society’s 
homogeneity, whilst the predominant themes tackled are populism’s conspirationism, 
links to fascism and its interpretation as a troubling cultural issue. 
 
Populism’s global emergence should not implicate assumptions on such: 
characteristics, effects as well as causes are explained in detail by Fondazione’s 
numerous publications. Casalino underlines how the interregnum of a dying order is 
commonly characterized by charismatic spectacles (Fondazione Feltrinelli, 2019). A 
cultural matter shows as the public spirit acquires quick, reckless thinking that often 
leads to scapegoating. The author makes a remark later considered paramount to this 
paper: among the hate generated by the financial sector as well as political choices, 
populism is a symptom as opposed to societies’ disease. A symptom that grows by the 
day and is degenerating in an actual disease: neo-fascism (2019). What is left/what is 
right was replicated in Stagione Capitale for the lead-up to the European elections: 
even here, one notices the populist wave’s outlining was prioritized. Francis 
Fukuyama and Chantal Mouffe were invited as keynote speakers for such initiative, to 
introduce respectively Identity and For a Left Populism (2018; 2018). Mouffe is 
among the most renowned advocates for leftist populism and conversely Fukuyama 
perceives populism as a danger to democracy: while their theses could appear distant, 
one argues both promote the rethinking of democracy through emotionality. Mouffe 
reiterated her core beliefs; this global populist moment represents an opportunity for 
left populists to foster a new order, yet will constitute an authoritarian turn if not acted 
upon (What is left/what is right, 2019). Above its responsibility, the left bears 
culpability. Social-democratic parties’ shift towards the centre caused the feeling of 
abandonment among popular fringes, while their accepting of financial capitalism’s 
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diktat contributed to grave economic inequalities. Thus the left is partly to blame for 
populism’s main cause: the neoliberal hegemonic order. The crisis of such system 
goes hand-in-hand with post-democracy, as the popular resistance against 
neoliberalism initiated the erosion of democracy’s two pillars, equality and popular 
sovereignty (2019). Both left and right populism originate from unsatisfied demands, 
propose democracy’s recovering, however do not necessarily share egalitarian 
objectives. Populism is defined by the division into two camps and the distinction 
among left and right lies precisely in the composition of “we”.  Right populists in fact 
promise popular sovereignty solely to “true nationals”. Furthermore, the people 
negatively affected by neoliberal policies are many more than those traditionally 
considered left voters. This is where Mouffe’s opportunity shows given left populists 
must undertake “radical reformism” to form a new economic, as opposed to political, 
order. This project’s radicalization of democracy would not take a left extremist form, 
rather the construction of a progressive majority surrounding themes as exploitation, 
domination and an ecological concern. In response to Filchestein’s assertion that 
populism is an authoritarian form of democracy during the initiative, Mouffe affirmed 
the movement she promotes respects liberal-democracy. Finally, Italy can radicalize 
and hence strengthen democracy through the valorisation of its rich leftist tradition, 
allowing for the development of potent left patriotism. Ideas gain prominence through 
affect: the Italian left must prioritize sentiment to rationality, mobilizing an identity 
within people and consequently patriotism (2019). Mouffe distinguishes left and right, 
specifically the populist camps, identifies neoliberalism’s crisis as their originator and 
gives a radical lecture in Fondazione calling for left populists’ action. 
 
By capturing people’s emotions, not just reason, Fukuyama believes populists can be 
defeated (What is left/what is right, 2019). The author notes three causes for 
populism: the most cited one is globalization and the pressures it created among the 
Western world’s working class. A political trigger is exemplified by Italy and USA, 
where ineffective governments and their lacking services produced a significant 
demand for strong, charismatic leaders. Identity is an aspect Fukuyama suspects is 
greatly underappreciated in the populist analysis: considering the issue brought about 
by neoliberalism is deep inequality, why did the left – which promises to protect 
society from capitalism – not experience an upsurge of support? The defection from 
left to right begun with the first’s increasing cosmopolitanism, association to the 
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privileged strata and consequent distancing from the working class (2019). The left 
reconceptualised towards a multicultural approach, typical in elevated education, no 
longer providing representation for the general population; it created a fertile ground 
for populists by also failing to seriously promote the notions of the nation. All 
individuals have an innate, incorruptible dignity: the missing recognition of such has 
driven politics historically, where passion prevails over economic interest. National 
identity still functions as a source of recognition and Brexit voters preferred 
“protecting” the community from foreigners, rather than acknowledging the economic 
catastrophe warnings. The recurrent dichotomy of populist vs. non-populist approach 
is implicitly accepted by Fukuyama who argues “what can we do to counter this threat 
to liberal democracy? We find a symbolic way of supporting national identity” 
(2019). Right populists’ nationalist reappropriation of identity through ethnicity is 
unacceptable in our de facto multicultural societies, nor can a single religion represent 
a population and hence shape identity. By drawing on the emotionality typically 
equated to populism, Fukuyama wishes for a democratic majority with ideals based 
on constitutionalism and national identity to form. Lerner acted as the mediator and 
further contextualized Fukuyama’s remarks to Italy by noting how instrumental 
religious identity can be at times: the League travelled from pagan, Celtic rites to 
rosaries (2019). Therefore Mouffe states democracy can be rethought and 
strengthened through the formulation of a progressive left populist paradigm, 
achieved through left patriotism; Fukuyama denounces populism as anti-democratic 
yet agrees with the populist binary division of society, and calls for emotions over 
rationality for democracy’s rethinking as well. Fondazione’s predominant criticism of 
populism cannot be said to be perennial and its leftist origins and guests do not censor 
the left’s culpability within populism’s emergence. Its educational role mainly entails 
the countering of populism’s hegemony - thus acts as an anti-State Apparatus - 
nonetheless the Foundation maintains a critical stance even with regards to the left.  
 
Just as antifascism is promoted through historical reviews nonetheless such term is 
also questioned by Fondazione, populism is often linked to historical fascism through 
the paralleling to the past however the term and link do not escape challenging. 
Bidussa judges the development of populism’s discussion solely around the fascist vs. 
antifascist axis as reductionist (Fondazione Feltrinelli, 2018). He introduces a 
laboratory for researchers and professionals, where current political anxieties will be 
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understood through the nationalism-populism-Euroscepticism question, by assessing 
how the exorbitant use of the term fascism can initiate its analytical loss. Such term 
has made a remarkable comeback in Italy, either in nostalgic terms or employed by 
those who fight it as if it were an Italian brand. Bidussa does not deny the link 
between fascism and populism, however warns readers of the intellectual 
ineffectiveness which can arise through constant citing of fascism and the 
understanding of populism solely through such connection (2018). The article initiates 
the unravelling of the populist knot: souverainism, one of its features, does not just 
equate to nationalism, as the first is a cultural and social perception of the group that 
is equated in economic terms. Bidussa provides a solution on top of his populist 
specification, noting fascism as a term can regain intellectual prominence through its 
reading in economic, sociological and anthropological terms, as well as history of 
course.  
 
Upon seeing the results of March 2018’s elections and the establishment of an 
extremist, anti-pluralistic government Fondazione Feltrinelli felt irrevocably called to 
pursue its educational duty while mainly criticizing populism. While one is not left to 
guess the institution’s perception of populist demagogues in Stagione Capitale’s 
introduction and video, binary thinking does not travel from the clip to the 
publications, as conflicting and different readings of populism are promoted to 
achieve productive agonism (Grossberg, 2017). One argues an us-them rhetoric solely 
emerged in the video, as the literature offers multiple readings of populism, where 
such is not demonized as the absolute enemy. Cultural institutions’ duty rests in the 
favouring of multiple contexts (Carr, 2003). Fondazione typically disagrees with a 
populist characteristic, simplification, and this movement’s reduction as well; 
nonetheless utilizes dichotomies solely in the video to reaffirm its concern for the 
populist moment. The latter’s gained prominence in the hub’s cultural scope, between 
Stagione Ribelle and Capitale, is exemplified by the exorbitant increase in 
publications concerning it. The in-depth literary review of the recent publications 
served to grasp the various analyses of the phenomenon. Significantly, the definition 
of populism grew in Fondazione’s texts with its governmental establishment in Italy. 
Most of the populist characteristics identified in this thesis’ theoretical framework 
were noticed among the institution’s publications and events: the potency of the 
spectacle, homogeneous society, hate and politics of resentment, racism, anti-
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academic and anti-scientific notions. Scapegoating and conspirationism as well are 
noted as populism’s effects. The neoliberal order’s crisis – a core concept of the 
season – is unanimously regarded as a pivotal cause and the threat posed by populism, 
or specifically right populism, to democracy echos Tarantino’s words throughout the 
season’s publications. The topicality of the promulgations and initiatives’ both 
materializes in their contemporary discussion summaries and in the national-
international outlook, defined in the institution’s self-proclaimed scope, of populism’s 
emergence. Therefore one believes the recent publications effectively illuminate 
contemporary debate. Fondazione’s informational role materializes both in the 
topicality of its work that continuously adapts to society’s transformation, and in the 
emphasis of populism’s characteristics, effects as well as possible solutions. Mouffe, 
similarly to Fukuyama, proposes the rethinking of democracy through left 
patriotism’s emotionality. Fondazione therefore both proposes texts which directly 
link Salvini’s populism to Mussolini, and Mouffe’s radical calling for left populism. 
This cultural space’s antifascist struggle through its historical emphasis duty repeats 
itself in Stagione Capitale, however a more critical understanding of Italian populism 
is offered through its repeated association to fascism. Whilst the left’s culpability is 
noted, solely leftist thinkers in fact undertook thorough definitions of the first and 
populism. Compared to Stagione Ribelle, Fondazione Feltrinelli’s current populist 
debate still offers several readings, however all are organically intellectual given they 
oppose Italy’s dominant culture represented by the coalition, either explicitly 
condemning it or implicitly doing so by comparing it to an authoritarian rule. All 
intellectuals have the choice of supporting the dominant common-sense or not, 
nonetheless must recognize their professional category’s responsibility (Chomsky, 
2011). Agonistic views are found in the Foundation’s initiatives, nonetheless they 
typically counter the present-moment anti-pluralistic order: both this thesis and 
Fondazione mainly value specific, liberal intellectuals who view their role as 
permanent persuaders joining in the political struggle. The momentousness of the 
Government of Change’s establishment called for the Foundation’s employment of its 
privileged position and thus opportunity to increase its political, leftist responsibility. 
Stagione Capitale video’s rhetoric of severity materializes in its recurrent yet not 
absolute populist critique. 
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3.4 – Democracy’s decline is the disease, populism a mere symptom 
 
Mouffe views the primary role of agonistic struggles as the challenging of 
neoliberalism’s hegemony. No order should be treated as incontestable: “this is why a 
liberal democratic society requires a debate about possible alternatives” (Mouffe, 
2013:7). Populism certainly finds a central space in Fondazione Feltrinelli’s 
intellectual work and countering, however it would be diminutive to assess the 
opposition of such emergence as the institution’s imperative task. Fondazione poses 
the bettering of society’s future prospects as its priority and notes two ambitious 
activities to do so: rethinking capitalism and rethinking democracy. As noted, 
brainstorming for alternative economic models is perceived as the most significant 
strategy to achieve the latter.  One argues this cultural centre favours the countering of 
democracy’s decline, rather than the labelling populism as the ultimate enemy.  
 
Resistance requires studying and Fondazione has reflected on the crises of knowledge 
with fervour. This collapse was confirmed by a troubling study: Ipsos Mori compared 
national perceptions of reality to statistics, only to discover Italy is the most ignorant 
country in Europe (2017). 14% of Italians believe certain vaccines cause autism and 
31% of Italians think terrorist attacks have increased since 9/11. Again, 34% of 
prisoners are foreigners yet Italians think such are 48% and 50% of such population 
perceive murder rates as having increased, when they have fallen by 39% since 2000 
(2017). Ignorance here is intended in the literal sense, as lack of awareness of 
everyday life (Alleyoop.ilsole24ore, 2018). Fondazione undertakes the crises of 
knowledge through historical and contemporary debate, outlining national and 
international factors. An article emphasized D’Alembert’s philosophical inquiry into 
the courageous, enlightened path to ameliorate the human condition: individuals are 
subject to power relations however bear the duty of illuminating knowledge through 
truth’s pursuit (Fondazione Feltrinelli, 2018). Algorithms, filter bubbles and echo 
chambers are noted as global causes of post-truth (Fondazione Feltrinelli, Artieri, 
2018). Polizzi noted in 2016 - before the full extent of the crises had been 
demonstrated by populism’s global emergence - that speaking the truth to power 
entails not only confronting political, but economic power as well as the public 
opinion, given the latter is growingly gullible to unverified notions (Fondazione 
Feltrinelli, 2016). Current politics are in fact witnessing appeals largely based on 
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emotionality, distant from factual analysis; algorithms and filter bubbles generate 
isolation within informational bubbles, made to coincide with the truth by individuals, 
similarly to echo chambers where single theses become amplified. “Platform politics” 
cause polarization and citizens’ turning against rational debate (Fondazione 
Feltrinelli, Artieri, 2018).  Truth is often tailored: it originates from an obscure 
algorithm that creates a suit to fit its user (Fondazione Feltrinelli, Pucciarelli, 2019). 
Croce deems the present a bubble democracy of interconnected solitude where rising 
numbers choose to believe what confirms their emotional prejudices, nonetheless 
there is a significant knot that ties freedom, truth and subjectivity (Fondazione 
Feltrinelli, 2019). Rather than echoing one political, cultural or religious authority’s 
notion, one can gain autonomy by questioning the world as it unfolds. Croce argues 
“we believe that culture, information and research’s role is that of promoting accurate 
analyses, complex thinking, deep and well documented investigations to render truth a 
certainly conflicting yet shared ground” (2019). Freedom of expression is not only a 
right and duty: it is citizens’ practice for the exercise of truth. Sapere aude! is thus a 
motto which remains relevant across time.  
 
The infamous shift from reason to emotionality in the Italian context has been 
assessed by Fondazione. The historian Prosperi deems Italy’s anti-other prejudice an 
identity question (Fondazione Feltrinelli, Troglio & Panaino, 2018). Memory’s 
horizon is annulled by the fact individuals feel as though there is no future: when the 
notion of time’s development disappears, the illusory perception of fixed identities is 
enhanced. The other is seen as a threat, not solely given his foreignness, rather his 
instability in space and time. This notion was debated in an interdisciplinary manner, 
as the philosopher Veca detailed in the public event “Contemporary fears” the anxiety 
others elicit stems from the fact they are not sufficiently “different” (Pauree 
Contemporanee, 2018). Given the other is only distant to an extent, one fears of being 
“contaminated” by such. Prosperi relates Italy’s post-truth to the greatly restricted 
opportunity university degrees still represent. Access to such only witnessed a 
significant growth in the ‘60s, giving life to the wonders of ’68. The hope held by the 
historian is for cultured journalism to seek the truth while passing “history’s torch” on 
(2018). Among these investigations, intellectuals and citizens’ pivotal duty to seek 
accurate facts are accentuated. Fioravante similarly relates Italy’s political, scientific 
and journalistic authorities’ loss of authority to the growing cultural degraded forms 
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and functional analphabetism, such as the inability to employ reading, writing and 
mathematical skills in everyday life. 23% of the adult population does not have the 
basic ICT skills (OECD Skills Outlook, 2013; Fondazione Feltrinelli, 2018). 
Significantly the returning analphabetism and functional analphabetism purely 
originate from political choices regarding public education. Notwithstanding the fact 
Italy has among the highest educational taxes in the EU, it does not follow the general 
European trend of increasing teachers’ incomes, nor does it provide proportionate 
scholarship opportunities (2018). This country is among the last in the EU for public 
spending on education and suffers from a school dropout rate of 14% (ISTAT, 2018). 
Fioravante argues people’s inability to distinguish reliable sources, the proliferation of 
fake-news and debates which question the pillars of scientific thought should certainly 
not come as a surprise given Italy’s failing public education. Far from “natural” 
exclusion of some as the one women used to experience, Italy’s troubled knowledge 
largely stems from conscious political decisions (2018).  
 
Among Fondazione’s analysis of the crises of knowledge’s general trends, two results 
hint to democracy’s epitomized decline: the killing of political opponents and 
questioning of universal suffrage. Totalitarianism’s return in Europe does not 
singularly imply a regime of terror, as it primarily entails the delegitimation of 
opposing opinions and thus the rejection of democracy’s inherent heterogeneity. 
Pawel Adamowicz was Danzica’s liberal Mayor who was killed by a Polish extreme 
right supporter, and confirms this reality (Fondazione Feltrinelli, 2019). Further, the 
debate concerning the quality of democracy, and thus the alphabetization of citizens 
and amount of information such are exposed to has made a notable comeback given 
the disintermediation between political institutions and the public (Fondazione 
Feltrinelli, Fioravante, 2018). Specifically new media and social media’s 
informational capabilities and quasi-hegemonic shaping of public opinions, and the 
increasingly populist phenomena brought this questioning about. Classic liberalism 
has always been concerned with the issue of ignorance and its effects on democracy; 
nowadays however the awareness of the complexity of certain voting topics and 
lacking meeting between such knowledge and shared skills has climaxed. Brennan 
proposes all voters should take a test and Van Reybrouck advocates for voters’ 
drawing lots (2013; 2017; Fondazione Feltrinelli, Fioravante, 2018). Timeless 
questions concerning universal suffrage’s validity are amplified by the paradoxical 
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election of anti-democratic populists, but point to democracy structure’s instability 
rather than the politicians themselves. Democracy’s threat arises from its 
incompleteness. The digital infrastructure aids the sharing of untested theories and 
lies, nonetheless the issue lies in liberal democracy’s structure given an evolution 
towards truthful equality is yet to be – as demonstrated by Italy’s education - trapping 
itself in an anti-democratic loop (Urbinati et al., 2018; Fondazione Feltrinelli, 2018). 
Populism and its often associated rejection of rational thought is simply a symptom of 
democracy’s partial nature which then viciously cycles and enhances its crisis. The 
Foundation’s task of rethinking democracy functions as an acknowledgment that the 
issue and solution lie there. Populism is certainly in opposition with the Foundation’s 
pluralistic ethos, however it is merely a political materialization that magnifies 
democracy’s complexities and contradictions, as the current challenging of 
everyone’s right to vote. Fondazione’s daily intellectual work goes further than 
populism’s countering: it strives to grasp society’s major ills as unequal access to 
education, diminishing rational thought and totalitarianism. These are inevitably 
linked to the politics of resentment, people vs. the elite rhetoric, yet hint to larger 
democratic failures. Moreover, the cultural centre recognizes the current 
disorientation goes further than such political emergence, as exemplified by the 
initiative “The truth on the present, I beg of you”, which covers the unsuccessful 
promises of the Arab Spring through its “freedom” lectures, and the Italian mafia and 
drug market in its “legality” ones (La Verità, Vi Prego, sul Presente: Libertà, 2019; La 
Verità, Vi Prego, sul Presente: Legalità, 2019).  
 
Fondazione Feltrinelli’s striving to ameliorate future prospects, by tackling 
democracy collapse’s causes, shows in Scuola di Cittadinanza Europea: during its 
inauguration, the logo was described as portraying a boy attempting to look over a 
wall with a ladder, given the ubiquity of exclusion, even in schools (2018). What 
would have happened if the British had received more truthful information regarding 
Brexit? This frequent question motivated the Educational branch to launch a 
programme to aid informed voting. Unequal access to information is both analysed as 
perpetuating the crises of knowledge among the Foundation’s articles and directly 
acted upon through public initiatives by the Educational area. Humanization is also 
employed to oppose democratic rights’ loss. The exhibition ’900: la Stagione dei 
Diritti employs Fondazione’s patrimony as the narrator of 10 piazzas’ courageous 
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actions, which subsequently won human rights. A relevant laboratory for students is 
offered as well (2018). Rights were obtained through suffering and often lives, yet 
their winning does not mean they are earned forever, nor that they should be given for 
granted as their unstable definition depends on cultural, social and political 
conditions. LGBTIQ and women’s rights are featured, however the most thought-
provoking piazza is the exhibition’s last: “Piazza San Sepolcro, 23rd March 1919. 
Mussolini’s role was that of building an anti-party in contrast with the liberal right 
and the revolutionary left… piazzas do not solely produce opposition, battles for new 
rights. Even rights’ negation can arise” (2018). This functions as a historical overview 
and humanization of the individuals who battled to gain dignity, and arguably 
succeeded in fulfilling Fondazione’s reaching of wider audiences. The right wing 
newspaper Il Giornale, while owning a blog that strongly promotes xenophobia and 
hate as portrayed in the vile picture below, wrote about the exhibition and how it 
appeals to all (2018). (A thesis centred on the explosion of intolerance in a country 
might as well include a source to grasp how emotional vignettes can animate crowds 
and awaken such emergence). Tarantino asserted “participation is vital to the future’s 
construction…this exhibition is a form of resistance to a political phenomenon in 
which we certainly do not identify, but in which we need to take interest and oppose 
with the most elevated form: knowledge” (‘900: la Stagione dei Diritti, 2018). 
Therefore Fondazione’s countering of populism is recurrent, nonetheless one argues 
the institution’s concern is societal and hence calls for a holistic approach: the 
philosophical as well as historical analysis of the anxiety towards the other meets with 
an anti-exclusion educational initiative and outlining of Italy’s scholastic paradoxes. 
The mental and physical walls of different nature are tackled transversally. The 
institution has a perennial informational duty: knowledge is seen as the antidote to 
democracy’s historical decline and participation its enactment. Awareness has the 
potential of overturning disastrous future Brexits - which work against the European 
project - and underlining rights’ value, the basis of EU’s democratic promotion.  
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             Figure 14: Opening image of an article titled "Immigrants to Hell" 
          (Blog.il Giornale, 2018) 
 
Barcelona and Milan’s mayors, Ada Colau Ballano and Beppe Sala, dialogued in 
Fondazione as well on democracy’s strengthening (Democrazia Minima, 2019). Colau 
Ballano initially emphasized Europe’s origins as a land of peace, democracy and 
rights born as a post-war shared project to prevent future horrors. This project’s 
profound crisis can be attributed to a phenomenon greater than the continent, 
neoliberalism, and to the excessive technocratic management of Europe, which 
blurred its original perceived role as protector of citizens’ rights. Sala noted three 
recent elections to point to the cleavage between cities and towns. In the week leading 
up to the event the first black, gay woman was elected as Chicago’s Mayor10, Erdogan 
won yet not in Ankara and Istanbul11 and Amsterdam was won by environmentalists 
while the provinces preferred a party which denies global warming12 (2019). After 
noting his hope for cities, Sala argued Europe must renovate itself given it is 
unfinished and hence hard to defend. Fiscal leverages for example should be imposed 
by the continent rather than countries, to prevent colossal companies from not paying 
taxes. Italy has a duty of welcoming migrants, surrounded by one of “realism”: 
Milan’s Mayor thinks society is enriched by migrations, however complexity 
envelops the question. To exemplify the implications of the topic and how immediate 
 
10 Lori Lightfoot is the first African American, openly gay, elected Chicago Mayor.  
11 Tayyip Erdogan and his ultranationalist allies won 52% of votes, however the cities of Ankara, 
Istanbul, Adana and Mersin were won by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) (Financial Times, 
2019) 
12 The Greens doubled the far-right Forum for Democracy party, which proved popular among 
provinces. 
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racism’s appearance can be, he asked: “what happens if someone is told they could 
become 20th rather than 180th on the list for public housing, if such were only given to 
Italians?” The solution to these claims is to communicate and oppose, statistics being 
an effective weapon. Far from an invasion, Italy has 9% of migrants (2019). 
”Migration is certainly complex. I only accept this notion however if we add that 
nothing is simple: the environment is a difficult question, the battle against inequality 
as well” added Colau Ballano (2019). She discredits immigration’s state of crisis 
through facts as well, by underlining that Europe is an aging continent in need of 
labour force. Further, it is a mistake to indulge in the idea that migrants are in 
competition with low-income people for housing in Colau Ballano’s opinion; rather 
the problem is the fact the Spanish state receives European money for the former but 
spends hundreds of millions in detention centres. Barcelona paradoxically holds one 
of such against the city’s public opinion and this space testifies to Europe’s unstable 
rights’ protection. The crisis is far from migratory: it is European. Both mayors hence 
outlined troubled features of the EU’s incomplete project and agreed active 
citizenship and voting for the European elections are vital to democracy’s deepening. 
The vote can overturn the populist anti-other erasing of the Union and the extension 
of the rights this land presupposes.  
 
Until now emotionality to foster a progressive identity and counter populism, or 
specifically right populism, and participation have been traced as general means for 
democracy’s reformulation. The seeking of capitalism’s alternative is a specific 
strategy for such. Thatcher’s “there is no alternative” maxim in fact travelled from 
being questioned among Fondazione’s literature in 2016, to becoming one of the two 
challenged bases in Stagione Capitale. Whilst Chiappero Martinetti had posed the 
need for a more sustainable economic system - as the “rising-tide hypothesis” that 
capitalism would have allowed all “boats to rise” is far past (Fondazione Feltrinelli, 
2016) – Carlo Feltrinelli introduced Stagione Capitale stating “we must create novel 
relational and economic models, focused on equity, sustainability and social justice” 
(Feltrinelli C. , 2018). “There is no alternative” and “rethinking capitalism” are two 
cultural initiatives that aim to do just this, through options’ brainstorming (2018-
2019;Rethinking Capitalism, 2019). The former is structured as a cycle of public 
events arisen from the view that the recent, violent occurrences of environmental, 
social and economic nature call for a reflection on modern capitalism’s paradigm. 
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Rethinking capitalism combined a 2-day workshop where international researchers, 
activists and policy-makers under the age of 38 could apply, to a final lecture with 
guests linked to Western capitalism’s alternatives or the promotion of new models of 
consumption and management of natural capital, as Ecuador’s former President, 
Rafael Correa. Linked specifically to sustainable practices, the initiative “Water 
Watch Summit” had the task of discussing more efficient, low-impact water uses 
(2018). Sustainable, alternative economic models are researched and tackled 
transversally through the specific reporting on water uses. This chapter served as a 
brief summary of the copious, varied cultural initiatives, recounting a minority of 
them, to demonstrate how reductive it is to deem populism’s opposing as 
Fondazione’s primary objective, its counter-hegemonic pivotal task.  
 
“Populism brings to the fore those unresolved knots at the foundations of Western 
democracy” (Urbinati et al., 2018: 77). The people vs. elite is among the institution’s 
key topics, witnessed in its increased topicality in Stagione Capitale, nonetheless 
Fondazione prioritizes its holistic service to citizens’ duty. Democracy’s 
contradictions and incompleteness are in fact treated as the main threat to society’s 
future. Among disorientation, cultural institutions promise to allow for reflection 
(Carr, 2003). The crises of knowledge and exclusion ways are fought through analysis 
and diverse public initiatives, to give citizens the tools for critical thinking and thus a 
thoughtful vote. These features together with fear, inequality, scapegoating, unequal 
education and so on materialize in populism, however Fondazione’s analysis and 
rethinking of democracy/capitalism hint to the fact it is a mere symptom of 
democracy’s profound crisis. Whilst the cultural hub’s scope demonstrates it 
perceives its political responsibility as having increased in Stagione Capitale, the 
Foundation understands capitalism’s reformulation as the essential measure to 
enhance democracy. This is far off from enacting “moral valuing” of the consensus by 
acting as a neoliberal ideological machine that legitimizes the hegemonic order 
(Althusser, 1971; Šešić & Vickery, 2018). Fondazione’s overview demonstrates that 
in quintessentially political agonistic reality, characterized by passion and 
antagonistic opinions, no order is the only legitimate one (Mouffe, 2013). The 
emphasis of historian’s role and of active citizenship, together with an 
epistemological duty, are the cultural centre’s three most recurrent activities 
nominated in its self-proclaimed significance. History is consistently cited and 
 85 
paralleled to the present moment, for instance in rights’ valorisation and persistent 
antifascist struggle. A culture of inquiry shows through dialogue’s productive 
capabilities (Carr, 2003; Grossberg, 2017): to study, communicate and share is the 
ultimate tool to face democracy’s decline and to make citizens aware, which often 
entails Fondazione Feltrinelli’s privileged employment of its speaking the truth to 
power opportunity. Populism is typically targeted given its homogenous, anti-
democratic depiction of society through its outlining and fact-countering. Citizens’ 
civic duty to participate is underlined in the struggle for truth, and in the majority of 
initiatives (Fondazione Feltrinelli, Croce, 2018; ‘900: La Stagione dei Diritti, 2018; 
Stagione Capitale, 2018; Democrazia Minima, 2019), given democracy’s 
strengthening can solely be achieved through such. Similarly to What is left/what is 
right in Stagione Ribelle, which posed the democratic context with its agonistic theses 
above all its other priorities, Fondazione’s ethos is guided by the vital task of 
democracy’s restoration. It perceives its role within the cultural domain as 
regenerative of democracy and its pluralism: this requires the questioning of 



















Chapter 4: Italy’s landscape of cultural institutions 
 
This final chapter will be a comparative one, whose purpose is that of outlining Italian 
responses to the populist moment through three distinct approaches adopted by 
differing cultural institutions, and providing context to the peninsula’s cultural 
landscape. Fondazione Lelio e Lisli Basso and Istituto Luigi Sturzo were selected, as 
opposed to other institutions, for their combined long history, prominence and fervent 
undertaking of oppositional roles to populism, respectively emphasising universal 
human rights and employing a comparative framework through popularism’s 
ideology. The Istituto Dignitatis Humanae on the other hand is less established and far 
from referencing distinguished cultural ideals it hopes to create the future generation 
of populist leaders (Washinton Post, 2018); the overview of such is beneficial to this 
paper as it accounts for the functioning of Italy’s sole populist cultural institution.  
 
4.1: Fondazione Lelio e Lisli Basso’s human rights maxim 
 
Lelio Basso was born in 1903 and was politically committed from a young age. After 
having joined the socialist youth movement during his high school studies, Basso 
started writing for socialist newspapers while collaborating with the antifascist 
movement. Among many, Basso became the editor-in-chief of Pietre in 1928, 
founded the International Socialist Centre and was elected in the Senate in the Italian 
Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity in 1973; he was also arrested twice for his radical 
intellectualism during Mussolini’s dictatorship and sent to the island of Ponza 
(Fondazione Basso, 2019). Elisa (Lisli) Carini studied law and married Lelio in 1932, 
as they both shared antifascist values and struggled for democracy and freedom. Lisli 
was concerned with cybernetics, biotechnology and men’s ruthless violence, and 
worked in the Italian committee for nuclear disarmament (2019). The contemporary 
Foundation originated from the converging of two different institutions in 2005: both 
aimed to expand democratic life through historical-social and juridical-institutional 
studies and reflected Lelio Basso’s intellectual and political vocations as a socialist 
leader (Fondazione Basso: Storia e Fisionomia, 2019). In 1973 the Istituto per lo 
Studio della Società Contemporanea (Isocco) was founded in Rome and its profile 
was defined from the start by its vocation for historical references as well as regard 
for contemporary data emerging from the social context. It defined itself as a “frontier 
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institution” whose work was never fulfilled by its own certainties (2019). After Lelio 
Basso’s participation in the writing of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of 
Peoples in 1976, the International Foundation Lelio Basso for the Right and 
Liberation of Populations was established, which has been a research space for the 
emphasis and underlining of rights’ violations, to grasp their causes in depth. It 
promoted intellectual and “on the field” forms of resistance to oppression. Today the 
merged Foundation reflects Lelio and Lisli’s interest as demonstrated by its socio-
scientific interdisciplinary cross. Anthropology, the history of rights, philosophy, 
economy, sociology and digital technologies are all studied. It holds an archive that is 
open to the public, with 65 distinct archival funds that have been declared of historical 
relevance by the Superintendence of the Lazio Region. Isocco and the International 
Foundation appear in Fondazione Basso’s scope: “it is a natural meeting point for 
different cultures of fundamental rights and peace, against all types of war, dominion 
and inequality” (Fondazione Basso: Storia e Fisionomia, 2019), with the objective of 
studying society’s transformational processes. These aims are promoted through 
contemporary debate, research, formation courses, projects, conferences, seminars, 
book presentations, exhibitions and publication in both digital and traditional forms. 
The formation courses include the School for Good Politics and the Populations’ 
Rights course.  
 
Fondazione Feltrinelli’s scope is paralleled in the Italian landscape: Fondazione Basso 
has an informational and historically oriented role. The President Franco Ippolito 
emphasized at the 2018 AICI Meeting cultural institutions’ paramount responsibility 
of vitalizing Europe’s common memory and rich cultural tradition. “Preserving, 
updating and vivifying the best of the 20th century’s political cultures is essential to 
offer the new generations the concrete possibility to meet such, hence understand the 
present to build the future” (Ippolito, Lo Stato Costituzionale di Diritti come 
Patrimonio Comune Europeo, 2018). In fact Ippolito identifies an urgent need to 
engage the youth, seeing scholastic institutions’ inability to pursue this duty. An 
explosion of inequalities is taking place 70 years after the UN Paper and 60 years 
after the beginning of Europe’s unification. Italy is witnessing xenophobic tendencies 
as well as indifference; far from neutral, these approaches constitute the soil for 
sentiments of the other’s rejection (2018). A complex responsibility to protect the 
European project has arisen. Building the future is strictly linked to the strengthening 
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of the sense of belonging to a common European space. Europe’s rich heritage is one 
of values that cannot be dissipated: the separation of power, constitutional democracy 
and the guaranteeing of rights and dignity, independently of nationality. The re-
emergence of an illusory ideal as populism is occurring at the expense of the original 
project’s authority. Therefore cultural institutions cannot omit rather must underline 
negative historic facts and struggle for the truth, to counter populist movements; as a 
matter of fact, Europe’s establishment was born as a consequence of nationalism’s 
horrors (2018). Bobbio noted that searching for the truth during times of crisis is a 
political commitment (1993): Fondazione Basso suggests the comparing of 
politicians’ instrumentalization of the immigrant crisis with truthful statistics. 
Fondazione Basso hence believes political commitment to be pivotal. It is an openly 
pro-European institution whose information and historically oriented role strive for 
the safe-guarding of European values, to reach a just and inclusive democracy 
characterized by rights (Ippolito, 2018). Speaking the truth to power can achieve a 
“novel emancipatory opportunity with regards to the dominant thought” (Fondazione 
Basso, Paulizzi, 2019).  
 
Fondazione Basso’s interdisciplinary research appears in the common link between 
populism’s social emergence to the post-truth - technology binomial. Post-truth is 
defined as modernity’s crisis: the collapse of canons of truth and power caused by the 
overcoming of modern structures, as relations-production-labour models, ruling 
institutions and communication (Fondazione Basso, Pisani, 2019). Paulizzi outlines 
how the simultaneity offered by the web induces passiveness in readers, given its 
“tsunami of information” (Fondazione Basso, 2019). The Internet is an extraordinary 
public space, however produces campaigns of irrationality and disinformation, which 
feed resentment. Parascandolo underlines how mass opinions fostered by demagogy 
and their susceptibility to fake news and conspiracy theories have increased 
exponentially (Fondazione Basso, 2019). The current model is viewed as guilty: an 
indissoluble connection ties post-truth and neoliberalism, as the number of clicks 
matter more than contents’ value, hence fake news will be more remunerative and a 
campaign based on hate will be more popular. Disinformation is tackled by Giua as 
well, yet the lack of mediation is underlined given professional communicators 
proliferate unfiltered messages on social media. Harvard demonstrated that Breitbart’s 
contents - an extreme right site that shares non verified information, and criticized 
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Obama and Hillary Clinton – have been re-tweeted more than any article from liberal 
media sources (Roberts et al., 2017). It is thus assumed that Trump would not be in 
power without Breitbart’s deceitful news (Fondazione Basso, 2019). Without 
mediation, social media functions as the “perfect propaganda”. 
 
Media platforms’ lacking mediation can be both understood as the missing 
verification of information, as well as leaders-voters’ communication without parties’ 
involvement. Fondazione Basso, like Feltrinelli, condemns populism as democracy’s 
collapse. Somma believes an Orwellian frame hides behind the myth of “direct 
democracy”: this technological populism could lead to democracy’s overturning 
(Fondazione Basso, 2019). Increased participation opportunities have not fostered 
active participation, such as citizens’ truthful partaking in legislative and decisional 
processes, rather it caused the public’s anthropological shift to a passive-judgmental 
power. Whilst the public does not directly effect legislations, the eye of the 
“judgemental crowd” gains primacy in the creation of symbols of politicians’ 
spectacles: leaders found their consensus in an Orwellian manner, moulding their 
programmes starting from the public’s opinions (2019). This thesis opposes the global 
populist order and treats it as an illegitimate enemy given its manipulative 
technological origin. However resignation cannot appear: the causes of post-truth are 
complemented by possible solutions. Self-awareness in the public must be elicited 
through the expression of a novel Humanism that recognizes the Universal Human 
Rights Declaration’s values: justice, emancipation and freedom (Fondazione Basso, 
Parascandolo, 2019). This is the first of many references to human rights, which play 
a fundamental role in Fondazione Basso’s scope. Pisani proposes a similar “toolbox” 
which features an ever-growing collective intelligence, thanks to dialogue and 
diversity (Fondazione Basso, 2019). The Foundation’s epistemological role 
materializes in its enquiry of multiple contexts (Carr, 2003), such as populism’s post-
truth origins and citizens’ “anti-disinformation tools”.  
 
The populist moment has been analysed in numerous ways that surpass its 
technological link by Fondazione Basso. Populism’s definition and terminological 
confusion have been outlined. One of Lelio Basso’s cardinal beliefs was democracy’s 
sole survival through elected representative and minorities’ control of popular 
consensus. Salvati defines populism through democracy’s crisis itself: the people’s 
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sovereignty and the principle of representation are constitutive of democracy, 
nonetheless are troubled by populism’s proposed direct power of the people (Living 
Democracy, 2010). Dominijanni notes the term’s confusion partly derives from the 
establishment’s derogatory definition of all grass-root movements, left and right, as 
such. Dominijanni does however boil-down populism to a bottom-up, protest 
movement (Justice’s Words, 2017). Whilst Fondazione Basso does not clearly link its 
epistemological role to the discussing of agonistic views, Pennacchi posits the latter: 
populism is “not a mere grass-root rebellion, nor a spontaneous resentment 
consequence arising from a revolt sentiment” (2019). “Professional stirrers”, ergo 
large information companies, create these manipulative offers and are aided by 
technology’s predisposition for such. 
 
“No person who is paying attention to what is taking place in Italy can remain 
indifferent or not commit to restart debates that brought the left’s crisis” (Ippolito, 
2018). The President’s words resonate with the widespread political engagement 
demonstrated in Fondazione Basso intellectualism’s counter-hegemonic relevance: 
populism’s recurrent criticism often starts with the analysis of the left’s culpability 
and collapse. Intellectuals must act as permanent persuaders by participating in the 
political struggle (Gramsci, 1957). The paradoxical situation we are witnessing, the 
popular indignation caused by neoliberalism’s enormous inequalities that either 
remains devoid of direction or is hijacked towards right populists’ reactionary aims, 
can be rationalized through communism’s political and symbolic collapse 
(Fondazione Basso, Fazio, 2019). While left and right have become looser terms, the 
former has acquired a “Homo economicus” essence. Pennacchi criticizes the left as 
lacking critical and alternative thinking: neo-centrist opinions and TINA’s following 
have become a blind recurrence (Pennacchi, 2019). Fazio links the left’s culpability to 
idealistic as well as economic values: it has abandoned its fundamental duty to 
envision a quintessentially ideal society distant from a capitalist one. It de facto 
abandoned all projects to radically transform society and stopped feeding off “utopian 
energies”, which had historically made the left immune to resignation despite unjust 
conditions (Fondazione Basso, 2019). After 1989 a referential political culture able to 
shape its mission, attractiveness and identity disappeared. The Italian left is 
specifically witnessing a grief identity crisis (Fondazione Basso, Winkler, 2019). For 
instance, Blair thought that discussing globalization was pointless given “the world is 
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changing in a way that is indifferent to tradition...it is full of opportunities for all of 
those who are ready to adapt” (ac cited in Fondazione Basso, Fazio, 2019). A 
superficially optimistic reading of globalization and abandonment of the left’s 
schemes are apparent, as its anti-hierarchy language and spokesperson’s of 
subordinate classes’ role were effaced by individuals’ self-responsibility in the market 
(2019). A relatable component was lost once the left proposed citizens must exploit 
globalization’s opportunities, initiating a mass popular strata exodus. Despite the fact 
Fondazione Basso does not fervently argue for dialogue’s knowledge producing 
capabilities as Feltrinelli, both follow a culture of enquiry through debate. Its work 
organically opposes the dominant populist consensus as diverse understandings 
equated such to a manipulative Orwellian frame, deceitful post-truths, reactionary 
ways and democracy’s failure. This criticism is not devoid of critical thought: the 
left’s culpability is noted among Basso’s populist contemporary debate. 
 
At a time when an ethnic narrative was gaining popularity in Italy, Dominijanni 
condemns the left for not having understood mass mediation’s value. In Berlusconi’s 
twenty years of influence all political discourse began to pass through media, 
specifically television (Justice’s Words, 2017). Whilst the left disastrously treated 
such as secondary, this vertical medium allowed for a top-to-bottom ruling, the 
disappearance of public-private distinctions and the gaining of capital significance for 
the political persona. The Lega was among Italy’s first populist parties: its political 
discourse was based on a fragmented, illusory and ethnic population, as opposed to 
class belonging. Notwithstanding Salvini’s anti-immigration and national aspiration, 
the foundations of his party did not change greatly from that of his predecessor, Bossi. 
It travelled from “ethnic-local in the first season and ethnic-national in the second” 
(Justice’s Words, 2017), where traditional values and land must be protected from 
invaders. Berlusconi’s legacy - the blurred distinction between mass media and 
politics that enhances the persona’s self-representation - has been vital for both the 
Lega and M5S’s web potency. Whilst Salvini’s employment of Facebook might 
appear naïf, it generates much consensus by drawing its effectiveness from 
communication professionals as Morisi (Fondazione Basso, Giua, 2019). Grillo’s blog 
editor, Casaleggio, equivalently understood the former comedian could enter the 
digital sphere as a tv personality, and used his predominant YouTube presence as if it 
were tv on demand. Santoro underlines his work should not demonize his populist 
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adversary, rather underline M5S digital-era party’s characteristics (Fondazione Basso, 
2019).  
 
Mediums succeed when they respond to a demand created by one before. Eco 
described “neo-television” as the moment when such ceased to be a mere screen, and 
started giving the crowd a feeling of participation through tv-votes. Grillo’s tv-
personality colonization of the web is a testament to the close tv-web relationship 
(1983; 2019). Santoro argues the “direct façade” of the one-equates-one in the Five 
Stars “disappeared long ago - even in the moments of greatest openness, the authority 
of the founder-father-owner-benevolent and comedian-guarantor was always present” 
(2019). Furthermore, the demands created by neo-television’s interactiveness have 
been filled by the Rousseau platform. Digital mediums strive for an ensemble of 
distinct audience niches and the social media par excellence, Facebook, allows such 
to seldom meet thanks to algorithms (2019). The Five Stars have never celebrated a 
national assembly nor can voters discuss among each other on its ad hoc platform. 
Here, one can communicate with the voted and submit proposals. The Rousseau 
platform thus functions as an arena where electoral differences never become 
contradictions: they co-exist side-by-side, given collective dialogue cannot arise from 
the voters-voted asymmetrical communication. Mosca demonstrated that the number 
of activists involved in the writing of M5S laws has dropped dramatically: the average 
comment per law project travelled from 446 to 63 from 2014-2017 (2017; Fondazione 
Basso, 2019). As opposed to creating a thinking group, a movement of automated 
individuals shows as collective action looses prominence without debate. The 
platform simply reduces the voters-voted tension through a fictional volontè generalè.  
Santoro acknowledges the importance of agonistic opinions for true dialogue to 
emerge, given politics should be constituted by critically thinking, collective bodies. 
Whilst he does not wish to demonize populist politicians, he criticizes the Five Star 
platform’s illusory a-hierarchy as illegitimate; it does not allow discussion. One 
supposes the unprecedented outlining of populism’s technological potency derives 
from Lisli Basso’s cybernetic passion.  
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De gustibus et de valoribus non est disputandum13. Pennacchi attributes the populist 
challenge to the fallacious epistemological equation of “taste” to “values”, concurrent 
to the market’s pervasion of social life and its shared ideals. The privatization of 
values, arisen from lack of consensus and their assimilation to preferences, fostered a 
general indifference to such. In fact populism can be traced to two interlinked issues, 
neoliberalism’s decline and ostracism within society, which has triggered the 
questioning of the public sphere’s values, causing disorientation. This cultural loss 
has been enhanced by the skepticism and relativism it originated, which in turn negate 
that values can be true or false (2019). The formation course for students “Living 
democracy” proposes to over-turn the disastrous political situation through a 
“conceptual tool box”: critical thinking is for instance fostered trough the comparison 
of present-time populist traits and re-emergence to the explosion of xenophobia in the 
1930s (2019). The institution’s interdisciplinary, epistemological historical 
referencing role appears through the course. Pennacchi’s similar counter-hegemonic 
practice is constituted by a collective “theory of values” needed to defeat indifference, 
regain independent thinking and the ability to discuss and verify information (2019). 
This theory challenges both the populist and neoliberal consensus, as it is a cultural 
construction for the socio-economic rethinking of capitalism. Fazio agrees on the 
interconnectedness of populism’s appearance and capitalism’s failure, nonetheless 
proposes a specific group’s refining of values: updating the left’s political culture 
through socialism’s renovation frame, to gain its innovation and shedding of 
vagueness (Fondazione Basso, 2019). The socialist denomination has been erased 
from such European parties, thus a redefinition of democratic socialism is essential. 
Right populists have been providing regressive, anti-human rights and anti-
immigration popular responses up until now. Socialism’s update conversely must 
create an alliance between emancipation and social protection: the left’s challenge is 
that of responding in emancipatory and democratic ways to subordinate classes’ 
safety and social protection needs. Dominijanni is committed to populism’s 
overturning through a greater democratic reality as well, and calls for all modern 
progressives to join together and reestablish universal notions that are stronger than 
fear (Justice’s Words, 2017). The Italian left should include the lacking component 
that has attracted its old voters towards populism: sentimentality. There must be an 
 
13 Latin maxim: “in matters of taste, there can be no disputes”. 
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acknowledgment that the soil is a populist one and that distant politics have 
demonstrated their limits in terms of engaging individual subjectivity. Counter-
populisms therefore cannot be reduced to rational politics: they must be reinvigorated 
with emotion through values as libertè and anti-capitalism (2017). All intellectuals 
must not forget their societal responsibility (Gramsci, 1957). Fondazione Feltrinelli’s 
role is paralleled in the Italian landscape by Fondazione Basso: populism is 
recurrently challenged in the latter’s cultural scope. Pennacchi and Dominijanni argue 
for an anti-capitalism opposing of the populist hegemonic order. Whilst Fazio 
proposes socialism’s eliciting of conviviality through the erasing of anti-human rights 
ways, Dominijanni and Pennacchi disagree with Mouffe’s antagonistic positions: a 
harmonious consensus on values must emerge.  
 
Agonistic positions have been epitomized in the discussion of citizens’ income and 
racism. Social fragility deriving from precarious jobs is in Dominijanni’s view pivotal 
to the understanding of populism’s growth (2017). Ferrajoli described citizens’ 
income as a Constitutional duty in the initiative “Not just redistribution: policies to 
overcome inequalities” (2018). What must be surpassed is the commonplace 
neoliberal notion that social and industrial policies, focused on equality and 
wellbeing, are a cost; they are productive investments. The capitalist “working 
doctrine” is also flawed in that it cannot provide universal jobs: employing 
individuals is a guideline of full-employment programmes rather than a rule. Ferrajoli 
argues the valuing of workers’ rights should not be a political choice: “why oppose a 
direct measure which tackles the right to exist, given employment’s devaluation has 
reached slavery in some cases?” (2018). Significantly, he promotes the dominant 
M5S’s view that the primary benefit deriving from citizens’ income will be dignity, as 
the minimum contractual force given by such allows individuals not to accept 
“survival blackmailing” - unacceptable job conditions. What Ferrajoli believes to be a 
constitutive element of the welfare state, Fracassi – who represents Italy’s national 
trade union (CGIL) – perceives as a fallacious, unfinished measure. Social and 
material questions cannot be solved by mere monetary distributions: access to primary 
rights and social services must be added to any income provision. The State should 
directly intervene in the creation of jobs (specifically for women, the youth and in the 
South) and through the implementation of a strategic lever that provides citizens with 
social networks (health, education etc.) hence basic human rights, to reach full and 
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“good” employment. In Fracassi’s view the dignified tool is “citizens’ work”, rather 
than the State’s singular monetary assistance (2018). Pennacchi links citizens’ income 
to quitter attitude, thus appraises State intervention as well. The neoliberal objective 
“starving the beast” (the State’s institutions) materializes in Italy’s State deterioration, 
as demonstrated by its tremendous lack of public servants compared to Germany and 
France (2018). Within the precariousness frame and inspired by Bernie Sanders’ 
researching of public, guaranteed jobs, Pennacchi argues for the hiring of 500,000 
individuals as State civil engineers and geologists, among others, rather than spending 
millions on citizens’ income. The human rights’ maxim prevalent in the Foundation, 
born from Basso’s participation in the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples’ 
writing, particularly shows among the agonistic discussions of workers and 
immigrants’ rights and dignity – which will be tackled shortly. Ferrajoli is the sole 
intellectual who supports a populist value in the Foundation’s work, by paralleling the 
Five Star citizens’ income to a fundamental right, which is agonistically opposed to 
Fraccasi and Pennacchi’s counter-hegemonic practice with regards to neoliberalism 
and populism. Fracassi posits human rights can only appear through the State’s 
creation of jobs and workers’ social services, as opposed to monetary aid. Dialogue’s 
agonistic predisposition favours knowledge production through the discussion of 
citizens’ income pros and cons, dominant and emancipatory opinions (Grossberg, 
2017).  
 
“Some, hoping to hide the true problems from the public, blame racism: the truth is 
that there is no racism. The same, small minorities have continued to practice it” 
(Fondazione Basso, Winkler, 2019). Racist attitudes are recurrently denounced, as 
noted in the literature, only to an extent among Fondazione Basso’s intellectualism. 
Associating populism, racism and souverainism to the socio-economic crisis escapes 
the understanding of society’s true knots; what is omitted is the lack of politics that 
safeguard and enact adequate work policies. Winkler believes politicians portray 
workers’ precariousness as flexibility, yet this solely exists when there is a dynamic 
market. Most Italians are witnessing sanitary costs’ rise and can only retire once they 
are 70. The author believes such citizens, living under administrative procedures 
worthy of the most illiberal countries, have a hard time accepting that foreigners can 
enter the unregulated labour market. This irritation is the fruit of desperation rather 
than racism as “politics of rigidity cause underdevelopment and awaken humanity’s 
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worst trait: the struggle between those isolated…which totally prescinds the colour of 
skin” (2019). Distinctly opposing views appear in Fondazione’s outlining of the 
other’s treatment. 
 
Among the loss of shared values, we are witnessing the troubling of elementary 
notions, as politicians’ traditional use of respectful vocabulary (Pennacchi, 2019). 
Within this frame, Salvini proposed the chemical castration of pedophiles on social 
media. Notwithstanding the consensus generated by such statement, a punitive act of 
this sort is strongly outside of Constitutional legality (Fondazione Basso, Billotti, 
2019). Ippolito further criticizes the Italian government as being the antithesis of 
Kant’s maxim - which understands individuals’ reasoning as being based on 
subjective conditions that determine their actions (1871). The President referenced an 
occurrence taking place as he spoke: Malta and Italy’s “arm-wrestling” as to who 
should welcome an immigrants’ boat, causing their imprisonment on such for 7 days. 
“Europe does not seem to understand that no sea…will prevent these people from 
attempting to cross the Mediterranean. This has to be the most important inequality, 
which starts from the most basic right to be recognized as a human being” (2018). 
Kant’s subjective maxim is violated when migrants’ wills are disregarded through 
their boat imprisonment, and when the Lega delegitimizes these life-threatening 
travels as facilitated by a “sea taxi”. During the initiative “Europe’s rights and 
migrations”, Paciotti emphasized “each individual has the right to search/ be assured 
of asylum from persecution in other countries” (2019; Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, 1948: 5). The Italian Constitution resonates with the Universal 
Declaration as it notes “a foreigner, who is not guaranteed democratic rights in his/her 
country that are assured by the Italian Constitution, has the right of asylum in the 
Republic’s territory” (1946:11), similarly the Navigation Code underlines the duty to 
aid all of those in a dangerous situation at sea (1942). Ippolito performs a political act, 
a struggle for the truth, by stressing the gap between these juridical norms and actual 
facts. Not only has Kant’s maxim been neglected, the Lega-M5S coalition is 
antithetical to Italy’s own welcoming laws; migrants are often sent back to Libyan 
torturous lagers after having attempted to cross the Mediterranean. The President 
argues “it is our duty to go in the opposite direction. We know we represent a 
minority that believes in integration…in each society there are phases which require 
for minorities to organize themselves, gain the tools and communicate” (2019). 
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Dialogue is employed in the institution, is promoted within schools particularly to 
defeat Italy’s cultural issue of racism and is outlined by Ippolito as necessary between 
European and African countries to truly explore immigration policies. A specific 
interest is placed in the younger generation, compared to Fondazione Feltrinelli’s 
ambition for an ageless crowd. Ippolito believes this populist moment calls for a 
convivial, welcoming minority to initiate counter-hegemonic practices, hence 
emphasizes how minuscule the number of migrants travelling to Europe are compared 
to global fluxes, and how the aging continent necessitates Africa’s doubling 
population (2019). Whilst Fondazione Feltrinelli surely references human rights, 
Basso’s following of a specific human rights’ maxim clearly shows in the migratory 
crisis debate, through the comparing of Universal, Italian and Navigation rights and 
duty to actual facts. The M5S-Lega coalition is defined as antithetical and illegitimate 
due to its disregard for juridical norms. As implied by the initiative’s title and 
Ippolito’s previous AICI speech, the European project is vital given it acts as a 
protector of rights. Fondazione Basso employs its privileged opportunity to oppose 
the contemporary anti-immigration common-sense, through the speaking of truth and 
call to action.  
 
“Let us not forget a person’s dignity, underlined in all European Constitutions” 
(2019). Fondazione Feltrinelli’s development of a pluralistic common-sense is 
mirrored to a great extent by another institution in Italy’s cultural landscape, 
Fondazione Basso, with the exception of human rights’ superlative position in the 
latter. Its epistemological role is complemented by the prolific meeting of 
contemporary and historical teachings, interdisciplinary analysis and dialogue. A 
culture of enquiry appears through the outlining of post-truth and populism’s 
connections, origins and solutions; a specific emphasis on technological populism 
shows. Similarly to Feltrinelli, Fondazione Basso opposes the dominant populist order 
by condemning such challenge as a reactionary phenomenon and manipulative 
representation linked to democracy’s collapse. The recurrent use of this cultural 
institution’s privileged opportunity to oppose populist values, through its 
intellectualism, notes the contingency of another social order, capitalism. Nonetheless 
the typical leftist call to action does not prevent the stressing of its culpability. 
Agonistic dialogue, while implicit within the role, particularly shows in the clashing 
views on racism and citizens’ income elicited rights. In fact, Lelio Basso’s regard for 
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universal human rights materializes in the Foundation’s unique rights’ maxim: 
individuals’ dignity is noted as imperative hence discussed in migratory and income 
debates. The gap between the Constitutional rights of all populations and actual facts 
motivates Fondazione Basso to act politically as a counter-hegemonic, integration 
minority and speak the truth to power by underlining the populist coalition’s 
antithetical ways.  
4.2: Istituto Luigi Sturzo: compare as a means to contrast 
 
Secularism will now gain a considerable significance in this paper. Luigi Sturzo was a 
Catholic priest and politician who founded the centrist Partito Popolare Italiano14 
(PPI) through his prominent “Appeal to Free and Strong Men”: “my long and difficult 
experience has led me to understand politics as a statute of ethics, inspired by the love 
for one’s neighbour, rendered noble by the aim of common good” (Sturzo, 1919; Il 
Popolo, 1956; Istituto Sturzo, 2019). By positing that shared morality should be 
public and applied to politics, Sturzo’s religious ethics guided his popularist political 
stance. The PPI’s idiosyncrasy was its terminological (“popular”) antagonism to the 
bourgeoisie - which had dominated Italian politics until then - joined by its “love for 
thy neighbour” character, as demonstrated by Sturzo’s inter-classist objective 
(Azétsop, popolarismo vs. populismo, 2018; Mattesini, 2018). The party did not 
represent any social class or class struggle; rather, by bringing Catholic masses 
towards politics, Sturzo hoped to harmonize class relations and strengthen democracy 
against demagogic phenomena. The Sturzo Institute was established in 1951 by a 
group of the priest’s friends, and prioritizes the relationship between society and 
democracy within the study of national and international socio-economic 
transformations. Its disciplines include law, economics, sociology and history, whilst 
its ethos is born from the notion that democracy is not the sole grouping of its notable 
procedures, but the expression of society’s values as well (Istituto Sturzo, 2019). The 
Institute holds a rich political Catholicism patrimony, including 140,000 volumes and 
1,450 films (Istituto Sturzo, 2019). Research, conferences, seminars, debates, 
scholarships, workshops and formation courses (for students, graduates, cultural 
operators and public/private officials) are employed in the Institute’s educational 
scope; nonetheless such believes the young must be especially directed towards the 
 
14 The Democrazia Cristiana succeeded this party in 1943. 
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analysis of democracy’s radical changes, given this topic’s antidotal nature to 
populations’ democratic regression. A civic duty for all cultural institutions to teach 
the youth the European project is noted as well (Antonietti, 2018). 
 
 
Istituto Sturzo’s peculiarity derives from its outlining of the politician’s ideology, 
popularism, often as a means to compare and contrast populism. With regards to 
Sturzo’s ideological denomination, he purposefully excluded the term “Catholic” 
when founding the PPI as he supported politics and religion’s autonomy. Whilst 
popularist credos derive from Christianity, Sturzo firmly promoted secularism: “from 
the start we have excluded the notion that our political teaching was religion and 
wanted to clearly underline that our primary interest is the nation’s public life” 
(Sturzo, 1992: 99). The Party did not want to resemble the Church’s system, nor could 
it speak in its name. Popularism’s centrism results from Sturzo’s distancing from any 
form of extremist, and was coined to differentiate such ideology from communism, 
nationalism, fascism, socialism and radicalism (Pennisi, popolarismo vs. populismo, 
2018; Mattesini, 2018). Popularism in fact arose to counter one of Italy’s first populist 
movements: fascism. After the First World War, Sturzo witnessed illiterate and 
marginalized masses being drawn towards fascism by passion as opposed to 
rationality. The priest’s definition of dictatorships resonates with contemporary 
populist culture in Mattesini’s opinion, such as a convulsive movement of sentiments 
and differing interests with the sole aim of gaining people’s approval (2018). “These 
sentiments affect the intellect’s judgment and can lead…to the weakening of the exact 
perception of reality” (Sturzo, 2007:235). Fascism’s rise resulted both from these 
sentiments and an individualistic democracy that excluded all intermediate organisms, 
to connect politicians to citizens directly. On the other hand popularism’s paramount 
aim is the liberal State’s democratic transformation, the centralized State’s shift to a 
decentralized one; the purpose is for regional institutions to gain administrative 
autonomy, hence organically connecting society to institutions (Antonietti, Agensir, 
2019). As a means to strengthen democracy and prevent extremist ways, Sturzo 
strived for the people, government and regions’ ruling. The people can act as a moral 
force and limit those in power, while the democratic government controls popular 
sovereignty. Freedom and authority “should be employed so to prevent, if one is to 
exceed, the other re-establishes the equilibrium” (Sturzo, 1960: 228; Mattesini, 2018). 
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Popularism was born as a direct consequence of populist dictatorships’ unmediated 
ruling.  
 
Popularism views society as constituted by collective bodies with differing interests, 
thus agrees with Mouffe that it cannot be reduced to a single will (Mattesini, 2018 
Mouffe, 2013). The PPI, while not representing any specific class, aimed for 
conviviality to appear through the representation of rural, professional, middle, 
industrial workers and artisan classes. With Italy’s public interest at heart, Sturzo 
wished to shape the new ruling classes, and the debate concerning the country’s 
development in its post-war’s poverty wake (Istituto Sturzo, 2019). Mattesini argues 
Sturzo’s pragmatism allowed such to become one of Italy’s most coherently secular 
politicians. Popularism’s relativism both recognizes individuals’ agonistic views and 
is a key difference to populist propaganda: Sturzo did not hold a Messianic vision of 
politics nor did he promise a “perfect” society. “We negate the idea that we can 
achieve a perfect state…an absolute good” (Sturzo, 1923:166; 2018). As historical 
and Christian teachings underline the relativity of each present moment, popularism 
prioritizes the pacifying values that it considers irrepressible, above politics. The 
Church’s teaching, such as a communitarian demonstration of love, is perceived as 
being superior to political likings. Istituto Sturzo’s educational comparison employs a 
brief outline of populism and popularism’s similarities to emphasize the former’s 
“healthy” traits: both are born from societal anxieties fostered from marginalization, 
and Sturzo’s strong language and request for referendums could be classified as 
populist. While advocating for a decentralized Government, Sturzo noted the State is 
a “large octopus that absorbs community life” (Sturzo, 1958:273; Mattesini, 2018). 
Nonetheless popularism is the sole ideology that can truly mobilize social forces. 
Nicola Antonietti, the President, mentions Sturzo’s antagonism to fascism originated 
from this ideology’s annulling of citizens through an illusory pan-collectiveness, 
which then led to the cancelling of all other parties in the name of the “people” 
(Antonietti, Agensir, 2019; Mattesini, 2018). Istituto Sturzo’s historical predisposition 
is demonstrated through the recounting of popularism’s birth. Populism and 
popularism cannot be considered synonymous: Sturzo was fervently critical of 
society’s representation as amorphous.  
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Political affairs should not be a minority’s concern (Mouffe, 2013). Similarly to 
Fondazione Feltrinelli and Basso, the Institute promotes citizens’ political 
engagement. A cycle of events was inaugurated on the Appeal’s centenary to 
specifically discuss populism and popularism’s differences, and to call for citizen’s 
political involvement (Popolarismo e Populismo, 2019). Populism threatens 
democracy itself, by weakening rational thought: “as Italians we must have the 
courage of being self-aware so to abandon our fears…Europe constitutes a living-
together society” (Antonetti, 2018). Italy cannot exist without Europe, whose 
diversity is juxtaposed to radicalization. Moreover, the concept of “people” rests on 
that of “freedom” in popularism, which in turn is linked to “truth”. The latter is 
achieved when society is accurately represented through its bottom-up needs 
(Garavaglia, 2019). “People” also entails democracy, which would become a regime 
if lacking freedom, just as freedom without democracy entails freedom solely for 
privileged classes (Mattesini, 2018). One of Sturzo’s most celebrated achievements 
was getting a proportional law approved, with the objective of rendering the 
bourgeoisie’s parties the agonistic opposition, rather than advocating their 
elimination. On top of people and democracy’s mutually regulative ways, the 
proposition that the representational system should act as a synthesis between the 
State and society is constitutive of popularism. This should not be confused with 
direct democracy. Within the study of societies modifications’ “medical” purpose, 
popularism is repeatedly presented as an antidote to populism, both by the Institute’s 
lecturers and vice-president (Pennisi, popolarismo vs. populismo, 2018; Di Giovanni, 
2019). Popularism’s intermediate bodies must function as a means to increase 
individuals’ political involvement: their need arises from parties’ inability to represent 
all. Popularism is an inclusive and institutional integration ideology, whereas 
populism’s direct democracy can solely build a fictional democratic context, given the 
“superior” society it publicizes and its lacking mediation; it innately works against 
harmonization. The populist negation of intermediation threatens the democratic 
modern structure, as contemporary parties are in severe crisis. The latter cannot 
substitute the government, as those elected require a moral responsibility that ties 
them to the State (Garavaglia, 2019). The us-against-the-elite rhetoric is opposed, due 
to its homogenization and anti-institutional ways, to Sturzo’s democratic active 
participation (Mattesini, 2018). The people, regions and governments’ sovereignty 
has remained as topical as it was during fascism’s rise, given popularism’s inclusive 
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and engaging politics can counter populism’s illusory voicing of the people. The 
truthful representation of society and people’s political engagement can act as 
populism’s antidote. Istituto Sturzo directly opposes populism through the delineating 
of its fallacious and antidemocratic characteristics, as compared to popularism’s 
restorative ways. A peculiar counter-hegemonic practice through the promotion of a 
single ideology is noticed in this cultural institution.   
 
Political regression is Istituto Sturzo’s primary enemy. It recently inaugurated its 5th 
political formation course, concerning the study of the Italian Constitution given the 
contemporary troubling of the cohesive and representative features of democratic life 
("la Costituzione Repubblicana", 2019). To reduce the distance between politics and 
the youth, this was complemented by a course for students on political analysis and its 
challenges, while another course particularly aimed to support all citizens in the lead 
up to the European 2019 elections (le Ragioni e I Limiti della Politica, 2019; Per una 
Nuova Consapevolezza Politica, 2019). Citizens’ political involvement and voting are 
considered essential to prevent democracy’s collapse. Notwithstanding the erroneous 
association and assonance, popularism is the negation of populism (Garavaglia, 
2019). Populism is led by individualism, as opposed to common good, and its 
celebration of the people is a symptom of its ideological poverty. It is believed Sturzo 
would be distraught by the association between M5S-Lega’s Government Contract 
and the volontè generalè, given its negation of mediation (2019). The struggle for 
secularism promoted by Sturzo included the avoidance of confessionalism – a de 
facto mixture of politics and religion. Populism’s negation of popularism materializes 
digitally in the Five Star platform’s confessionalist dogmatism; it is all but 
autonomous from an ecclesiastic hierarchy, a top-to-bottom ruling (Di Giovanni, 
2019). Again, the Appeal maintains an impressive relevance today, as popularism’s 
antidotal nature also derives from its just, communitarian attributes. Sturzo’s 
convivial interest included his hope for societies’ pacification, disarming, freedom of 
seas and thus welcoming of migrants. His pro-Europe stance was intended to prevent 
nationalism from causing future wars (Antonietti, Agensir, 2019; Di Giovanni, 2019). 
Popularism’s love for thy neighbour is strongly opposed to the Lega’s politics of 
borders. This individualistic extremism precisely constitutes as political regression 
according to popularism’s pluralistic view. The Institute’s educational and historical 
roles demonstrate versatility: the advocating for a living-together-society is 
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complemented by a formation course surrounding the analysis of Europe’s migratory 
waves and integration processes (La Sfida dell'Integrazione in Italia e Europa, 2019). 
Therefore, not only do the differences between populism and popularism far surpass 
their similarities, popularism’s representative system and communitarian notions are 
viewed by Istituto Sturzo as an antidote to populism. Agonistic views are 
acknowledged as legitimate in politics, given difference is constitutive of society, 
however the Institute employs its privileged position and Sturzo’s ideology to 
compare and oppose the populist hegemonic order. The debate, compared to 
Fondazione Basso and Feltrinelli, is limited to the discussing of two specific 
ideologies – populism and popularism – and the support of the latter. 
 
Istituto Sturzo shares with Fondazione Feltrinelli and Basso its epistemological and 
historical aims, its counter-hegemonic harmonizing practice and citizens’ call to 
action; nonetheless its approach is unique among the Italian cultural landscape 
outlined, as popularism is employed as a means to compare and contrast populism. 
Fondazione Basso valorizes rights yet explores multiple and at times antagonistic 
opinions; Istituto Sturzo however solely considers popularism and argues such can act 
as populism’s antidote, to which it owes its continuous topicality. Sturzo’s ethical and 
just views are capable of reinventing social living (Azétsop, popolarismo vs. 
populismo, 2018). Istituto Sturzo’s historical referencing appears through the 
emphasis of popularism’s origin, such as the ideological countering of populist 
dicatorship’s anti-rationalist, convulsive movements through centrist, pacifying 
values. The latter are said to be above politics themselves. Whilst both populism and 
popularism emerged as a consequence of inequality, the two are strongly opposed. 
Populism’s anti-institutionalism and anti-welcoming stance juxtaposes popularism’s 
intermediate bodies, diversity and inclusiveness - through which it can overturn the 
former. The Institute defines popularism by its truhtful representation of society and 
thus convivial ways, by condemning populism’s illusory democracy and Messianic 
portrayal of politics. “Popular” signifies citizens’ participation in civil life, which are 
vital to the opposing of politics’ regression as well. Therefore the educational scope 
of the Institute limits its culture of inquiry; the countering of common-sense populist 
notions focuses on a popularist analysis while advocating for the latter’s consensus. 
As outlined in the next sub-chapter, secularism can be supported by one priest and 
detested by others.    
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4.3: Istituto Dignitatis Humanae’s populist crusade 
 
Bannon15 referred to the Istituto Dignitatis Humanae (DHI) by proudly noting: “we 
call it the school for gladiators” (Corriere, 2019). The Trisulti Abbey, lost in the 
Italian Apennine mountains, has been the home to monks’ prayer and distinguished 
pharmacology for 8 centuries, however will soon be turned into a political school to 
create the populist leaders of the future. The DHI16 is a think-tank founded in 2008 by 
Benjamin Harnwell, one of Bannon’s close associates, whose goal is to protect human 
dignity based on the anthropological truth that man is born in the image and likeness 
of God. “DHI is a direct response to growing secularist intolerance to Christians that 
has led to myriads of attacks on human dignity” (DHI, 2019); Judeo-Christian values 
are perceived as the basis of Western civilization. When the Renzi Government issued 
a request for Trisulti’s tender  - which often occurs with historical buildings that 
require maintenance - Harnwell assured he would pursue its original nature, cultural 
activities, and signed a 19-year lease (Washington Post, 2018; DHI, 2019). 
Notwithstanding Trisulti inhabitants’ opposition to DHI, the populist school is set to 
open in Rome in the summer of 2019 and move into the Abbey once its renovation is 
complete (Bannon, 2019). Bannon sees Italy as the perfect political lab and was one 
of the architects behind the M5S-Lega coalition (Il Giornale, 2019). The latter 
synthetizes Bannon’s values, populism and souverainism: these will be taught through 
the disciplines of history, media studies, economics, theology and philosophy 
(Panorama, 2018). The traditionalist students (“agents of change”) will be 27 to 40 
year olds, and will be exposed primarily to the teachings of Bannon and Cardinal 
Burke, a fighter for the “culture of life” over abortion (Washington Post, 2018). 
Dignity is the focus of DHI’s research, articles, conferences and press releases. This 
Institute’s hegemonic analysis is considered vital to the paper. Whilst the Italian 
populist government cannot be considered directly linked to the populist school, 
Bannon has met with both Di Maio and Salvini - who has ties with the Honorary 
President, Cardinal Burke (DHI, 2019).  
 
 
15 Steve Bannon is a media strategist who served during the first 7 months of President Trump’s 
term.  
16 The Institute is active in political lobbying, even in Italy’s Chamber (Panorama, 2018). 
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“Do we have the confidence in our values to defend them at any cost?” (DHI, Motoca, 
2017). DHI’s Research Director, Motoca, celebrated the speech given by Trump in 
Poland. Each human life’s dignity and freedom should be protected, from conception 
to natural death, however an internal enemy threatens these notions: the rejection of 
Western principles. Harnwell participated in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Dignity’s writing and emphasizes how human rights and suffrage are manifestations 
of the Judeo-Christian tradition (Panorama, 2018). Nonetheless the latter innate 
values and Christian public voice are weakened by secularists’ intimidations. In 1975 
Pope Paul VI was already concerned with growing secularization. Today secularism’s 
corruption appears through pervasive media’s anti-life promotion, and in “maternal 
health” and homosexual “marriage”. The culture of life must surpass that of death: the 
galvanized anti-life agenda of mass media has corrupted the consciences of the law 
written by God on all (Cardinal Burke, 2019). England’s healthcare system uses the 
remains of aborted babies in its “waste-to-energy” scheme, and incinerated 15,000 
foetuses between 2012-2014 (DHI, 2014). The DHI’s Chairman, Luca Volonté 
(fitting name), argues state-sanctioned crimes as this are hostile towards Christianity: 
“we consider our Western society to be the most advanced” however “ a society that 
values recycling efficiency over humanity’s dignity is one that does not have long to 
survive”(DHI, 2014). Further, the UN structures its third world support through 
contraception, disguising population control through women’s health (DHI, Burke, 
2013). Also, the Lunacek Report discussed in the European Parliament far from 
bolstering LGBTIQ rights, politically favours such group. The Report includes 
measures to implement the LGBTIQ lobby in all areas of the EU legislation, as it 
posits that the current laws restrict its freedom of expression (DHI, 2014). The DHI 
supposes the eradication of freedom of expression restrictions’ will give LGBTIQ 
organizations the immunity from limitations applied to everyone else. This will fatally 
undermine the universality of human rights’ applicability by turning dignity into an 
arbitrary political allocation (2014). Christians’ superior holding of the moral law’s 
truth is no longer tolerated (DHI, Burke, 2013). “Dignity” and “truth”, as intended by 
the Institute, are fervently distant to the same terms employed until now. The DHI 
supposes Christian values to be inviolable and natural thus leads a crusade for God’s 
truth. Despite secularism and opposed to Mouffe’s refusal of the Universalist 
approach which presupposes Western modernity’s authority, the DHI posits that a 
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harmonic pro-life, pro-family consensus can arise given the universality of Judeo-
Christian notions. 
 
Populists initiate states of crisis (Moffit, 2016). This feature is recurring in the 
Institute’s teachings: the mothers of the English foetuses were supposedly not warned 
about the waste scheme, just as the Irish same-sex marriage vote constituted a threat 
to religious freedom, however Facebook told its employees to vote “yes” (DHI, 
2015). Churches risk being brought to court if they refuse to celebrate same-sex 
marriages, given the Constitution will not protect their freedom. Bannon’s ideology is 
constituted by two crisis elements: Islamic fascism and the corrupt elite. In 2016 the 
strategist noted a global war with jihadists was metastasizing between the West, ISIS 
and Boko Haram. “Trust me, it is coming to Europe” (DHI, 2016). Burke and 
Bannon’s views are mutual, as Bannon notes he represents a pro-life and pro-family 
movement, whilst the former thinks Islam acts as if it were destined to rule the world 
(NCR, 2019). Burke admits the Church must be generous with vulnerable individuals, 
however not with Muslims; the Pope himself fails to see such are typically 
opportunists. In fact, Europe’s moral collapse is partly to blame on Muslims’ influx 
and their pervading beliefs (2019). Burke’s educational role parallels the 
Government’s anti-pluralistic paranoia, yet identifies a Christian responsibility within 
migrants’ welcoming: instructing such on true as opposed to bankrupt culture. The 
DHI is an institution whose teaching mirrors Italy’s xenophobic consensus by 
perpetuating a state of crisis and arguing that limiting “Muslim immigration is…a 
responsible act of one’s patriotism” (2019). Mutual opinions show, rather than 
agonistic ones, through the demonization of secularism and migrants. An oxymoron 
manifests in universal “dignity’s” specific attribution. It is solely linked to those who 
do not “exploit” their rights in the European Government, as the LGBTIQ 
organizations, or those who do not seek asylum opportunistically. Truth to power is 
not spoken while a clear-cut anti-pluralism appears: what is considered “truth” is 
everyone’s likeness to God, which brings illegitimacy to those who do not share this 
view.  
 
Enlightened capitalism is another vital aspect in Bannon’s legacy. Capitalism’s Judeo-
Christian foundation has the capability of creating peace (DHI, 2016). Before 
capitalism’s crisis – which is associated to secularism’s sapping of the Judeo-
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Christian West’s strength – this order created a Pax Americana whilst generating 
tremendous wealth in the past century. Bannon disapproves of state-sponsored 
capitalism, as that in China, and the Objectivist School of libertarian capitalism; 
respectively one creates wealth for a minority and the other turns people into 
commodities. Individuals have the God-given right to work and accumulate wealth 
(Smith, 1776). Nonetheless this can only occur through “hard” capitalism, not one 
where crony “fat cats” who pretend to be conservative garner all the benefits (DHI, 
2016). One proposes crusade rhetoric originating from the state of crisis is intrinsic to 
populists’ discourse; in Bannon’s case the war is a hard capitalist, anti-Muslim 
populist one. Bannon describes himself as the centre-right populist movement’s voice, 
who represents the working and middle classes tired of being dictated by the 
corrupted, educated elite: “it is all the institutions…who forcibly took all the benefits” 
(2016). The rise of Breitbart is directly tied to this global revolt. What constitutes a 
“freedom-loving” capitalism is that which follows Christian values by reinvesting 
positively and sharing with the working and middle classes, hence avoiding cronyism. 
The DHI antagonizes all other forms of capitalism that are not hard, promotes the 
validity of this order and its benefits, and advocates for Italy’s souverainism. The 
Institute in fact also self-identifies as a Souverainism Academy, given its anti-Europe 
stance. Harnwell started promoting Italy’s souverainism after having worked in the 
European Government - a vacuous institution that solely benefits those who work in it 
(Il Sovranismo e' Il Futuro Dell'Europa?, 2019). Nations’ regaining of sovereignty is a 
democratic matter, as it will allow them to defend their own rather than supranational 
economic interests. The Institute’s souverainism educational role hopes to form the 
future ruling class mostly through cultural values (Il Giornale, 2019). The DHI 
supports the credo that there is no alternative to (enlightened) capitalism and 
demonstrates the widely discussed populist anti-institutionalism through the 
opposition of the educated elite and Europe. Bannon perceives himself as the people’s 
voice and underlines the crusade rhetoric within the crisis discourse by noting the 
Western and capitalist crisis: “it is incumbent to really think about our role in this 
battle that is before us” (DHI, 2016).  
 
The home of Italy’s pharmacology might become the heart of its disease. Bannon 
understands Rome as the political universe’s centre and hopes to largely impact 
European elections (Panorama, 2018). Luckily Trisulti inhabitants’ unrest has been 
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echoed by the Ministry of Culture, which is currently considering whether to revoke 
DHI’s concession of space, given the inconsistencies noticed in the application’s 
specified purpose (safe-guarding, valorisation) and its actual religious-political scope 
(Repubblica, 2019). The DHI emphasizes it will use every source at its disposal to 
fight this revoke, thus battle for the Judeo-Christian West (Washington Post, 2019). 
Whilst the DHI’s politico-educational scope’s concretization is uncertain, the 
outlining of its role sheds light on a unique Italian populist cultural institution, 
endorsed by the strategist behind the most infamous populist, Trump. Not all 
institutions in the Peninsula act counter-hegemonically to anti-institutional beliefs. 
Fondazione Feltrinelli, Basso and Istituto Sturzo’s cultures of enquiry, educational 
and historical courter-populist purposes are strongly juxtaposed to DHI’s anti-
pluralistic paranoia and hard capitalist promotion; as are their employments of terms 
as “truth” and “dignity”. Fondazione Basso attributes dignity regardless of nationality 
and religion, while Istituto Sturzo secularly distinguishes its Christian credos from its 
political view, or truth. DHI on the other hand argues against gay marriage, 
immigrants’ welcoming and regards its responsibility to be populist gladiators’ 
forming. The persecution of Christians – which is at its highpoint - and populists is 
noted as secularism’s victory, which disregards universal values as traditional 
families. Its self-given role is to teach the populist ruling class through a crusade 
rhetoric – noticed even in its violent response to the revoke - and state of crisis. Facts 
in the face of power are prevented by Bannon and Cardinal Burke’s anti-Muslim, 
anti-corrupt elite “voicing of the people”. All men must respect each other’s dignity 
however, oxymoronically, one is only given innate rights if he conforms to the 
“superior” foundations of Western civilization. If Trisulti does become a populist 
haeven, Harnwell predicts future leaders will descend the mountaints to Rome, to 






Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
 
Nowadays, above a sea of uncertainty and lost canons of truth and power, individuals 
are required to make funambulism their profession. A global disenchantment with 
mainstream politics is currently taking place within the age of anger; populist 
politicians capitalize on such moment and innate binary thinking. Humans draw 
differences in the world to allow for its understanding (Levy-Strauss, 1962). 
Traditional dichotomies as night and day have been paralleled by the ubiquity of 
populists’ ideology: “pure people” and the “corrupt elite”. As noted in chapter 2, the 
populist echoing of the people’s voice is a preliminary definition of such leaders’ anti-
pluralistic and illusory impersonification. The persuasive “people vs. elite” rhetoric 
allows populists’ symbolic enrichment through the gaining of the status of “sole 
representative”, and thrives on the problematic and flexible depiction of society as 
homogenous. The cross-cultural discontent, which led to the silent majority’s 
antagonism to the establishment, originated from technocracy’s induced 
powerlessness sentiment. The inequality and contradictions brought about by 
hyperglobalization and the 2008 crisis exacerbated the people’s need to restore 
control. Populism is the regime of the majority (Urbinati et. al, 2018). The neoliberal 
order’s decline in legitimacy corresponds to the troubled consensus over values. 
Paradoxically, while capitalism’s individualistic traits are being overturned, personal 
beliefs construct post-truth public opinions in the crises of knowledge. Technology is 
redefining knowledge, given excessive information, speed and fake news are causing 
individuals’ refusal of reason. As the long-standing authority of all knowledge 
production logics crumbles due to distrust, individuals seek refuge in digital echo 
chambers of like-minded people; algorithms enhance these ideological safe spaces’ 
sharing of alternative facts. Such arenas foster a fundamental populist trait: affect. 
This internship report’s conceptual framework emphasizes how all information today 
can be politicized and is typically polarized. Emotionality prevents critical thinking 
and is furthered by populists’ spectacle, the dismissing of dominant notions through 
the “us-them” narrative.  
 
5000 refugees drowned in the Mediterranean in 2015 (Weiwei, 2017). Emotion does 
not equate to humanity, as populists often construct their representation through 
migrants’ othering. Salvini’s narrative of invasion generates consensus. A contra-
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culture – an unethical group’s conflict with the dominant culture - is noticed in Italian 
populists’ oppositional notions, which travelled from being a revolt movement to an 
extremist Government. What the “’immoral elite’ supposedly have always done, the 
populists will end up doing…with a democratic justification” (Müller, 2016: 49). 
Salvini’s anti-pluralist narrative of invasion purposefully enhances the crises of 
knowledge through a state of alarm. The M5S employ a demagogic spectacle as well, 
through the alleged restoration of dignity and thus control to people thanks to citizens’ 
income; and by eroding one of the Enlightenment’s conquests, science, through its 
anti-vaccine claims. The populist moment’s cancelling of debate through its 
simplification intensifies the need for epistemological individuals, intellectuals, and 
places, cultural institutions. Privilege is intrinsic to intellectuals’ societal role. 
Specifically, their truth-telling capabilities must be employed in the face of power. 
Intellectuals can decide whether to support mainstream values, however cannot ignore 
their responsibility. 
 
Fondazione Feltrinelli, Fondazione Basso and Istituto Sturzo’s intellectualism 
demonstrate Italian cultural institutions’ employment of their privileged role to act as 
counter-hegemonic forces to populist ideals. Populism is in tension with agonistic 
dialogue, which is promoted by Fondazione Feltrinelli’s research, comparison of 
polyphonic views, interdisciplinarity, truth-seeking and historical references. To 
study, communicate and share guides the ideology of this educational, social and 
political institution, whose analysis and opposition to populism incremented with the 
establishment of the coalition. Whilst Fondazione’s political responsibility increased 
in Stagione Capitale, such acts in a holistic manner as a service to citizens: in line 
with individuals’ pre-election guidance through left and right lectures, it aims for 
democracy’s strengthening. Populism’s anti-conviviality is a symptom of 
democracy’s crisis and Fondazione posits the countering of the capitalist order will 
enhance democracy. The role of cultural institutions, given Italy’s emerging 
populism, is typically associated to a culture of enquiry and development of a plural 
common-sense, hence an educational duty shows. Fondazione Basso similarly to 
Feltrinelli utilizes the meeting of historical and contemporary fact-sharing references, 
while prioritizing the value of human rights in its debate. Istituto Sturzo has a specific 
scope within its educational purpose as well: its counter-hegemonic harmonizing 
practices and call-to-action occur through its comparison and contrast of populism 
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and popularism. Conversely, the Istituto Dignitatis Humanae is a formation school 
that hopes to form future populist gladiators through its crusade rhetoric, pluralistic 
paranoia and enlightened capitalism. Its state of crisis’ “epistemological” role 
promotes an oxymoronic dignity, through pro-life and anti-Muslim credos. The 
institutions outlined in the Italian cultural landscape believe they bear the duty to 
nurture change through reflection in times of bewilderment, with the exception of the 
Istituto Dignitatis Humanae. Intellectuals must act as decent human beings and 
support values of peace, truth and freedom (Chomsky, 2011): what is the extent to 
which Italian cultural institutions have succeeded in developing convivial ideals 
within public opinion? While such research must continue, the current paper points to 
Fondazione Feltrinelli’s key positioning among Italian institutions, given its 
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